


# IJDL



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
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The manuscripts of articles should be submitted in *triplicate* typed double space with wide margins. Language data should be underlined with meaning in inverted commas. The system of footnoting and listing of bibliography will be those adopted in *Language*. The article if theoretically important will be treated as in *Current Anthropology* and published with comments and replies. Fifty offprints will be issued free of cost to the authors. Classical papers which are out of print will also be republished, if there is demand.



K P Verma

*International Journal of Dravidian Linguistics*



## **LANGUAGE MODERNIZATION : EXPLORATIONS IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF REGISTERS**

**Shivendra K. Verma**  
*CIEFL, Hyderabad*

This paper attempts to present 'language modernization' as a multidimensional process of register creation and register creation as a process of language change. Modernization is a cluster-concept; it represents a complex network of processes and mechanisms by which languages change and expand their resources to meet the demands of the presentday social, cultural, economic, industrial, and technological needs. At the conceptual level 'modernization of Indian languages' means using Indian languages to express new ideas, new attitudes, new concepts and new interpretations. At the formal level it represents a set of linguistic strategies which languages use in order to play new roles, express new meanings, and function as as effective companions of new communication technologies: the teleprinter, the printing press, the radio and television, and communication satellites. At the educational level the introduction of the Indian languages as official state languages and as media of instruction represents a marked move in the direction of language expansion. Modernization should not be equated with westernization, for 'the west' is a point in space and 'modern' a point in time—time which is present and also 'past in present'. The modern man, whether he belongs to the East or to the West must keep pace with a reality that is dynamic and constantly changing. "We can say that the modernization process of the Asian and African languages is a projection of the modernization of the Asian and African societies and cultures themselves" (Alisjabana, 1976, p. 25).

Hindi and the other major languages of India have begun to play a variety of new roles in order to fulfil the demands



of urbanization, rising literacy, increasing media exposure, industrialization, technological expansion and a new system of education. When a language has to play a set of new roles, it has to create a set of new registers appropriate to the new roles. According to Halliday (1964, p. 87) :

“The category of ‘register’ is needed when we want to account for what people do with their language. When we observe language activity in the various contexts in which it takes place, we find differences in the type of language selected as appropriate to different type of situation”.

Halliday (1978, p. 195) relates register to a set of new meanings “that is appropriate to a particular function of language, together with the words and structures which express these meanings. We can refer to a ‘mathematics register’, in the sense of the meanings that belong to the language of mathematics (the mathematical use of natural language, that is : not mathematics itself), and that a language must express if it is being used for mathematical purposes .... It is the meanings, including the styles of meanings and modes of argument, that constitute a register, rather than the words and structures as such. In order to express new meanings, it may be necessary to invent new words : but there are many different ways in which a language can add new meanings, and inventing words is only one of them.” The pattern of social and economic life in India has been changing at a fast pace for quite sometime. Efforts are being made by academies, translation units, commissions for scientific and technical terminology and by writers to shape the major Indian languages in such a way as to enable them to articulate those ideas, views, and visions which are characteristic of a brave new world. The processes of shaping a language to meet new communicative needs involve borrowing words from other languages and also extending and modifying the use of existing lexical items. It has been said again and again that English has a large stock of words and phrases to express complex and subtle notions in the areas of science, law, administration, trade, and commerce. It has a vast body of literature on these disciplines. The Indian languages do not have such a body of literature and a network of words. English therefore is a developed language whereas the Indian languages are not. We do not believe in subcategorizing languages into ‘developed’, ‘underdeveloped’, and ‘developing’ languages. Our assumption is that every language has a built-in potential for expanding its lexical resources and thereby fulfilling the communicative demands of people who use it. Languages change and grow by being made to



function in newer contexts and newer interactions. There is no such thing as an inefficient language or a language that cannot be shaped to function as a tool of modern scientific knowledge. No language is inherently incapable of creating any particular register or a range of registers to express the communicative tensions of a community: 'no language is any less qualified to be the vehicle of modern science and technology than were English and Russian some centuries ago' (Halliday, 1964, pp. 100-101). The linguistic repertoire of a community is derived from the range of uses that language is put to in that particular culture. A creative artist or a scientist may on occasion be impatient with his language, but he never finds his language poor and inadequate. Whenever there is an impassioned interaction between his personality and his language, a set of new and vital idioms comes out to meet new demands, to create new registers, and also to sharpen and refine the existing registral tools. This does not mean that all languages convey exactly the same meaning, have the same range of registers, and the same set of 'register markers'. "The concept of register seems to be a language universal but the formal realizations of registral features tend to vary from language to language" (Verma, 1969, p. 299). The point that we are stressing here is that language is a meaning potential: it is what its speakers can make it do. What a particular language is actually doing now is a context-governed and use-determined externalization of what it can do. Language does not exist in isolation: it comes to life only when functioning in some environment. The concept of context has been used here not only to mean an actual situation, that is, 'what is going on at the time': the situation in which language is actualized and comes to life, but also to refer to the total set of possible environments in which the 'creativity' of language, that is the extension of its resources, can be realized. This functional approach to language based on 'meaning potential' shows that 'language is as it is because of the functions it has evolved to serve in people's lives' (Halliday, 1978, p. 4).

The languages of India have been in a state of creative tension for quite sometime—trying to fulfil the needs and aspirations of their users who find themselves sandwiched between two cultures. As a result of this the languages have experienced a pull in two directions—'nativization' and 'westernization'. 'Nativization' in this context refers to the exploration of native resources—drawing on Sanskrit (i.e. classicalization), on the Indian languages in contact, and also on dialectal resources. 'Westernization' refers to the processes by which technical words and phrases from



western languages (specially from English) have been introduced into the systems of Indian languages. A natural result of the interaction between English and Indian languages has been the creation of a variety of mixed codes arising out of the processes of mixing words and phrases, and switching codes in the same discourse. These changes are changes in the direction of 'language modernization'—equipping languages for functioning in new settings. Haugen (1966) refers to it as 'elaboration of function'. We would like to call it 'register creation' i.e. creation of one or more new language varieties to meet the demands of rapid technical innovation and 'fashions of speaking and writing'. The key concept here is that of 'creating new registers and subregisters' in a language in order to enable it to function effectively in new situations. It is a fallacy to say that a language should first be 'developed', then be put to use in new domains. What do we actually mean by 'developing a language'? An undeveloped language is a language that has not been used in all the functions that a language serves in a society. If a language looks undeveloped or underdeveloped in certain areas, it simply means that it has not been used in those areas. For some political or social or economic reason the users of language 'A' have used language 'B' in the areas referred to above. One of the meanings of the expression 'developing a language' like 'developing a film' may be to bring out what is already latent there. The history of languages demonstrates convincingly that there is no such thing as an inherently handicapped language. There is no such thing as a language more suited, by its nature, to science and technology. All the so-called great languages of today were once undeveloped. "English in medieval England was not a developed language, since many of the social functions of language in the community could be performed only in Latin or in French" (Halliday, 1978, p. 194). We would like to say that any language is as good as any other language in the sense that every language is well adapted to the uses to which the community puts it. "The notion of 'developing a language' means...adding to its range of social functions. This is achieved by developing new registers" (Halliday, 1978, p. 195).

Developmental changes in a contact situation are normally not unidirectional: they are bidirectional and circular. Consider the following:

doctor                      ḍaaktar  
 English    →    Hindi    →    English

The English lexical item 'doctor' was borrowed by Hindi during the early years of borrowing. It acquired a new phonological



and an expanded semantic value in the system of Hindi and was again fed back into English used in the Hindi-speaking area.

dhobii                      dobi  
Hindi      →      English      →      Hindi

The Hindi lexical item 'dhobii' was borrowed into English during the early days of the British Empire in India. It acquired a new phonological value in the system of English and was again fed back into the Hindi used by Englishmen and also by Indian 'sahibs' (i. e. by Indians for whom English was/is their mothertongue). Hindi-English bilingualism has generated two processes — Englishization or Anglicization of Hindi and Indianization or Hindiazation of English. Hindi and the other major language of India have successfully exploited the resources of bilingualism in extending the domain of their functions. Code-switching and code-mixing have not only added to the linguistic repertoire of English-based bilinguals in India, but have also enabled them to express a variety of new experiences — social, political economic, scientific, and technological.

Michael West wrote an excellent monograph on bilingualism in 1926, but he failed to capture the fact that a competent bilingual handles two systems which theoretically represent the same 'meaning potential'. Explaining the scope and purpose of his monograph on 'Bilingualism', Michael West (1926) has said:

"Man needs two kinds of language: he needs an expression of the 'dear and intimate things', a language of the home, the fire-side, the motherland, — a language of emotion and of unexpressed associations. He needs also a language of fact, knowledge, exact argument, scientific truth — a language in which words are world-current and steadfast in their meanings... the small languages of the world fulfil the first purpose, but as time goes on they prove more and more insufficient for the second, insufficient for the complexity, the variety, the international teamwork of languages."

It is necessary to emphasize here that the notion of 'insufficiency' has no value in sociolinguistics. What West has called 'the small languages of the world' may grow into the 'major' languages of the world. All over the world today these so-called small languages are being consciously expanded in vocabulary and standardized in spelling and grammar so that they can increasingly function as the exclusive languages of government and of higher culture and technology. We must remember as planners and educators that every human language has a network of devices for



expanding its structural and lexical resources. Theoretically there are no limits to the elaboration of language. No one should therefore be made to feel that his language is 'no good'. We must remember that "a speaker who is made ashamed of his own language habits suffers a basic injury as a human being; to make anyone, especially a child feel so ashamed is as indefensible as to make him feel ashamed of the colour of his skin" (Halliday, et al., 1964, p. 105).

Languages, as we have already said, use a variety of mechanisms to meet the demands of their users. Talking of translation as a mechanism, Catford (1965, p. 90) says: "One of the problems of translating scientific texts into certain languages which have recently become National Languages such as Hindi, is that of finding, or creating, an equivalent scientific register".


Catford has made a very important point here — the need for creating scientific registers in languages which have recently become National Languages. How do we create scientific registers? We do it by using our languages as tools of scientific knowledge by creating an atmosphere where new styles and new registers will emerge to meet new demands. A new cultural experience or a new scientific concept may necessitate adding to the symbolic resources of the language, and this can be done in a variety of ways: by borrowing words from other languages, by an extension of existing forms, by expanding the semantic range of existing or borrowed items, and by using a mixed code. The following registers in Hindi illustrate these mechanisms:

- i) ise dissection table par le jaanaa. pahle ise dissect karna. phir iskii veins and arteries nikaalnaa aur uskii microscopic examination karna.
- ii) ab ek bartan mē dahii aur gur ko acchii tarah phēṭ kar milaa lē; phir usmē sodaa aur namak ke saath moyan ke liye jaraasaa tel yaa ghii choṛ dē\* ab aate ko acchii tarah chaan kar us mishraṇ mē milaa dē aur use Kaṭṭhaa-Kaṭṭhaa gūudh lē thoṛii der tak rakhne ke baad use mancaahē aakar mē belkar madhim āac par laal tal lē (From a book on cooking).

\*Ṛ-Retroflex flap



- iii) Kroshiyaa aur yuu-pin lē. Kroshiyaa apne daaye haath mē rakhē. dhaage ke chor par luup banaa kar kroshiyaa huk mē ḍaalē. yuu-pin ko apne baayē haath mē rakhē. pin kii golaaii kaa bhaag niice kii or ho aur donō kāate uupar kii or (From a book on embroidery).
- iv) hriday-pratyaropan ke liye yah aavashak hotaa hai ki kisii aise vyakti ke shariir mē se hriday nikaalaa jaay jiskii dil kii dhaṛkanē rukii naahō. aam taurse dil kii dhaṛkan ko kisii vyaktii ke jiivit hone kaa akaatya pramaṇ maanaa jaataa hai, lekin hriday-pratyaaropan karnevaale Sarjanō ne hriday praapt karne ke liye mrityuu kii ḍaaktarii paribhaashaa kaa sahaaraa liyaa jiske anusaar mastiskke aavegōo kaa puurṇatayaa shaant paṛ jaanaa mrityuu kaa lakshaṇ hai (From a book on heart-transplantation).



In (i) Hindi has used a mixed code. The grammatical frame of the sentence is that of Hindi and all the lexical fillers have been derived from English. This is how Hindi is pushing English out of the science laboratories. In (ii) Hindi has used its native resources. There is only one loan item: Soḍaa. Hindi and the other major languages of India have had a rich tradition of producing books on cooking. In (iii) which refers to a modern western system of embroidery only the grammatical items are those of Hindi: the lexical slots are filled with English items. In (iv) which is connected with medicine and surgery Hindi has found it useful to draw on Sanskrit. These four examples prove that languages make use of a variety of strategies to enrich their repertoire of registers and play their roles effectively in terms of socio-cultural setting, topic of discourse, and addresser-addressee relationship. Hindi has drawn heavily on English to meet the demands of new knowledge in the fields of science, technology, architecture, business, commerce, administration and a number of other areas. Modern Hindi, like other modern languages, which have begun to play a variety of new roles in modern life, makes use of a variety of strategies to express modern concepts and also to externalize the reactions of Indians today to the expanding universe of science and technology around them – borrowing, hybrid formation, calquing, extending the semantic range of common words, reinterpreting existing words, creating new words out of native and non-native word-stocks, inventing totally new



thing-names, and shaping a mixed code into an effective functional tool. These strategies are pan-Indian; infact, they are pan-global. By using these strategies Hindi has created a variety of new registers and has been making these registers more and more precise and effective every year. Words and phrases are self-sharpening; the more they are used, the more pointed they become in focus. The language of cricket commentary in Hindi is much more powerful now than what it was about ten years ago. A number of new mixed phrases have been created in the language of banking. One of the marked features of these mixed nominal phrases is that the message carrying headwords are taken from English and the modifiers are drawn from Hindi.

Consider the following examples :

(a) Hindi modifier + English Headword

adarsh deposit, pragati cash certificate, surakshaa deposit, arogya cumulative deposit, kapRaa mill, sanshodhit bajeta.

(b) English modifier + Hindi Head word

Savings Bank khaataa, Social Security yojnaa, 'own your own home' yojnaa.

(c) Noun phrases made up of native elements

bacat baink khaataa jamaa parcii (for Savings Bank Account Pay-in-Slip)

These three examples [(a), (b), and (c)] show how a code's capacity can be elaborated.

Changes brought about by the following processes enable human languages to meet the needs of the changing and expanding societies for words and phrases for new objects, concepts, and places :

### **I. Borrowing :**

Borrowed items are said to function as lexical gap fillers : typing, typewriter, coupon, company, shampoo, shirtings, suitings, wrist watch, cabin, lamp, holders, firebrigade, protein, stadium, phone, dinner, lunch, belt, boeing, airbus, hydrogen, taperecorder, cassettee, umpire, pavillion, nursing home, ambulance, doctor, identity card, driver, ... We can go on enlarging this list,

We feel that the borrowed items do not necessarily 'fill lexical gaps' in a multilingual setting: they function like groups of lexical items meaning the same thing. We have Persian, English, Sanskrit and dialectal words in modern Hindi meaning the same thing but representing different stylistic choices :



Englishized	Persianized	Sanskritized
Tuberculosis (T. S.)	Tapedik	Rajyakshmaa
Asthma/aazmaa	damaa	Shvass rog

‘Rajyakshmaa’ is used in the register of Ayurveda, ‘tapedic’ in ordinary, everyday language, and ‘tuberculosis’ in the language used by modern doctors :

Modern mass media like movies, radio, television are responsible for the development of different types of style.

Borrowing is a powerful language enriching device but according to Halliday et al it can block the process of creating words out of native resources. — ‘The use of English in situations for which the  $L_1$  is adequately developed, and of English items in  $L_1$  utterances where  $L_1$  items are available, tends to inhibit the progress of the  $L_1$  towards regaining its full status in the community” (Halliday, 1964, p. 102). Nehru (1953, p. 456) was in favour of enriching Hindustani by borrowing words from English : “I would personally like to encourage Hindustani to adapt and assimilate many words from English....This is necessary as we lack modern terms, and it is better to have well-known words rather than to evolve new and difficult words from Sanskrit or Persian or Arabic. Purists object to the use of foreign words, but I think they make a great mistake.” Suniti Kumar Chatterjee, on the other hand, favoured the exploration of native resources. “Native Hindi failing we should not go to a foreign country for words which can be supplied by Sanskrit; names of new *objects* and *processes* may be European and international; for *ideas* we should have our own words” (Chatterjee, 1943, p. 29). Borrowing, we feel, has helped Hindi enrich its repertoire of registers and styles. Hindi has assimilated Persianized items (like *istiifaa*) English items like *ticket* and has also created a new set of words (like *tyagpatra*). It uses *elaan* (announcement) and *ghoshnaapatra*, *bhuukh haṛṭaal* (hunger strike) and also *anashan* as stylistic variants of the same set of concepts. It has used code-mixing, style-mixing, register-mixing, and code-switching to expand its lexicon and develop new styles and forms of discourse to serve the communicative needs of modern society.

Perso-arabic	Sanskrit	English	Mixed code
istiifaa	tyagpatra	registration	resignation denaa
arzii	aavedan (patra)	application	apply karna
nuqsaan	Kshati	loss	loss honaa



In the fields of law and administration technical terms have been drawn from Sanskrit texts, English texts, and texts in Persian/Arabic used during the Muslim rule in India.

Miithaaksharaa (Sanskrit)	Persian/Arabic	English
adhikaara	kaanuun	Decree
aparaadha	mokaddamaa	Warrant
nyaaya	dastaavej	Summons
maanahaani	dariyaafi	Notice
Danda	Sajaa	Appeal
Svaadhiina	nakal	Affidavit
	katal	Bail
	talaash	Jail

In creating the language of aviation Hindi has drawn on Sanskrit, Persian, English and also on its native resources. It has shown that it can function and is actually functioning as an effective tool.

English	Hindi
Passenger ticket and baggage check	yaatrii tikaṭ aur saamaan patra
Notice of Baggage Liability Limitations	saamaan ke baare me daayitva kii parisiimaañ kii suuchaa
Restricted Articles in Passenger Baggage	yaatrii saamaan me pratibandhit vastuuñ

Modernization of Hindi has thus taken place on two interlocking and mutually defining axes : horizontal and vertical. On the horizontal axis it presents a continuum of registers and sub-registers and on the vertical axis each register offers a continuum of styles — ranging from highly formal to highly informal on the one hand and from highly Sanskritized and Persianized to highly Englishized styles on the other. In between the two, it may be said, we have a variety of mixed codes.

## II. Extending the semantic range of words:

Words used in a non-technical sense are given a technical value:

Saakchaatkaar → appearance before someone → interview  
rekhaankita → to underscore → crossed (cheque)


The extension of existing lexical items to new situations has brought about a variety of semantic changes. Words like, अनु,



rasaayan, bhautiki, bhashiki, aakaashvani, sachivaalay are used in a technical sense. Vyavasthaa, Vikalp, Vyatirekii, sanracnaa and a host of similar words of everyday use have acquired a precise technical value in the register of linguistics. The word 'colony' in English means "country or territory settled by migrants from another country, and controlled by it; "groups of people from another country, or people with the same trade, profession or occupation, living together". In Hindi and also in Indian English it is used to mean 'a residential area' as 'Rajendra Nagar Colony' and 'Defence Colony'; 'Bathroom' in English refers to a room in which there is a bathtub (and usually a wash-hand-basin). In Hindi it is used to mean a lavatory. Ordinary everyday words like *daadaa* (elder brother/grandfather), *makkhan* (butter), and *camcaa* (spoon) have been expanded in their use to refer to 'trade union leader' 'to flatter someone' (as in *makkhan lagaanaa*) and 'trying to win favour or approval by using flattery' (as in *camcaagirii karna*). The word 'luṭnaa' has a basic meaning : 'to rob', but it is used with a special meaning in the register of Kite-flying : 'catching kites'. A linguistic unit derives its value(s) from its setting : linguistic and socio-cultural. When this unit is borrowed by another language, it carries its value along with it but it is made to function in a new linguistic and socio-cultural setting. It now derives its precise meaning from this new setting — which means that it gets either a new meaning or its old meaning is modified (reduced or expanded).

### III. Creating new words on the model of words or phrases in English :

English	Hindi
Running Commentary	aankhon dekhaa haal
Tool down proposal	kaam rokoo prastaav
Rural developmant scheme	gramiin vikaas yojanaa
Additional dearness allowance	atirikta manhgaaii bhattaa
Essential service	aavashyak sevaa
Typing	Tankan
Typist	Tankak
Technical	takniikii
Literacy	saakchartaa
Academy	akaadamii
Airhostess	aakaash kanyaa
Tug-of-war	rassaakashii
Interim	antarim





IV. Creating new words on the basis of words in Hindi :

Hindi	New words in Hindi
darshan	duur darshan
liip	lipik (clerk, writer)

V. Calquing (creating new words and phrases in imitation of another language):

English	Hindi
Complementation	puurakikaraN
Family Planning	parivaar niyojan
Test Series	Test shrinkhalaa

Note that translation is a powerful machanism for enriching vocabulary. Each translated word or set of words acquires a technical value in the system of the recipient language.

English	Hindi
Academic Council	Vidyaa parishad
Birthday party	janmdin paartii
Bowling	gaindbaazii
release (of a book)	vimochan
hospital	aspataal/cikitshaalaa
Black market	kaalaa baazaar
Black money	kaala dhan
Hunger strike	anshana/bhuukh hartaal
Agitation	Aandolan
Social Welfare	Samaj kalyaan

Languages use different modes of word-creation. What is interesting here is to examine how the users of a language use different devices to create technical terms when they are faced with a compelling need for doing so. A variety of devices have been used in the language of advertisement and of newspaper headlines in Hindi. Syntactic mechanisms like front-shifting, compounding, and gapping have been used (i) to mark certain items of news as prominent (ii) for compressing a number of items into one phrase for precision, (iii) for topicalization (for highlighting items).

- |  |   |
|--|---|
| i) <i>Dehulti</i>                      | : hinsaa kaa laavaa phir phuutaa                        |
| ii) hiire jaisii dhaar<br>vaalaa blade | : <i>Erasmic Stainless Supreme</i>                      |
| iii) <i>Cerelac</i>                    | : aapke bacca ke liye ek<br>svaadishṭa sampuurna aahaar |



Here in (i) and (iii) the objects of discourse have been brought into focus by placing them in the first position. In (ii) back-shifting has been used as a syntactic mechanism to draw the attention of readers and listeners to the object of discourse. (The objects of discourse have been underlined). These lexical and structural innovations show how Hindi has been sharpening its registral tools to make the language of newspaper headlines and advertisements meaningful. "The fact of change in a language over a period of time is well established, and it would appear that in this change a language undergoes a process of development which is analogous to the process to which the term *evolution* is applied in the biological fields, and it would appear unnecessarily pedantic to deny the use of the term to language development. A language thus may legitimately be said to evolve" (Brosnahan, 1961. p. 235).

In creating the register of administration Hindi has used its native resources and also borrowed words from English, Sanskrit, and Persian. In this process of performing new functions Hindi has undergone some degree of 'stretching'. Consider the following examples:

English	Hindi	Remarks
Appear for interview	Saakchaatkaar ke liye upasthit hoiye	'saakchaatkaar' used in a technical sense
As directed	yathaanideshit	based on Sanskrit
As desired	yathaa vaanchit	„ „ „
As early as possible	yathaa shiighra	based on Sanskrit
As far as possible	yathaa sambhav	„ „ „
Certified copy	pramaṇit prati	„ „ „
Delay is regretted	vilamb ke liye khed hai	Sanskrit + native words
For enquiry and report	jaach aur prativedan ke liye	native + Sanskrit words
Tour programme	daure kaa kaaryakrama	Persian + Sanskrit words
Halt at Calcutta	haalṭa kalkatte mē	English + native words
Anti Malaria Unit	Maleriyaa rodhak yuunit	English + Sanskrit + English words
Central Tractor Organization	Kendriyaa Tracktar Sangathan	Sanskrit + English + Sanskrit words



These examples show how Hindi has drawn on the languages it has come into contact with in order to enrich itself and has succeeded in fulfilling the demands of people who use it. This reinforces the point made earlier on that the forms of a language are shaped and determined by what we use it for and a code's capacity can be elaborated by making it function in new situations.

English and Hindi have coexisted in an atmosphere of intense and intimate interaction for nearly two hundred years. Initially English in India meant learning the ruler's language — a new system of communication which was also a manifestation of a new culture, a new philosophy of life, and a new mode of introducing a socio-cultural process called westernization. This system of linguistic rules and cultural values started interacting with the system of Hindi and the system of Indian culture. Infact, for English-Hindi bilinguals it meant operating the rules of English and Hindi in the socio-cultural setting of India. When two systems of rules coexist in a contact situation, they get modified in a variety of ways — and generate processes like mixing, switching, and also borrowing right from the level of words to that of sentences and discourse. We have already examined lexical borrowings and innovations. At the level of syntax Hindi has favoured the use of a variety of mechanisms to play news in the modern world such as the passive ( $\pm$  dvaaraa), imperatives in books of instructions, reduced relatives, relative clauses following *vah* + Noun head, topicalizations and other devices:

i) **Passivization:**

kahaa jaataa hai ki ..... (It is said that.....)

aapko suucit kiya jaataa hai ..... (You are informed.....)

use kortẽ meẽ pesh kiya gayaa (He was produced before  
the court)

pulis ke dvaaraa jaaẽ karvaaii jaa rahii hai (investigation  
is being conducted by the police)

ii) **Imperatives:**

aayu anusaar raat ko sote samay 5 graam se 10 graam  
tak paanii ke saath deẽ

maagii gaii raashi kam kii jaae

iii) **Relative participles:**

yuunian ne biis din se cal rahii

haRtaal aajse sathagit kar dii hai

gunðo ne ghar lauṭtii hui mahilaa ko kidnaip kiya.

iv) **Full relative clauses following *vah* + Noun head:**

Sirf maargo hii vah saabun hai jo safaaii ke  
alaavaa kuch aur bhii kartaa hai



v) Use of 'ek' as an indefinite article:

yah ek laṛkii hai  
yah ek kalam hai

The following examples show how the structural resources of the Noun Phrase in Hindi have been used to express new ideas:

- |  |  |
|--|--|
| i) pancaayat rajya prañaalii<br>kii samiikshaa                                     | (A review of Panchayat<br>Rajya system)  |
| ii) apraadh aur avyavasthaa<br>kii rokthaam  | (Checking crime & disorder)  |
| iii) Cunaav niyomon men hue<br>sansodhan radd karne kaa<br>vicaar                  | (The idea of annulling the<br>amendments brought out in<br>election laws)                                  |
| iv) Vidyut parishad ke saciv<br>par samjhautaa vaartaa kii<br>avahelnaa kaa aaropa | (Allegations against the<br>Secretary of the Electricity<br>Board for ignoring settlement<br>negotiations) |

The point to be stressed here is that all these syntactic devices have a set of values in encoding and decoding messages. The changes in Hindi and the major Indian languages has led to the creation of a network of registers and sub-registers and a variety of ways of expressing registral contents. Languages show their vitality, elasticity, and creativity when they are used in new contexts. They do it by drawing (i) on their native resources. (ii) on the work done by academies, commissions, and translation units, and (iii) on the resources of languages in contact. Interaction with English, the use of mass media like the newspaper, radio, and television, and the need to verbalise ever-expanding universe around us have enabled Hindi and the major Indian languages to show how their communicative potential can be exploited to make them function efficiently by strengthening their lexical stock, sharpening their syntactic tools, and using discourse-resources.

What needs to be done is to keep on using Hindi and other major Indian languages in new situations like banking, insurance, administration, shipping, airlines and scientific discourse. In order to help these languages play their roles efficiently and effectively it is necessary to step-up work in the following areas :

Production of monolingual, bilingual and technical dictionaries, thesaurus, and encyclopaedia, and writing of descriptive and generative grammars.



It has been remarked that highly Sanskritized and/or Persianized Hindi may lead to the creation of an elitist language and English-Hindi mixed code may lead to the birth of different types of pidginized Hindi and pidginized English. This fear is based on the false assumption that language is a monolithic system: it has only one standard form. Language, in fact, is a cluster of dialectal, registral and stylistic varieties. One of the markers of the growth of Hindi today is that it has created a repertoire of styles: Persianized, Sanskritized Englishized and nativized to be used according to the demands of 'topic of discourse, addresser-addressee relationship, and socio-cultural setting'. We must remember that what sounded odd and funny yesterday sounds normal and familiar today. One of the remarkable features of human languages is its creativity — the power to generate new linguistic expressions which express new thoughts and are appropriate to new situations. This creative language use is universally present in all human languages. "All peoples, in all languages, can transform, recreate, and generate alternative forms of expression" (Ouden, 1975, p. 54). Classicalization, tradition and modernity do not represent 'polar opposites'; they are mutually defining integrative strategies used by languages to capture 'the universe around us'.

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## THE CONCEPT OF LINGUISTIC COMPETENCE IN PROCESS GRAMMAR — SOME REFLECTIONS

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### Linguistic Competence as Developmental

It will be a great error not to assume that bulk of speaking is in fact *acting*, doing something with language; speaking is, in other words, acting verbally i. e. effecting speech acts. Process Grammar begins with this assumption or insight and remains faithful to it throughout its other developments. The descriptions of the structural features such as the phonological, semantic and syntactic are descriptions that do not nullify the above observation. Consistent with this view, the general linguistic competence has to be seen as that which enables and makes in fact possible the effectations of speech acts. It is a specific capacity, perhaps peculiar only to members of Homo Sapiens, that facilitates the effectations of actions through the use of phonological strings by imposing some structures on them.

Though peculiar and specific, by virtue of the fact that it is nevertheless the *doing of something*, effecting actions, linguistic competence shares some features with what can be called 'a competence to do something' which is a general dispositional trait of *all* living things. And it consists in the abilities :

- a) to generate an *idea* of action (in whatever rudimentary manner);
- b) to *effect* an action and bring about outcomes or change of some sort or other;
- c) to note the conditions under which actions succeed or fail and generate new actions that are better *informed*.



The effecting of actions, noting of outcomes, reforming the actions and so forth constitute the *learning* aspects of living creatures in general. This learning dimension defines the universal behavioural disposition of all living creatures no matter how differentiated or undifferentiated they may be with respect to the scope and range of their abilities.

But linguistic competence is larger and more inclusive; it is a higher level of competence to do. It is not also simply a manifestation of new ability to effect actions with phonological strings through the articulation of vocal cords. What is peculiar to speaking is the ability to engage in a specific sort of *interpersonal* behaviour; a capacity for a new kind of *interactional* behaviour. The new dimension is more specifically cognitive and it can be stated as follows:

- a<sup>1</sup>) to *generate* intentions and formulate *thoughts* reflective of intentions and correspondingly to *perceive* thoughts and intentions when expressed linguistically.

When we replace (a) earlier with (a<sup>1</sup>) we have a characterisation of linguistic competence which brings out its peculiarity and simultaneously the manner in which it relates to the general competence to act.

The concept of 'thought' here needs to be clarified. The form of thought relates not alone to what the person *intends* but also to what he does. Thought then *structures* the intention but it structures it in a form that allows it to be translated into action that may bring about what is intended. The thoughts when effected as actions emerge as speech acts i. e. stating something, ridiculing, criticizing, ordering, commanding, inviting and so forth. Such effectations are also what is *intended* by the person – the reason why a person does something linguistically at all.

'Thought' is not simply then, an awareness though it is grounded on such things. For clearly there cannot be thoughts without some form of awareness or consciousness. We could say then that thoughts are *transformed* awareness, awareness restructured so that it can be acted out and hence changed into means for realizing an intention.

Now at least among human beings, as thoughts in general underlie all actions including the non-verbal, clearly in order to explain the peculiarities of linguistic competence, we have to also postulate a specific type of transformation of consciousness that would unfailingly relate thoughts thus formed to speech acts and



not other. It is not also purely the interpersonal dimensions for clearly there are non-verbal acts that are interpersonal. Assaulting somebody physically is just as interpersonal as doing the same verbally.

Linguistic competence involves, among other things, restructuring consciousness into thoughts that also *restricts* to linguistic means of acting it out or realizing intentions. Such a restructuring then presupposes *performance* – the actual effectations of verbal actions.

From the perspectives of Process Grammar then, linguistic competence incorporates in an essential manner the performative knowledge and skills understood here as the knowledge of verbal acts. Linguistic competence *facilitates* such performative knowledge and in turn is built upon it. There appears to be a cyclic relationship between the two.

But does this mean that linguistic competence cannot be described independent of knowledge of some specific language and its uses and hence not a description of anything universal? Certainly not. The specification of verbal acts in the structuring process presupposes only knowledge of acts that can be done only verbally and this is not tying down competence to any specific language. For clearly verbal acts are just as universal as the syntactic and so forth. What is empirical however, is the specific contextual, phonological and other surface structural features and how they relate to effectations of the verbal acts. The concept of linguistic competence as universal aspects of knowledge of language can be described, even in Process Grammar, independent of such empirical knowledge. Specifying how to do certain things linguistically may not be possible without recourse to some specific language. But the description of linguistic competence is not to be confused with this; it is different and it is a description of what *enables* a creature to act verbally in the first place.

Though universal, it is universal in a peculiar sense. It is not a description of something uniformly true of all speakers of language. For linguistic competence is not incompatible with a unique realization. Whether it is uniformly true of all or unique to a particular individual is a matter for empirical research and not part of the description of linguistic competence. For we could envisage the possibility of a unique kind of speech act as part of the competence of one person or a linguistic community and not that of other individuals or other communities. In what sense then it is universal? It is a universal in the sense that it is structural description that can be used to test something among all



individuals within or across different linguistic communities. More generally it provides a *means* for ascertaining the existence of a certain capacity among creatures including the human that are known or unknown that underlies what they do, how they behave and effect actions.

This linguistic competence or a particular description of it could have different components. Some aspects of it may be available among *all* speakers including the young, the mentally retarded, the abnormal, the underdeveloped and so forth. Some aspects may not be so – it may be detectable only among the highly cultured, or the communities spearheading new advances or an individual breaking new grounds in the totality of human knowledge.

It also must be noted that a particular description of linguistic competence is that of a linguist and therefore somewhat limited by his own competence towards intuiting the underlying. It may be possible that there are individuals who have competence *beyond* the intuitive powers of a particular linguist to intuit and describe.

One more important point to note is that linguistic competence thus conceived is forever a description of *open* system. Linguistic competence is a growing, developing capacity and therefore in principle not axiomatisable. This point, which is crucial from the perspective of Process Grammar needs to be clarified a bit further. Let us distinguish between *recursive creativity* on the one hand and *advansive creativity* on the other. Recursive creativity is *repeated*, application of what one can do under different contextual conditions. To negate or conjoin two clauses is a competence that once acquired can be exploited in innumerable different contexts. Advansive creativity is an absolute advance, it is a going beyond what anybody can do linguistically at that point in time. It is the creation of totally new forms of action and totally new forms of meaning that reveals itself in the transformation of language into new shapes syntactic, semantic and phonological. Such changes are deeper and slower but underlie the historical evolution of languages.

The concept of advansive creativity can also be utilised to explain the acquisition of language by children. From the perspective of the child the acquisition of a language would require *advansive* creativity with the difference that it is something that happens under the stimulations of established creative advances and as practised by the adults. When we view language acquisition in this manner, clearly the child could *not* be considered a non-intelligent device with a certain precisely describable processing



capacities. The child should be considered as an intelligent and rational *agent* who has within his power the capacity to break new grounds in what he can do. This brings us to the view that the behavioural manifestation of linguistic competence is conditioned by at least three important factors :

- a) a certain kind of creature nature, a psychic maturity, a certain kind of developed subjectivity such as observable among the human beings but not the lower species;
- b) the exposure to exercises of accomplished linguistic competence such as that of parents, peers and so forth i.e. people who enter the psychological space of the individual; and
- c) the psychodynamics of the individual that determines the strength with which he endeavours to realize advansive creativity and assimilates the socially available competence.

The linguistic competence of an individual in its totality cannot be then talkad of independent of the developmental stage of an individual. It *develops* along with the development of the individual. The developmental aspects of a child ceases when he assimilates the adult competencies but then as an adult he could take it to new heights. In other words there could be no end to the development of the linguistic competence of an individual.

The child is certainly not a Language Acquisition Device with the social factors playing the rather trivial role of triggering to action a mechanism already there. The child is an intelligent creature whose intelligence is revealed in the acts he executes i.e. in the exercise of power he manifests. What distinguishes him from the lower creatures is the additional agency he has – the agency he has to execute acts verbally. Given this competence the furtherance of it is subject to at least the three factors listed above. However it is clear that a child is educatable in his linguistic competence however diffuse and complex the relevant strategies may be. The developmental and educatable dimensions the present concept of linguistic competence reveal also lead us to another insight into the nature of the psychic constitution of the creatures in general.

If competence increases with creative advances, the question arises as to why it has to be so. Each advance breaks into new grounds in knowledge and hence brings about new dimensions of consciousness. It is as if the psychic consciousness at any time has its own *boundaries*, boundaries which are enlarged with each



advance made in competence. It is then as if the psyches are *constrained deeply within* in the forms of awareness they can generate, in the kinds of things they can in fact perceive. We are reminded here of the concept of āṇavam in Saiva Siddhanta, a concept so central to the whole system and on the basis of which it is to be distinguished from the other philosophical/psychological systems in India. The psyche is an āṇu by virtue of the fact that it is infected with āṇavam which is conceptualised as a primordial and deep seated delimiter or constraint that continually and impersonally blocks off or tends to block off the onset of consciousness or restricts any attempt to increase the capacity to generate new dimensions of consciousness. The āṇavam causes Darkness to prevail in the psychic consciousness, enveloping whatever consciousness it has and tending to eradicate whatever consciousness that has been attained. Advansive creativities are the kinds of events that register a reduction in the hold of āṇavam in the psychic constitution.

The developmental and educatable aspects revealed also raise another issue, If a child is educatable in linguistic competence then clearly it is something that can be *learned*. If one can learn then clearly one can also forget. Is this consistent with what we are intuitively aware of in the concept of linguistic competence?

Linguistic competence, once acquired, is not that easily forgotten. It is as if a permanent acquisition that is not lost through lapses in memory, failure to retrieve and so forth. It seems to survive even some forms of severe brain damage.

In the light of these generally known facts of linguistic competence, it may appear that the present view of linguistic competence is rather erroneous.

But this may be a hasty conclusion for the concept of learning itself is rather ill understood. We are forced to note at least two strands in human learning – one that increases linguistic competence and another that brings in additional knowledge through the *exercise* of acquired competence. The bulk of the present studies in cognitive psychology is probably concerned with the latter kind of learning where forgetting is commonplace. The former may be a deeper kind of learning where advance are not that easily made but once made not that easily forgotten either. It is a form of learning intimately related to the psychic constitution which once transformed into another remains so until further transformations are effected. Such a form of learning then would presumably



a permanent acquisition of the psyche for even when further transformed the hitherto acquired competence can remain with it, this kind of learning being integrative<sup>1</sup>.

## 2.0. The Description of Linguistic Competence

In field work we transcribe utterances and use the transcriptions for various kinds of linguistic studies. When our focus is phonological, we tend to overlook the fact that what are transcribed are verbal acts of individuals. (Cases where we request an individual to utter a word or recall the names of this and that and so forth are to be exempted.) When we proceed further with this rather refractory frame of mind we tend to forget that what we are analysing are representations of verbal acts. When we become conscious of this fact, we tend to enrich the representation with intonations, pitch, pause and so forth added. We also begin to place the representation in its proper context by specifying for example, the place a particular utterance occupies in the sequence of utterances, who speaks and to whom, and in some cases the various kinds of paralinguistic features that are seen as relevant.

Such a description, no matter how detailed and rich it may be, is nevertheless description only of verbal acts and not that of linguistic competence. Linguistic competence is not amenable to such surface descriptions which are descriptions of the *observable*. The competence we are talking about is that which *underlies* the effectations of verbal acts; something that is not observable but either perceivable inferentially or through observing criteriological features that have already been established as constituting *evidences* for attributing the existence of the competence in question. This gives us an important insight as to the form of the description of linguistic competence. It has to be clearly an independent mode of description utilising elements that would furnish us an idea what elements and in what sense the surface description would constitute evidence for inferring linguistic competence of a particular sort. This immediately takes us to the question of the elements that would serve as constituents in the explication of the criteria. We

<sup>1</sup>Such more complex theories of learning with qualitatively different strands are emerging from different fields. An interesting one is that of Erich Jantsch (1976). Unfortunately this theory sees learning within a *process* paradigm and not an action paradigm. I have made attempts to develop a multilayered theory of learning in Mutharayan 1983 (a). A more detailed account of it is available in Mutharayan 1984.



must enquire into what must be specified so that what we know of the structural features of verbal acts would constitute evidence for ascertaining the existence of competence.

Let us recall the centrality of the notion of consciousness transformation or structuring/restructuring awareness into thoughts that would translate into verbal acts and no other in the concept of linguistic competence we are expounding here. This immediately makes it clear that whatever symbolic devices we evolve for describing linguistic competence, it must be capable of representing various forms of awareness generatable by an individual or the community in question and the manner in which they are transformed into thoughts that would also specify the nature of the verbal acts. Since consciousness is always consciousness of this and that, it is also clear that what enters into the description of awareness are *objects*—objects as they are in the *psychological space* of the individual or community.

The concept of psychological space is important here and some additional remarks are relevant. We have already noted that there are boundaries to an individual's or a community's total consciousness. The existence of such boundaries would also follow from the distinctions between recursive and advansive creativities. Linguistic competence is also developmental, something that can be augmented through facilitating appropriate kinds of learning. Such notions indicate that what is relevant for the description of linguistic competence is not the totality of objects, their categories and so forth but rather only those that have found a place in the consciousness of the individual or community in some form or other. The range and scope of object-consciousness that exists now constitutes the psychological space in question and certainly it is always bounded and open. It would appear to be always surrounded by the notion of the *Unknown* – that there are things yet to be known, categories yet to be realized and so forth. Learning then results in the reduction of the Unknown and hence the expansion of the psychological space<sup>2</sup>.

Everything in consciousness is an *object* and their categoricity determines the mode of consciousness. As it has already been explained in greater detail, we have to distinguish at least two

<sup>2</sup>Learning as an activity that results in the reduction of ignorance is made the central definition of the theory of learning I have developed and described in the papers above.



distinct modes of object consciousness particularly with respect to concrete particulars. What we have in mind here is what Tolkappiyar termed 'poruḷoṭu puṇarāc cuṭṭuṇarvu' and derivately the 'poruḷoṭu puṇarum cuṭṭuṇarvu'. These distinctions first articulated in the ancient Tamil linguistic tradition has entered the wider Indian logical tradition under the name of 'niruvikarṇa jñāna' and 'cavikarṇa jñāna' i.e. 'non-conceptual awareness' and 'conceptual awareness'. It is not clear (to me) whether these distinctions apply equally to other categories of objects as well.

The other categories that have been already mentioned include Time, Space, Qualities, Actions, Processes, Concepts and so forth. Perhaps there are more. The categoricity of objects remains part of the consciousness of objects and therefore inalienable from object-consciousness. The categorical distinctions are not obliterated when thoughts are formed i.e. when a complex of object-consciousness are brought together to form a coherent whole.

But are the notions of forms of consciousness and categoricity of objects sufficient to represent thoughts that would also specify the speech act?

Certainly not and the additional objects that have to be listed for this purpose appear to be the *case* notions. For the cases specify *roles* of objects and since roles are defined in relation to the *acts*, it is likely then that the cases that are defined on the objects in the formulation of a thought also encode the specific verbal act that would succeed in translating it into action. When A commands B with 'Go and shut the door', the roles that A defines on himself and on B, are not independent of each other and the act effected. Similarly when A *states* that P to B, another set of roles are defined on A and B. Such roles are *interpersonal* and arise in the course of interaction. They specify verbal act that relate the interacting agents in a particular episode. Normally we do not include such role definitions in the representation of thoughts generated but clearly they have to be if the relationship between action and thought is also taken to be relevant in the description of linguistic competence. And this can be enormously complicated and subtle as recent developments in discourse analysis would reveal. The differentiation and subtlety of person role definitions in interpersonal interactions directly relate to the linguistic competence of the person or persons. Where there are differences, such interactions become the primary means for the less developed to acquire the competence of the more developed.

We have said that thoughts are complex. They define interpersonal roles in the context of certain other consciousness. When A states that P to B, the interpersonal roles between A and B is defined with P as the ground. P is what is communicated and provides the ground for casting A as the one who states and B as the one who listens. P then is that which is *acted* upon in effecting the action of stating something. It also becomes that which is agreed upon, denied, questioned, doubted, assented to as possible and so forth. P as such has to be a *generated* form of awareness, something known to some and possibly unknown to others. For other-wise the need to communicate that will not arise.

The generated forms of awareness are product of actions of a particularly sort viz. cognitive acts. With such acts different category of objects are brought together and interrelated in a specific manner. This interrelating necessitates also definitions of roles on objects that are interrelated. When P is the awareness 'X struck Y with Z', the agentive role is defined on X, the Patient role on Y and the instrumental on Z.

It is clear then that there are two distinct types of cases; thought constitutive object roles and act constitutive person roles. Perhaps we can term them as object-cases and person-cases.

In the Tamil linguistic tradition there has been some controversies with respect to the status of the vocative. Tolkappiyar has stated quite clearly that there would be eight cases altogether provided one also takes the vocative as a case. From the perspectives of Process Grammar outlined above, vocative and an enormous number of such other cases would belong to the category of person-cases and not object-cases. They are constitutive of interpersonal actions and are the results of restructuring generated awareness that would relate to the mode of act execution. This area of linguistic enquiry appears to be the main thrust of recent developments in discourse analysis, oral and written.

Perhaps what we have termed person-orientations i. e. such notions as first, second and third persons in grammar, are aspects of this person-cases, a matter that remains to be further investigated. The developmental history of pronouns may also reveal important insights with respect to this question.

In the above discussions we have alluded to cognitive acts viz. person and object case indexing operations. In the earlier papers the necessity for such other intra-propositional acts as



presupposing, object selection and so forth and inter-propositional acts such as conjunctive conjoining, disjunctive conjoining, quantifying and so forth have been argued. Perhaps there are many more such acts that remains to be identified and listed<sup>3</sup>.

The question now arises as to whether the categorical distinctions, we have noted and the listing of a variety of such categories of objects and acts are in themselves sufficient to describe linguistic competence that we have been talking about. Does it for example, allow the description of *rules* that could be seen as what underlies our knowledge of 'grammatical', 'ungrammatical' sentences and so forth which is part of the competence underlying successful effectations of verbal acts?

I think the specification of such rules is superfluous. The combinatorial possibilities and that of being a constituent in a complex that is generated through the exercise of certain cognitive acts is written into the specification of the entity and its categoricity. Specifying the entity 'conjunctive co-ordination' involves stating what category of things it can co-ordinate, under what conditions it would succeed or fail; how it relates to negation and so forth. The specification of 'a' as an inanimate concrete particular rules out indexing it with intelligent agency but not the ascription of certain perceptual qualities and so forth.

We appear to have knowledge of such characteristics of elements for otherwise it would not be possible to generate thoughts that can be effected as actions successfully. However the descriptive specifications may be somewhat incomplete—limited possibly by the depth and accuracy of our own introspection. There could be modifications and enrichment even in this direction.

If such are the minimally necessary constituents for the description of linguistic competence, then clearly it would be necessary to invent a *calculus* for describing competence. Such notions as non-conceptual and conceptual consciousness of objects and so forth would be more conveniently captured in a calculus rather than in ordinary language. The design of Process Calculus that has been described elsewhere<sup>4</sup>, is an attempt in this direction.

<sup>3</sup>For greater details see Mutharayan 1983 (b). For additional information also see my "Process Grammar, Agamic Psychology and the Social Sciences" forthcoming in *Tamil Civilization* of the Tamil University, Thanjavur.

<sup>4</sup>For additional references on Process Calculus see references given in [3] above.

The specifications of the minimally necessary constituents as above also explain why the Predicate Calculus of Peano, Russel and Whitehead is grossly inadequate for this purpose. This calculus was invented initially for mathematics and later extended to the analysis of language by the British and other philosophers. The modern mathematical logic is also founded upon the assumption of the validity of this calculus. Some linguistic theories of the recent past such as Generative Semantics and perhaps also Montague Grammar, Relational Grammar and so forth also appear to be inspired somewhat by this Calculus. But such attempts, to the extent they fail to modify and enrich the calculus sufficiently, so that thoughts as detailed here are representable, are doomed to fail – they cannot represent linguistic competence as competence to effect speech acts.

Consistent with our notion of open, developmental or learnable competence that allows for creative advances, it must also be stated that the Process Calculus cannot ever be a complete and closed axiom system. The calculus would forever allow for new additions in categories as well as within categories.

But how does Process Calculus explain the mechanisms of learning and thereby allow for the growth of competence?

It must be noted that when the calculus is supplemented with elements of the surface structure i.e. the means for representing the surface structural features of the execution of speech acts, we would have a symbolic system that would *model* the deep and the surface features of any speech act. It will not be exactly a simulation model if by that what is meant is a very detailed program that on being run in a computer would result in a similar kind of behaviour. However it would be a simulation model, if by that what is meant is a modelling of the critical skeletal features that are somehow intuitable as actually present in the behaviour that is being modelled. The model the Process Calculus provides is a *clarification* of the intuitive knowledge we already possess and hence something that can be used to gain a better insight into the structural peculiarities that underlie language behaviour. Where there is conflict between the insights gained and the intuitive knowledge we already have, we perceive the need to rebuild the model and hence reshape the calculus to facilitate a more accurate modelling. When linguistic competence has grown to new dimensions, clearly models that were adequate before would become inadequate now. The perception of such inadequacies is simultaneously perception of the improvement in competence that has taken place,



whatever the causal factors underlying this growth. The necessitated search for and identification of the new elements that have to be provided for in the calculus, gives us an insight into the kind of learning that has taken place. On the basis of this perception when we further investigate the experiential or other factors that could have contributed to the emergence of the new elements in the competence, we would get an idea of the mechanisms of learning that underly the growth of linguistic competence.

### 3.0. The Incorporated and the Represented in Linguistic Competence

D. N. S. Bhat (1983) has drawn attention to the need to distinguish between two species of knowledge: the incorporated and the represented. It is only knowledge that is *individually represented* in the brain that would be accessible for introspection. The knowledge incorporated would be part of the structuring principles of the device and hence, we can add in Wittgensteinian strain, something that can be *shown* in behaviour but cannot be *stated*. The incorporated knowledge would be inaccessible for introspection because it would not be individually represented. A person's grammatical competence is knowledge of this variety i.e. something unrepresented but incorporated accounting for the reason why it remain inaccessible for introspection. As he says 'It would be impossible for our innate knowledge of grammatical rules and elements to contain any representation as such. The rules and elements will have to be of the general nature, and therefore, they can only be incorporated into the structuring of our neural network. This incorporation would take place as the neural network grows up as a result of the activities of the genetic material' (1983: 174). He also feels on the strength of these observations that the Transformational Grammar of Chomsky fails to describe either the introspectable or the non-introspectable grammatical knowledge of a speaker-hearer. (Ibid P. 178.)

While we can accept the distinction between the incorporated and represented forms of knowledge, the further identification of these with introspectable and non-introspectable seems to be grossly mistaken. It can be argued that there is no such a thing as 'non-introspectable grammatical knowledge' and if further this is taken to be the sense of 'innate knowledge' then knowledge of linguistic competence is certainly not of this sort i.e. not innate at all. Such knowledge is available for intuitive grasping and while it may be unconscious but by that very token something that can be brought up to reflective consciousness.

When we reexamine the Process Calculus keeping in mind these distinctions, it can be seen quite clearly that such things as concrete particulars in their conceptual and non-conceptual modes of awareness, qualities, processes, actions, differentiated time and space and so forth are elements that are individually represented in the brain as D. N. S. Bhat would put it. They are experiential and would not be there unless the individual had been exposed to the appropriate empirical stimuli. In contrast to these are the remaining elements – the cognitive acts – which because they are not tied to any particular experiential content, would not be represented in the brain as individual items. Such cognitive acts are *capacities to do* and therefore would be incorporated as part of the structure of the neural network. When we view them after subtracting away the psychological aspects of acts, then we would see them as *processes* the neural networks are capable of under suitable stimulus conditions. The calculus symbolises then two kinds of entities experientially derived knowledge of individual objects and *processes* which are dispositional or capacities that can be activated under suitable stimulus conditions.

Now there is an intimate link between such processes and the experiential knowledge of individual objects. For certainly the discriminative and analytical knowledge of the space-time-manifold is a *product* of the processes that are set into motion under various kinds of circumstances in which the presence of the stimuli is one and the need to act is another. Unless the processes are of a particular sort there could be *no* representation of knowledge of the space-time-manifold in terms of this and that and describable as so-and-so. This means an introspective awareness of the represented items should also reveal, in some specifiable manner, the nature of the processes that underly the production of such representations. Such revelations constitute our *intuition* of such processes and clearly constitute part of what we are aware of however vaguely it may be. While it may not be introspectable in the same sense as the individual items represented, it is nevertheless *accessible* for consciousness. It is vague and unclear and perhaps that is the main impetus for *modelling* the processes, an endeavour that may bring about the clarification, a gain in perspicuity and clarity that we seek.

The processing capacities can be isolated and distinguished within the linguistic competence we have articulated. Let us call this component 'cognitive-act-competence'. Then clearly it would be seen that there could be no linguistic competence *without* this cognitive-act-competence. What establishes the capacity for speech



acts is precisely this competence. And this competence must be available in whoever is capable of language. In other words it is a universal in the sense that wherever we can identify speech acts there we could deduce also the presence and function of this competence.

What can be modelled and studied cannot be innate. Our knowledge of even this underlying cognitive-act-competence is then certainly not innate. It is to be wondered whether there could be any 'innate' forms of knowledge at all, whether it is self contradictory to describe one and the same thing as knowledge on the one hand and innate on the other. From the perspectives gained from Process Grammar we are inclined to the view that 'innate' as articulated by Chomsky is a vacuous notion, a chimera that has arisen from the fundamentally erroneous ideas Transformational Grammar has generated. It may be possible that what Chomsky was trying to articulate was this cognitive-act-competence for certainly it is that which underlies the syntactic structure of language. But he give a misleading description of it by failing to note that speaking is not simply a performance, an activation of the neural processes but rather that of doing something, effecting an action.

We are also obliged to explain in what sense Process Grammar is not a species of Cartesian Linguistics. Since acting is not to be equated with performance, it is not something that can be done by non-intelligent entities such as the neural processes we have been describing. We have to postulate a 'ghost' in the machine, as Ryle would describe it or a 'miniscule of a man' as Skinner would put it as the agent of the actions effected. The individual items represented in the brain, and the processes available in the network facilitate the realization of a range of actions. But since in each action there is activation of only a *selected* range of entities and processes, it is clear the agent must be a 'ghost' distinct from these elements and processes with a capacity for selection and decision. The ghost must be then an entity capable of consciousness for clearly selection and evaluative decisions are impossible without this capacity.

But the ghost we are postulating, it must be emphasized, is certainly not the Cartesian Ghost. The Cartesian ghost is an *unchanging* intelligence, an entity that already knows all that needs to be known and therefore without any need to *learn*. The psyches we are postulating are the sorts of entities that are termed *pasu* in Saiva Siddhanta and which are distinguished carefully from *Pathi*,

the unchanging and all knowing intelligence that is the real source and ground of all activities.

The agency of speech acts has led us to postulate a psyche as distinct from the neural processes and object representations and with a capacity for consciousness. But this in itself is not sufficient to conclude the reality of innumerable and distinct psyches, one perhaps in each machine. But we are led to this view on the grounds of person-roles that are seen as that which specify into what act and what speech act a particular thought would be translated into i.e. whether it will be commanding, requesting, questioning, stating and so forth. Such roles are indefinable unless the interaction is between independent psychic entities.

But how are we to make sense of the similarities and differences among these innumerable psyches? If there is perfect uniformity in behaviour, clearly we would fail to note any difference except perhaps the one of spatio-temporal location which is however inconsequential for establishing the reality of innumerable independent psyches. The absence of such uniformity and the observable differences in behaviour which reveal differences in needs, knowledge, competencies and so forth are the facts that lead us to an intuitive knowledge of the reality of innumerable independent psyches.

One of the things we have evoked here is the differences in linguistic competence among individuals. Clearly there is such a thing as language instruction where one is defined as the instructor and another as the learner. Learning is just as real as instruction. The psyche is the sort of entity that needs to be instructed to facilitate learning.

This learning process can be seen as being very complex involving at least two distinct strands. One will be enlarging the number of individual things and perhaps also the addition of new category of things *within* the cognitive processes that can in fact be activated through stimulating the neural network. Such learnings are assimilatory and are products of the recursive creativity we have mentioned earlier. But overall there is a *limit* to such assimilatory learning; there are boundaries to the range and scope to such acquisitions. But what are the factors underlying this perceived limit to knowledge? We can identify the following factors:

- a) the exposure to the stimuli and the demands made by the social and environmental factors upon the psyches;



- b) the range and scope of cognitive processes that can in fact be activated; and
- c) a constitutional limitations inherent in the psyche itself which sets boundaries to the selection and decision and hence actions it can in fact effect.

The first of the above is that which facilitates assimilatory learning and therefore cannot be cited as the cause to the upper boundaries to this form of learning. It has to be either factor two or three and we have to investigate whether both or only one of them.

Now we have mentioned earlier that there is such a thing as advansive creativity which results in new processing capacities and along with it new dimensions of consciousness. It is as if a complex computer restructuring itself with additional, new and qualitatively different processing capacities. When advansive creative thrusts occur, what we have is perhaps additional neural structures being built into the nervous system.

Now the question arises: Where does the impetus for this transformation come from? It cannot be traced either to the first or the second factor for both are non-intelligent and hence incapable of such creative advansive thrusts. We can also rule out Pathi as it is not in need of any such new competencies. We are left with the psyche as the only remaining candidate as the genuine source of this thrust.

But this again raises the question of why it has to be so? why the need for the psyches to effect such advances or transcendences? There is apparently a pressure within the psyches to reconstitute themselves so that they become capable of new dimensions of consciousness. This means, as Meykandar (13th. century) has concluded, the psyches are delimited or constrained deeply within by some impersonal obstruent (called *aṇavam*) that continuously acts to reduce the range and scope of the consciousness of the psyches. Such delimited psyches are termed *pacus* and once we postulate such 'ghosts' in the machine, the learning or developmental dimensions of linguistic competence is well accounted for. The impetus the psyches generate is an impetus to remove this affliction within and it would probably originate when the *limit* to the existing capacities are perceived somehow.

The post Meykandar Saiva Siddhanta literature is full of details about the structures of pathi, *pacu* and *pāsam* (to which belong the deep constraints and the rest) and the dynamic relations

between them all to account for the differences and developmental growth of competencies to act. Since they are being discussed elsewhere, we shall refrain from discussing such matters here.<sup>5</sup>

This discussion, it is hoped, should make it abundantly clear that Process Grammar is *not* a species of Cartesian Linguistics. More appropriately perhaps it can be called 'Meykandarian Linguistics' in honour of Meykandar, certainly one of the most brilliant philosophers India has produced and who seems to have anticipated the concept of mind theory of knowledge implicit in Process Grammar.

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<sup>5</sup>See my articles in *Saiva Siddhanta*, volume XVI-volume XVII.



## ECHO-WORD FORMATION IN ĀLU KURUMBA

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### Introduction

Till 1938, when M. B. Emeneau published his paper "Echo-words in Tōḍa" in the *New Indian Antiquary* (1:109–117), no special attention had been given by Dravidologists to the phenomenon of "echo-words" which are frequent in all Dravidian languages. The subject, no doubt, had been mentioned and, to some extent, discussed within the scope of various grammars of Dravidian languages, but nowhere in a linguistically satisfactory manner.<sup>1</sup> When Emeneau remarks in his paper that "a small and in its meagreness tantalizing amount has been written on this phenomenon"<sup>2</sup> until 1938, it is more than surprising to ascertain that the picture has barely changed since then, although the pursuit of studies dealing with Dravidian philology and linguistics has more and more increased during the past four decades.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup>For references cf. Emeneau 1938a: 109 f.

<sup>2</sup>Emeneau 1938a: 109.

<sup>3</sup>So, apart from M. B. Emeneau's contributions to the subject, viz. Emeneau 1938b, 1939, 1961:101 f. (Kol.) and 1970:154 f. (Kod), only the following four articles have come to my notice which, specifically, deal with echo-words in Dravidian languages: Ganeshsundaram 1971 (Ta.), Chidananda Murthy 1972 and Murigeppa 1982 (Ka.), Dey/Shetty 1976 (Tu.). As far as Ta. is concerned, I wish to draw the attention of the reader to the following, forthcoming Ph. D. thesis, by Thomas Malten, South Asia Institute, University of Heidelberg. *Reduplikation im Tamil*, being a comprehensive study, one part of which is devoted to the formation and function of echo-words. (It will be published in the course of 1985, within the series *Beiträge zur Südasiens-Forschung*, Wiesbaden). Last but not least, I should like to mention in this context an article by K. S. Mustafa, on echo-word formation in Dakkhni Urdu (as being current in Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka and Tamil Nadu), which is noteworthy in so far as its most common and productive type follows the Dravidian pattern; the echo-morpheme thereby being represented by /gī-/ "which is a clear case of morphological borrowing from Dravidian languages" (Mustafa 1979:242).

In this paper, an attempt is made to probe into one type of echo-word formation in Ālu Kurumba (AKu.), an illiterate South Dravidian tribal language, which is spoken by the Ālu Kurumbas of the Nilgiri Hills, South India.<sup>4</sup> The data on which the analysis is based, were, partly, drawn from taperecorded texts and, partly, obtained by questioning informants.<sup>5</sup>

Echo-words have no lexical meaning and occur, in AKu., only as the second members of so-called "echo-word compounds", the first members being represented by words belonging to certain word categories: preferably, nouns, verbal nouns, and adverbial participles. Echo-words "echo" the first member of the compounds they form, *i.e.* the basic word, by end-rhyming it and, thereby, replacing its initial syllable by certain other ones.

In AKu., two types of echo-word formation are differentiated. The first type may be defined as "restricted-productive" type of echo-word formation, as it is to be found with a restricted number of particular words only and is, in each case, idiomatically fixed. Thereby, the initial syllables of the echo-words formed according to this type, are represented by *pa-*, *ba-*, *ma-* *mi-*, *mu-*, *mu :- me :- mo-*, *mo:-*, *to-*, *ka:-*, and *gu-* respectively.

The second type, on the other hand, may be defined as the "unrestricted-productive" type of echo-word formation, as it is, without restriction, applicable to nearly all nouns, verbal nouns and adverbial participles. Thereby, the initial syllables of the echo-words formed according to this type are represented,

(a) by *gi-* when the vowel of the basic word's initial syllable is a short vowel, and *gi:-* when it is a long vowel; moreover – and this complicates situation in AKu., accordingly

(b) by *gĩ-* and *gĩ:-*, respectively.

It is the latter type of echo-word formation which I intend to analyze here; as for the first type, including illustrative references, cf. Kapp 1982:200 f.

### Analysis

General remarks with regard to the formation and function of echo-words of the second type

The "unrestricted-productive" type of echo-word formation in AKu. may be depicted by the following formulas:

<sup>4</sup>For further information cf. Kapp 1982.

<sup>5</sup>Field research among the Ālu Kurumbas, linguistic as well as ethnographic, was conducted during the period of May 1974, to April, 1976, with the financial support of the German Research Association.



- (a) in the case of monosyllables (which occur rarely and have always a long vowel):

basic word

echo-word compound

(C) V: > (C) V: -gi: / (C) V: -gĩ:

- (b) in the case of di- and polysyllables :

(C) V + X / (C) V: + X > { (C)V+X-gi+X / (C) V: +X-gi: +X  
{ (C)V+X-gĩ+X / (C) V: +X-gĩ: +X

(X represents here all the phonemes that follow the vowel of the first syllable<sup>6</sup>.)

A detailed survey of the references at hand led to the observation that the replacement of the basic word's initial syllable by either *gi-/gi:-* or *gĩ-/gĩ:-* is conditioned by the respective phoneme structure of the basic word; to be more precise, either

- (a) by the vowel quality of the basic word's initial syllable or,  
(b) by the quality of the consonant (s) (C, CC, NC) following the vowel of the basic word's initial syllable or,  
(c) by the conditioning factors given under (a) and (b) and, in addition, by the vowel quality of the basic word's second syllable (most likely valid for all the remaining structures):

Proceeding from this observation, the basic words of the references at hand are, in the following analysis, surveyed with regard to their phoneme structure in order to detect the respective conditioning factors and thus, to arrive at rules as to the occurrence of (a) *gi-/gi:-* and (b) *gĩ-/gĩ:-* as initial syllables of echo-words.

The analysis consists of two parts: In the first part, those references are investigated the basic words of which show phoneme structures, which allow to set up clear-cut rules as to the occurrence of the respective initial syllables of echo-words; whereas, the second part deals with those references the basic words of which show phoneme structures which point to possible rules as to the same end.

<sup>6</sup>Cf. Emeneau 1938a : 110 f.; Emeneau 1938b : 554; Emeneau 1961 : 101; etc.

As far as the function of echo-word compounds of this type is concerned, it has been ascertained that, in each case, they convey the meaning of "objects, qualities, actions, etc. denoted by the basic words *and* other objects, qualities, actions, etc. of similar nature, *i.e.* like those which are signified by the respective basic words".<sup>7</sup>

## 2.2. Conditioning factors which allow to set up clear-cut rules

### 2.2.1. Basic word echo-word

(C) cV/cV: + X > gĩ/gĩ: + X

(cV/cV: = ĩ/ĩ:, ě/ě:)

Expressed in words, this formula means that, if the first syllable of the word to be echoed contains a centralized vowel (cV), *i.e.* ĩ/ĩ:, ě/ě:, it is, in each case, replaced by gĩ-/gĩ:- in the echo-word.

### References (unlimited):

<i>dĩ!tu-gĩ!tu</i>	'small elevation, mound and the like' (DED 2633);
<i>tĩ:ta-gĩ:ta</i>	'pollution and the like' (DED 2680);
<i>děne-gĩne</i>	'veranda and the like' (DED 2639);
<i>mě:de-gĩ:de</i>	'platform and the like' (DED 3930 b);
<i>kĩruba-gĩruba</i>	'leopard and the like' (DED 1331);
<i>bĩ:ro:du-gĩ:ro:du</i>	'scattering and the like' (from <i>bĩ:r-</i> 'to scatter') (DED 4492);
<i>kěre-gĩre</i>	'pond, swamp and the like' (DED 1648);
<i>cě:ru-gĩ:ru</i>	'mud, mire and the like' (DED 1680);
<i>ĩe-gĩe</i>	'hair (of head) and the like' (DED 429);
<i>bĩ:vadu-gĩ:vadu</i>	'falling and the like' (from <i>bĩ:-</i> 'to fall' etc.) (DED 4457);
<i>ěttu-gĩttu</i>	'ox, bullock and the like' (DED 698);
<i>kě:yi-gĩ:yi</i>	'barking deer and the like' (DED 1660); etc.

<sup>7</sup>For a detailed information with regard to centralized vowels in AKu. (conditioning factors/origins) cf. my article "Centralized vowels in Ālu Kuṛumba" (forthcoming).

<sup>8</sup>Cf. Emeneau 1938a: 113, 115; Emeneau 1938b: 553 (where S. K. Chatterji is quoted), 554; Emeneau 1961: 100; etc.



→ Rule 1.1.

basic word initial syllable of the echo-word

(C)  $cV + X > g\ddot{i}$ -  
( $cV = \ddot{i}, \ddot{e}$ )

→ Rule 1.2.

(C)  $cV: + X > g\ddot{i}:-$   
( $cV: = \ddot{i}:, \ddot{e}:$ )

(C)  $V/V: + \text{Ret.}/r + X > g\ddot{i}/g\ddot{i}: + \text{Ret.}/r + X$

According to this formula, the initial syllable of the echo-word is always represented by  $g\ddot{i}$ -/ $g\ddot{i}:-$ , if the vowel of the basic word's initial syllable is followed by either a retroflex consonant,  $\ddot{i}e$   $\ddot{t}/\ddot{t}\ddot{t}$ ,  $\ddot{d}/\ddot{d}\ddot{d}$ ,  $\ddot{n}/\ddot{n}\ddot{n}/\ddot{n}\ddot{d}$ ,  $\ddot{l}/\ddot{l}\ddot{l}$ , or alveolar  $r$ .

References (unlimited):

<i>aṭṭe-gīṭṭe</i>	'leech and the like' (DED 89);
<i>aḍḍu-gīḍḍu</i>	'goat and the like' (DED 4229);
<i>aṇa-gīṇa</i>	'money and the like' (DBIA 250);
<i>doḷe-gīḷe</i>	'mucus, phlegm and the like' (DED 2397);
<i>aṛe-gīṛe</i>	'rock and the like' (DED 3392);
<i>kuṛe-gīṛe</i>	'cloth-louse and the like' (DED 1604);
etc. <sup>9</sup>	

→ Rule 2.1.

(C)  $V + \text{Ret.}/r + X > g\ddot{i}$ -

→ Rule 2.2.

(C)  $V: + \text{Ret.}/r + X > g\ddot{i}:-$

(C)  $V/V: + \emptyset (< *l/*r) + X > g\ddot{i}/g\ddot{i}: + X$

This formula says that, if the vowel of the basic word's initial syllable is followed by  $\emptyset < *l/*r$ ,<sup>10</sup> the initial syllable of the echo-word is, in accordance with the preceding formula, represented by  $g\ddot{i}$ -/ $g\ddot{i}:-$ .

<sup>9</sup>Cf. also sub 2.2.1.

<sup>10</sup> $\phi$  forms one of the developments of PDr.  $*l$  as well as  $*r$  in AKu. The different AKu developments of PDr.  $*l$  and  $*r$  will be treated in a separate article which is under preparation at present.



References :

<i>ae-gīe</i>	'cave and the like' (DED 261);
<i>mae-gīe</i>	'rain and the like' (DED 3893);
<i>joa<sup>n</sup>-gīa<sup>n</sup></i>	'maize and the like' (DED 2359);
<i>koe-gīe</i>	'filth, dirt and the like' (DED 1514);
<i>ba:e-gī:e</i>	'plantain and the like' (DED 4403).

→ Rule 2.1.1.

(C)V +  $\emptyset$  (< \*l/\*r) + X > gī-

→ Rule 2.2.1.

(C)V: +  $\emptyset$  (< \*l/\*r) + X > gī:-

Conditioning factors which point to possible rules

Basic word

(C)V:

(V: = i:, u:, o:)

References :

<i>ti:- gī:</i>	'tea and the like' (lw. < Engl.);
<i>u:- gī:</i>	'flower and the like' (DED 3554); maggot, grub and the like' (DED 3537);
<i>to:- gī:</i>	'corral, pen and the like' (DED 2905); etc.

→ Rule 3.1.

(C)fV: > gī:

(fV: = i:)

→ Rule 3.2.

(C)bV: > gī:

(bV: = u:, o:)

(a) (C) V + Lab. + X

(V = a, u, e, o)

References:

<i>tambaṭe-gīmbaṭe</i>	'tambourine and the like' (DED 2510);
<i>emme-gimme</i>	'buffalo (cow) and the like' (DED 699);
<i>coppu-gippu</i>	'eatable leaves, leafy vegetable and the like' (DED 2200);
<i>gobbara-gibbara</i>	'dried cowdung and the like' (DBIA 107).

But cf. :

<i>tuppa-gippa</i>	'ghee and the like' (DED 2685).
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## → Rule 4.1.

(C)  $V + \text{Lab.} + X > g\bar{i}-$ 

(V = a, u, e, o)

The exception, *tuppa-gippa*, however, is puzzling; or, 'does it prove the rule?'

(b) (C)  $V: + \text{Lab.} + fV$ 

(V: = a:, i:; fV = i, e)

## References:

*ka:pi-gi:pi* 'coffee and the like' (lw. via Ta. < Engl.);*i:pi-gi:pi* 'fly and the like' (DED 453);*ci me-gi:me* 'district (etc.) and the like' (lw. < IA).

## → Rule 4.2.

(C)  $V: + \text{Lab.} + fV > gi:-$ 

(V = a:, i:; fV = i, e)

(a) (C)  $V + \text{Den.} + X$ 

(V = a, u, e, o)

## References:

*attu-gittu* 'having wept and the like' (from *ag-* 'to weep') (DED 240);*gattu-gittu* 'neck and the like' (DED 1151);*andi-gīndi* 'wild boar and the like' (DED 3326);*kudure-gīdure* 'horse and the like' (DED 1423);*nenju-gīnju* 'heart, breast and the like' (DED 3097)*ottu-gittu* 'sun (etc.) and the like' (DED 3724).

But of.:

*netti-gitti* 'forehead and the like' (DED 3118);*kotti-gitti* 'cat and the like' (DED 1804).

## → Rule 5.1.

(C)  $V + \text{Den.} + X > g\bar{i}-$ 

(V = a, u, e, o)

The exceptions, *netti-gitti* and *kotti-gitti*, however, give rise to the following sub-rules:

## Sub-rule 5.1.1.

(C)  $fV_1 + \text{Den.} + fV_2 > g\bar{i}-$ (fV<sub>1</sub> = e; fV<sub>2</sub> = i)

Sub-rule 5.1.2

(C)bV + Den. + fV > gi-

(bV = o; fV = i)

(b) (C)V: + Den. + X

(V: = a:)

Reference:

*ka:tu-gī:tu* 'having waited and the like' (from *ka:-*  
to wait, etc.) (DED 1192).

→ Rule 5.2.

(C)V: Den. + X > gī:-

(V: = a:)

(a) (C) V + Aff. + X

(V = a, i)

References:

*majjige-gijjige* 'buttermilk and the like' (DED 3781);

*kiccu-giccu* 'fire and the like' (DED 1272);

*miccalu-giccalu* 'lightning and the like' (DED 3994).

→ Rule 6.1.

(C) V + Aff. + X > gi-

(V = a, i)

(b) (C) V: + Aff. + X

(V: = a:, i:, u:, e:, o:)

References:

*ka:cu-gī:cu* 'money and the like' (DED 1200);

*ga:cu-gī:cu* 'tuber, potato and the like' (DED 1314);

*u:cu-gī:cu* 'fart and the like' (DED 3571);

*mu:cu-gī:cu* 'breath and the like' (DED 4000);

*be:co:du-gī:co:du* 'cooking and the like' (from *be:c-* 'to  
cook') (DED 4540);

*go:cu-gī:cu* 'cabbage and the like' (cf. Ta. *kōcu*, Ka.  
*kōsu* 'cabbage');

*ro:ja-gī:ja* 'rose and the like' (lw. < Port.).

But cf. :

*ma:cu-gī:cu* 'placenta and the like' (DED 3920);

'chilli(es) and the like' (DED 3986);

*ku:cu-gī:cu* 'child, boy (etc.) and the like' (DED 1554)



<i>mi:ce-gi:ce</i>	'moustache and the like' (DED 3996);
<i>be:ci-gi:ci</i>	'having cooked and the like' (from <i>be:c</i> ; 'to cook') (DED 4540);
<i>a:ce-gi:ce</i>	'wish, desire and the like' (lw. < IA).

→ Rule 6.2.

(C)V: + Aff. + X > gī:-

(V: = a:, u:, e:, o:)

The exceptions, *ma:cu-gi:cu* and *ku:cu-gi:cu*, however, are puzzling (cf. Rule 4.1.!). With regard to the exceptions, *mi:ce-gi:ce* and *be:ci-gi:ci* (cf. *be:co:du-gīco:du!*), we have, as in the case of Rule 5.1., to set up the following sub-rule:

Sub-rule 6 2.1.

(C) fV: + Aff. + fV > gī:-

(fV: = i:, e;; fV = i, e)

As for the exception, *a:ce-gi:ce*, another sub-rule has to be set up, unless we regard it as a further exception of Rule 6.2.:

Sub-rule 6.2.2.

(C) mV: + Aff. + fV > gī:-

(mV: = a;; fV = e)

(a) (C)V + Vel. + X

(V = a, i, u, o)

References :

<i>akkilu-gīkkilu</i>	'bird and the like' (DBIA 233 b);
<i>tiṅga-gīṅga</i>	'moon, month and the like' (DED 2626);
<i>uṅgura-gīṅgura</i>	'finger-ring and the like' (DED 490);
<i>buguri-gīguri</i>	'bamboo flute and the like' (DED 3482);
<i>gugge-gīgge</i>	'ear-wax and the like' (DED 1540);
<i>okkuḍi-gīkkuḍi</i>	'navel and the like' (DED 3652).

→ Rule 7.1.

(C) V + Vel. + > gī-

(V = a, i, u, o)

(b) (C) V: + Vel. + X

(V: = u:)

Reference:

<i>mu:ku-gī:ku</i>	'nose and the like' (DED 4122).
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→ Rule 7.2.

(C) V: + Vel. + X > gĩ:-

(V: = u:)

(a) (C) V + n + X

(V = a, e; n = [n])

References:

<i>dana-gĩna</i>	'cow and the like' (lw. > IA);
<i>manuca-gĩnuca</i>	'man and the like' (DBIA 290);
<i>mane-gĩne</i>	'house, room and the like' (DED 3911).

But cf.:

<i>kenni-ginni</i>	'temple(s) and the like' (DED) 1655).
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→ Rule 8.1.

(C)V + n + X > gĩ-

(V = a; n = [n])

The exception, *kenni-ginni*, leads, as in the cases of Rule 5.1. and Rule 6.2., to the following sub-rule:

Sub-Rule 8.1.1.

(C) fV<sub>1</sub> + n/nn + fV<sub>2</sub> > gi-

(fV<sub>1</sub> = e; fV<sub>2</sub> = i; n/nn = [n]/[nn])

(b) (C) V: + n + X

(V: = a:, i:; n = [n])

References:

<i>a:ne-gi:ne</i>	'elephant and the like' (DED 4235 ;
<i>ba:nu-gi:nu</i>	'sky and the like' (DED 4410);
<i>mi:nu-gi:nu</i>	'star and the like' (DED 3994); fish and the like' (DED 3999).

→ Rule 8.2.

(C) V: + n + X > gi:-

(V: = a:, i:; n = [n])

(a) (C) V + y + X

(V = a)

Reference:

<i>kayi-gĩyi</i>	'hand and the like' (DED 1683).
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→ Rule 9.1.

(C) V + y + X > gĩ-

(V = a)



- (b) (C) V: + y + X  
(V: = a:, o:)

References:

- na:yi-gī:yi* 'dog and the like' (DED 3022);  
*ko:yi-gī:yi* 'fowl and the like' (DED 1862).

(If we take into consideration that *ko:yi* < \**kōri*, the latter reference may also be regarded as falling under Rule 2.2.1. which, in that case, had to be formulated thus:

- (C) V: + Ø/y (<\*/!/\*r) + X > gī:-.)

→ Rule 9.2.

- (C)V: + y + X > gī:-  
(V: = a:, o:)

- (a) (C)V + r + X  
(V = a, o)

References:

- mara-gīra* 'tree and the like' (DED 3856),  
*korangu-gīraṅgu* 'monkey and the like' (DED 1473).

But cf:

- carapaṇige-girapaṇige* 'neck-chain (with silver coins) and the like' (DED 1948; but, rather = lw. < IA [cf. Kapp 1982:348]);  
*nari-giri* 'jackal and the like' (DED 2981),

Rule 10.1.

- (C)V + r + X > gī-  
(V = a, o)


The exception, *carapaṇige-girapaṇige*, however, is as puzzling as those of Rule 4.1. and Rule 6.2. In the case of *nari-giri*, we have to set up the following sub-rule, unless we regard it as a further exception of Rule 10. 1.

Sub-rule 10.1.1

- (C)mV + r + fV > gi-  
(mV = a; fV = i)  
(b) (C)V: + r + X  
(V: = i:, u:, e:)

References:

- ni:ru-gī:ru* 'water and the like' (DED 3057);  
*u:ru-gī:ru* 'village and the like' (DED 643).



But cf :

*ke:ri-gi:ri,*

'space in front of a (line of) house(s) and the like' (DED 1669).

→ Rule 10.2.

(C)  $V: + r + X > gi:-$

( $V: + i:, u:$ )

The exception, *ke:ri-gi:ri*, gives rise to the following sub-rule which is in accordance with Subrules 5.1.1., 6.2.1., and 8.1.1.:

Sub-rule 10.2.1.

(C)  $fV: + r + fV > gi:-$

( $fV: = e:, fV = i$ )

(a) (C)  $V + l + X$

( $V = u, e, o$ )

References :

*uli-gili*

'tiger and the like' (DED 3532);

*eli-gili*

'rat and the like' (DED 710);

*ele-gile*

'leaf and the like' (DED 423);

*gelaca-gilaca*

'work and the like' (DED 1639);

*mola-gila*

'hare and the like' (DED 4 71).

→ Rule 11.1.

(C)  $V + l + X > gi-$

( $V = u, e, o$ )

(b) (C)  $V: + l + X$

( $V: = a:, o:$ )

References:

*a:lu-gi:lu*

'milk and the like' (DED 3370);

*ka:lu-gi:lu*

'foot and the like' (DED 1238).

But cf. :

*co:le-gi:le*

'(dense) forest and the like' (DED 2357).

→ Rule 11.2.

(C)  $V: + l + X > gi:-$

( $V: = a:$ )

The exception, *co:le-gi:le*, however, points to the following sub-rule:



**Sub-rule 11.2.1.**

(C)bV: + l + fV > gi:-

(bV: = o:; fV = e)

(a) (C)V + v + X

(V = a, e)

**References:**

*bevara-givara*

'detail and the like' (lw. < IA);

*kevi-givi*

'ear and the like' (DED 1645).


**But cf.:**

*avve-givve*

'mother and the like' (DED 212);

*devva-givva*

'evil spirit, possession, trance and the like' (DBIA 219).



**→ Rule 12.1.**

(C)V + v + X > gi-

(V = e)

The exceptions, *avve-givve* and *devva-givva*, lead to the following sub-rule:

**Sub-rule 12.1.1.**

(C)V + vv + X > gi-

(V = a, e)

(b) (C) V: + v + X

(V: = a:)

**References:**

*ka:vu-gi:vu*

'handle and the like' (DED 1155);

*ma:vu<sup>n</sup> --gi:vu<sup>n</sup>*

'mango and the like' (DED 3919).

**→ Rule 12.2.**

(C) V: + v + X > gi:-

(V: = a:)

**3. Synopsis**

**3 1. Synopsis of the rules and sub-rules**

	basic word		initial syllable of the echo-word
Rule 1.1.	(C) cV + X (cV = i, e)	>	gi-
Rule 1.2.	(C) cV: + X (cV: = i:, e:)	>	gi:-

Rule 2.1.	(C) V + Ret./ <u>r</u> + X	>	gī-
Rule 2.1.1.	(C) V + ∅ (< *l/*r) + X	>	gī-
Rule 2.2.	(C) V: + Ret./ <u>r</u> + X	>	gī:-
Rule 2.2.1.	(C) V: + ∅ (< *l/*r) + X	>	gī:-
Rule 3.1.	(C) fV: (fV: = i:)	>	gī:-
Rule 3.2.	(C) bV: (bV: = u:, o:)	>	gī:-
Rule 4.1.	(C)V + Lab. + X (V = a, u, e, o) Exception: <i>tuppa-gippa</i>	>	gī-
Rule 4.2.	(C) V: + Lab. + fV (V: = a:, i:; fV = i, e)	>	gī:-
Rule 5.1.	(C) V + Den. + X (V = a, u, e, o)	>	gī-
Sub-rule 5.1.1	(C) fV <sub>1</sub> + Den. + fV <sub>2</sub> (fV <sub>1</sub> = e; fV <sub>2</sub> = i)	>	gī-
Sub-rule 5.1.2.	(C) bV + Den. + fV (bV = o; fV = i)	>	gī-
Rule 5.2.	(C) V: + Den. + X (V: = a:)	>	gī:-
Rule 6.1.	(C) V + Aff. + X (V = a, i)	>	gī-
Rule 6.2.	(C)V: + Aff. + X (V: = a:, u:, e:, o:) Exceptions: <i>ma:cu-gi:cu</i> , <i>ku:cu-gi:cu</i>	>	gī-
Sub-rule 6.2.1.	(C) fV: + Aff. + fV (fV: = i:; e:; fV = i, e)	>	gī:-
Sub-rule 6.2.2.	(C) mV: + Aff. + fV (mV: = a:; fV = e)	>	gī:-
Rule 7.1.	(C) V + Vel. + X (V = a, i, u, o)	>	gī-
Rule 7.2.	(C) V: + Vel. + X (V: = u:)	>	gī:-
Rule 8.1.	(C) V + n + X (V = a; n = [n])	>	gī-
Sub-rule 8.1.1.	(C) fV <sub>1</sub> + n/nn + fV <sub>2</sub> fV <sub>1</sub> = e; fV <sub>2</sub> = i; n/nn = [n] / [nn])	>	gī-



Rule 8.2.	(C) V: + <i>n</i> + X (V): = <i>a:</i> , <i>i:</i> ; <i>n</i> = [ <u>n</u> ])	>	<i>gi:-</i>
Rule 9.1.	(C) V + <i>y</i> + X (V = <i>a</i> )	>	<i>gĩ-</i>
Rule 9.2.	(C) V + <i>y</i> + X (V: = <i>a:</i> , <i>o:</i> )	>	<i>gĩ:-</i>
Rule 10.1.	(C) V + <i>r</i> + X (V = <i>a</i> , <i>o</i> ) Exception: <i>carapaṇige-</i> <i>girapaṇige</i>	>	<i>gĩ-</i>
Sub-rule 10.1.1.	(C) mV + <i>r</i> + fV (mV = <i>a</i> ; fV = <i>i</i> )	>	<i>gi-</i>
Rule 10.2.	(C) V: + <i>r</i> + X (V: = <i>i:</i> , <i>u:</i> )	>	<i>gĩ:-</i>
Sub-rule 10.2.1.	(C) fV: + <i>r</i> + fV (fV: = <i>e:</i> ; fV = <i>i</i> )	>	<i>gi:-</i>
Rule 11.1.	(C) V + <i>l</i> + X (V = <i>u</i> , <i>e</i> , <i>o</i> )	>	<i>gi-</i>
Rule 11.2.	(C) V: + <i>l</i> + X (V: = <i>a:</i> )		
Sub-rule 11.2.1.	(C) bV: + <i>l</i> + fV (bV: = <i>o:</i> ; fV = <i>e</i> )	>	<i>gĩ:-</i>
Rule 12.1.	(C) V + <i>v</i> + X (V = <i>e</i> )	>	<i>gi-</i>
Sub-rule 12.1.1.	(C) V + <i>vv</i> + X (V = <i>a</i> , <i>e</i> )	>	<i>gĩ-</i>
Rule 12.2.	(C) V: + <i>v</i> + X (V: = <i>a:</i> )	>	<i>gi:-</i>

**Note:** From among these thirty-five rules and sub-rules, only the following rules are to be regarded as fixed rules:

1.1., 1.2., 2.1., 2.1.1., 2.2., 2.2.1., 3.1., and 3.2.

### 3.2. Synopsis of the conditioning factors for the occurrence of *gi-/gi:-* and *gĩ-/gĩ:-*, respectively

Conditioning factors for *gi-*

phoneme structure of the basic word

- (a) (C) fV<sub>1</sub> + Den. + fV<sub>2</sub> (= Sub-rule 5.1.1.)  
(fV<sub>1</sub> = *e*; fV<sub>2</sub> = *i*)
- (b) (C) bV + Den. + fV (= Sub-rule 5.1.2.)  
(bV = *o*; fV = *i*)

- (c) (C) V + Aff. + X (= Rule 6.1.)  
(V = a, i)
- (d) (C) fV<sub>1</sub> + n/nm + fV<sub>2</sub> (= Sub-rule 8 1.1.)  
fV<sub>1</sub> = e; fV<sub>2</sub> = i; n/nm = [n]/[nn])
- (e) (C) mV + r + fV (= Sub-rule 10.1.1.)  
(mV = a; fV = i)
- (f) (C)V + l + X (= Rule 11.1.)  
(V = u, e, o)
- (g) (C) V + v + X (= Rule 12.1.)  
V = e)
- (But cf. Sub-rule 12.1.1.1.)

Conditioning factors for gi:-


- (a) (C)fV: (= Rule 3.1.)  
(fV: = i:)
- (b) (C)V: + Lab. + fV (= Rule 4.2.)  
(V: = a:: i:: fV = i, e)
- (c) (C)fV: + Aff. + fV (= Sub-rule 6 2.1.)  
(fV: = i:, e:: fV = i, e)
- (d) (C)mV: + Aff. + fV (= Sub-rule 6 2 2.)  
(mV: = a:: fV = e)
- (e) (C) V: + n + X (= Rule 8.2.)  
(V: = a:, i:: n = [n])
- (f) (C) fV: + r + fV (= Sub-rule 10.2.1.)  
(fV: = e:: fV = i)
- (g) (C) V: + l + X (= Rule 11.2.)  
(V: = a:)
- (But cf. Sub-rule 11.2.1. !)
- (h) (C) V: + v + X (= Rule 12.2.)  
(V: = a:)

Conditioning factors for gī-

- (a) (C) cV + X (= Rule 1.1.)  
(cV = ī, ē)
- (b) (C) V + Ret./r + X (= Rule 2.1.)
- (c) (C) V + ∅ (< \*/\*r) + X (= Rule 2.1.1.)
- (d) (C) V + Lab. + X (= Rule 4.1.)  
(V = a, u, e, o)

Exception: tppa-gippa

- (e) (C) V + Den. + X (= Rule 5.1.)  
(V = a, u, e, o)





(But cf. Sub-rules 5.1.1. and 5.1.2. !)

(f) (C) V + Vel. + X (= Rule 7.1.)  
(V = a, i, u, o)

(g) (C) V + n + X (= Rule 8.1.)  
(V = a; n = [n] )

(But cf. Sub-rule 8.1.1. !)

(h) (c)V + y + X (= Rule 9.1.)  
(V = a)

(i) (C) V + r + X (= Rule 10.1.)  
(V = a, o)

Exception: *carapaṇige-girapaṇige*

(But cf. Sub-rule 10.1.1. !)

(j) (C) V + vv + X (= Sub-rule 12.1.1)  
(V = a, e)

Conditioning factors for *gĩ*:-

(a) (C) cV: + X (= Rule 1.2.)  
(cV: = i:, e:)

(b) (C) V: + Ret. / r + X (= Rule 2.2.)

(c) (C) V: + Ø (< \*l/\*r) + X (= Rule 2.2.1.)

(d) (C)bV: (= Rule 3.2.)  
(bV: = u:, o:)

(e) (C)V: + Den. + X (= Rule 5.2.)  
(V: = a:)

(f) (C)V: + Aff + X (= Rule 6.2.)  
(V: = a:, u:, e:, o:)

Exceptions: *ma:cu:-gi:cu*, *ku:cu:-gi:cu*

(But cf. Sub-rules 6.2.1. and 6.2.2. !)

(g) (C)V: + Vel. + X (= Rule 7.2.)  
(V: = u:)

(h) (C)V: + y + X (= Rule 9.2.)  
(V: = a:, o:)

(i) (C)V: + r + X (= Rule 10.2.)  
(V: = i:, u:)

(But cf. Sub-rule 10.2.1. !)

(j) (O) bV: + l + fV (= Sub-rule 11.2.1.)  
(bV: = o:; fV = e)

*Note:* From among the conditioning factors listed under 3.2.1. - 3.2.4., only the following are to be regarded as giving rise to fixed rules as to the occurrence of,

- (a) *gi:-* : 3.2.2. (a);
- (b) *gĩ-* : 3.2.3. (a), (b), (c);
- (c) *gĩ:-* : 3.2.4. (a), (b), (c), and (d),  
as initial syllables of echo-words.

### Conclusion

On the whole, the "unrestricted-productive" type of echo-word formation in AKu., represents a quite intricate problem in so far as it reveals, in comparison with other Dravidian languages, peculiar, puzzling, and therefore, remarkable principles. The analysis demonstrated that, as was referred to in the beginning, the occurrence of either *gi-/gi:-* or *gĩ-/gĩ:-* as initial syllables of echo-words depend on the respective phoneme structures of the basic words; the conditioning factors being either, the vowel quality of the basic word's initial syllable or, the quality of the consonant(s) (C, CC, NC) following the vowel of the basic word's initial syllable or, in addition to these factors, the vowel quality of the basic word's second syllable.

The analysis of the respective phoneme structures of the basic words of the references at hand the results of which have, subsequent to the analysis, been summarized synoptically, has given rise to the setting up of,

- (a) three possible rules (6.1., 11.1., 12.1.) and four possible sub-rules (5.1.1., 5.1.2., 8.1.1., 10.1.1.), as to the occurrence of *gi-*;
- (b) one fixed rule (3.1.), four possible rules (4.2., 8.2., 11.2., 12.2.) and three possible sub-rules (6.2.1., 6.2.2., 10.2.1.), as to the occurrence of *gi:-*;
- (c) three fixed rules (1.1., 2.1., 2.1.1.), six possible rules (4.1., 5.1., 7.1., 8.1., 9.1., 10.1.) and one possible sub-rule (12.1.1.), as to the occurrence of *gĩ-*;
- (d) four fixed rules (1.2., 2.2., 2.2.1., 3.2.), five possible rules (5.2., 6.2., 7.2., 9.2., 10.2.) and one possible sub-rule (11.2.1.), as to the occurrence of *gĩ:-*, as initial syllables of echo-words.

Thus, from among the set-up thirty-five rules and sub-rules, only eight rules form clear-cut rules, whereas the majority of them, twenty-seven, are to be regarded as tentative rules only, since the references at hand do not allow more definite statements.



At any rate, more searching appears to be imperative. An analysis of additional, more extensive data might enable us to arrive at final, unequivocal conclusions as to the peculiar principles underlying this type of echo-word formation in AKu., which to draw the Dravidologists' attention to, was the aim of this paper.

### Abbreviations

#### 1. Abbreviations for language names

AKu.	Ālu Kuṛumba	Kol.	Ko'ami
Engl.	English	PDr.	proto-Dravidian
IA.	Indo-Aryan	Port.	Portuguese
Ka.	Kannaḍa	Ta.	Tamil
Koḍ.	Koḍagu	Tu.	Tulu

#### 2. Other abbreviations

Aff. affricate (c/cc = [ts] / [tts]; j / jj = [dz] / [ddz])

DBIA *Dravidian Borrowings from Indo-Aryan* (cf. references sub Emeneau/Burrow 1962)

DED *Dravidian Etymological Dictionary* (cf. references sub Burrow/Emeneau 1961)

Den. dental (t/tt, d/dd, n-/nd/n [c/j])

Lab. labial (p/pp, b/bb, m/mm/mb)

lw. loan-word

Ret. retroflex (ʈ/ʈʈ, ɖ/ɖɖ, ɳ/ɳɳ/ɳɖ, ʡ/ʡʡ)

Vel. velar (k/kk, g/gg. ŋ/ŋg)

#### 3. Symbols

bV/bV: short/long back vowel (u/u: o/o:)

C/CC consonant/double consonant

cV/cV: short/long centralized vowel (ĩ/ĩ:, ẽ/ẽ:)

fV/fV: short/long front vowel (i/i:, e/e:)

l voiced alveolar lateral

mV/mV: short/long mid vowel (a/a:)

n/nn (in medial position:) single/geminated apico-alveolar nasal ([n] / [nn])

NC consonant preceded by (homorganic) nasal

r voiced post-dental/alveolar trill

r voiced apico-alveolar/post-alveolar trill

V/V: short/long vowel

v	voiced labio-dental fricative
w	geminated voiced bilabial fricative
X	whole of phonemes forming the rest of the respective word
Ø	zero
*	reconstructed phoneme or form
/ /	phonemic
[ ]	phonetic
>	results in
<	results from (historically)
→	leads to

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## **INTENSIFIERS IN HINDI<sup>1</sup>**

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In this paper, we shall first discuss the main characteristics of intensifiers in Hindi. In quite a many languages around the world, intensifiers and reflexives are either identical or very similar. This leads some to regard both, intensifiers and true reflexives, as having been derived from the same underlying structure, thus obliterating the distinction between the two. In this paper, we shall show that the reflexive and the intensifier are two distinct entities, derived from two underlying structures and have distinct functions to perform. We shall further argue that the feature [INT] should be posited in the base to indicate the intensive meaning.

In every language there is a device (often morphologically marked) whose function is to bring a noun phrase into prominence. One such device is to have an 'intensifier' which is generally placed adjacent to the noun phrase that is being made prominent, thus conveying the idea of emphasis.

Most of the grammars of Hindi miss description about intensifiers, for example, Guru (1926), Kachru (1980) to mention a few. And if a grammar mentions the intensifier used in the language, it groups the intensifier with the true reflexive, giving only the form which is used in the language, for example, Kellog (1875), Saksena (1937). Even in the recent years, no known detailed work has been done on intensifiers in any major Indo-Aryan language.

<sup>1</sup>This paper is based on the findings of the U. G. C. project on 'A Study of Linguistic Typology, Language Contact and Areal Universals in the Indian subcontinent' The abbreviations used are: B = Bengali, O = Oriya, E = English.



Linguists have either completely ignored intensifiers or they have merely made a mention of it.<sup>2</sup>

In this section, we shall discuss the main characteristics of intensifiers in Hindi.

In Hindi, as in other Indo-Aryan languages, the shape of the intensifier is similar to the reflexive used in the language. In Hindi, *apne āp*, *svayam* and *xud* are used as intensifiers, as sentence (1) below illustrates. Notice that *apne āp*, followed by a post-position, functions as the reflexive marker in Hindi. Sentence (2) is illustrative.

#### Intensifier

- (1) māĩ { *apne āp* } nāṭak dekhne gayā thā  
          { *svayam* }  
          { *xud* }

I Int. play to see had gone  
'I myself had gone to see the play.'

#### Reflexive

- (2) māĩ *apne āp* ko kos rahā hū  
I self to am cursing  
'I am cursing myself.'

It is important to mention that in Hindi, *apne āp*, *svayam* and *xud* can interchangeably occur when intensifier intensifies a [+Human] noun phrase but only *apne āp* can occur when the head noun phrase is a [-Human] noun phrase. The following sentences are illustrative.


- (3) jahāz { *apne āp* } jal gayā  
          { \* *svayam* }  
          { \* *xud* }

aeroplane Int. caught fire  
'The aeroplane caught fire by itself.'

- (4) rādhika { *apne āp* } jal gayī  
          { *svayam* }  
          { *xud* }

Radhika Int. caught fire  
'Radhika caught fire by herself.'

<sup>2</sup>Leskosky (1972) correctly points out 'while reflexive pronouns have been analyzed and found to have important implications for transformational grammar study, the closely related phenomenon of the intensive reflexive has been ignored, perhaps on the assumption that in itself it is uninteresting or that it at least has nothing to contribute beyond the insights garnered from the study of other reflexive pronouns' (Leskosky, 1972: 42).



Another important characteristic of the intensifiers in Hindi is that the intensifiers *apne ap*, *svayam* and *xud* remain the same irrespective of the person, number, gender and honorificity distinctions of their head noun. The following sentence illustrates this.

- (5) { māi ne  
I ERG.  
ham ne  
we ERG.  
tū ne  
you ERG.  
(nonpolite)  
āp ne  
you ERG.  
(polite)  
bacce ne  
child ERG. }
- apne ap yah kām nahī kiyā*  
Int. this work not did

Further, a common feature that is shared by most of the languages around the world is that the intensifier occurs to the right of its head noun phrase in the unmarked word order. The following sentences from English clearly show this.

E : (6) John himself went to see the play.

E : (7) \* Himself went to see the play.

Thus, any noun phrase, may it be the subject, the object, or the oblique object, can potentially be in the scope of the intensifier as long as it precedes the intensifier. However, in Hindi only the subject noun phrase can be in the scope of the intensifier, since it is governed by the Subject Antecedent Condition. We shall deal with the conditions needed for the realization of the intensifier in section 5.0.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>2</sup>In Hindi the intensifier can be moved to different positions in a sentence. Notice that with change in the position of the intensifier does not cease to intensify the subject. The following sentences are illustrative.

- (i) *riṭā xud har jagah jāne ke liye*  
Rita Int. everywhere to go for  
*tayyār rahti hai*  
is
- (ii) *riṭā har jagah jāne ke liye xud tayyār*  
Rita everywhere to go for Int. ready  
*rahti hai*  
is
- (iii) *riṭā har jagah jāne ke liye tayyār*  
Rita everywhere to go for ready  
*rahti hai xud*  
is Int.
- (iv) *xud riṭā har jagah jāne ke liye tayyār*  
Int Rita everywhere to go for ready  
*rahti hai*  
is

'Rita herself is ready to go everywhere.'

Notice that the intensifier behaves like an adverb with regard to its movement.



To summarize, in this section, we observed that the intensifier occurs to the right of its head noun phrase in most of the languages. In Hindi, the reflexive and the intensifier (*apne āp*) are homophonous and they remain invariant with regard to the person, number, gender and honorificity distinctions of its head noun phrase.

Before proceeding to discuss as to how intensifiers should be represented in the base, it is worth considering the main differences between reflexives and intensifiers.

Generally it is assumed that the intensifier is a subset of the reflexive. That's why, an intensifier is also labelled as an Intensive Reflexive or the Emphatic Reflexive by some linguists. In this study, we shall attempt to show that such a view is untenable. The following are the main differences between the reflexive and the intensifier construction.

One crucial difference is that the reflexive and its antecedent have *different case relations* with the verb whereas the intensifier and its head noun phrase have the *same case relations*. The intensifier, in fact, is a part of its head noun phrase. The following sentences are illustrative.

**Reflexive :**

- (8) *rām ko apne ūpar gussā ā rahā hai*  
 Ram DAT. self on anger is coming.  
 'Ram is getting angry on himself.'
- (9) *sīta ne apne āp ko musibat mẽ ḍāl diyā*  
 Sita ERG. self to difficulty in put  
 'Sita put herself in difficulty.'

**Intensive :**

- (10) *baccā apne āp so gayā*  
 child Int. slept  
 'Child slept by himself.'
- (11) *suhās ne apne āp sārā kām kar liyā*  
 Suhas ERG. Int. whole work did  
 'Suhas himself did the whole work.'

The aforementioned difference also points out that the reflexive occurs only with *transitive verbs* whereas the intensifier can occur with both *transitive* as well as *intransitive verbs*.

Another difference between the reflexive and the intensifier is that a true reflexive can be questioned whereas an intensifier can be questioned along with its antecedent only as the following sentences illustrate.

**Reflexive Questioned :**

- (12.a) *rām ne apne āp ko dekhā*  
 Ram ERG. self to saw  
 'Ram saw himself.'
- (12.b) *rām ne kis ko dekhā ?*  
 Ram ERG. whom saw  
 'Whom did Ram see?'

**Intensifier Questioned :**

- (13.a) *rām apne āp pikcar dekhne gayā thā*  
 Ram Int. movie to see had gone  
 'Ram himself had gone to see the movie.'
- (13.b) \* *rām kaun pikcar dekhne gayā thā ?*  
 Ram who movie to see had gone
- (13.c) *kaun pikcar dekhne gayā thā ?*  
 who movie to see had gone  
 'Who had gone to see the movie?'

The aforementioned sentences show that the reflexive *apne āp* in sentence (12.a) can be correctly questioned, as shown in sentence (12.b) whereas the intensifier *apne āp* by itself cannot be questioned, as shown in sentence (13.b). The ungrammaticality of sentence (13.b) is due to the fact that the intensifier is dependent on its antecedent and shares the same node. Therefore, we cannot question a part of the node.

It is important to note that reflexives are always used to state coreference relations whereas an intensifier gives the interpretations of: *Personally*, *Even* and *On One's Own*, in addition to that of emphasizing an NP.<sup>4</sup>

**Personally:** In Hindi, as in English, when the intensifier comes next to the head noun phrase, it sometimes gives the interpretation of *Personally*. The following sentence is illustrative.

- (14) *māī xud vahā gayā thā*  
 I Int. there had gone  
 'I myself went there (and did not send some one else).'

But notice that such an interpretation is deduced only when the head noun phrase is [+ Human].

<sup>4</sup>It is important to mention that there are no watertight compartments among these interpretations. In fact, there are certain sentences in which more than one reading is possible. Leskosky (1972) mentions two interpretations of the intensifier. These are: *Personally* and *Even*.



A subset of this interpretation is the intensifier's usage in sentences involving expression of voluntary action, i. e., the intensifier is also used to express the fact that the subject performed the action without any compulsion or coercion. The ungrammaticality of sentence (16) illustrates this point.

- (15) *rādhā ne mā-bāp kī jabardastī se*  
 Radha ERG. mother-father of force due to  
*us laṛke se śādī kar lī*  
 that boy with marriage did  
 'Radha got married to that boy at the insistence of her parents.'

- (16) \**rādhā ne apne āp mā-bāp kī jabardastī*  
 Radha ERG. Int. mother-father of force  
*se us laṛke se śādī kar lī*  
 due to that boy with marriage did

Even – The intensifier in many instances carries the force of *Even*, i. e., it establishes its antecedent as upper or lower bound on some scale of values. The following sentences are illustrative.

- (17) *pradhān mantri ko xud bhī suprēm kort*  
 Prime Minister to Int. inclusive supreme court  
*kī āgyā kā pālan karnā paṛegā*  
 Poss. order Poss. has to obey  
 'Even the Prime Minister himself should obey the order of the Supreme Court.'

- (18) *maulvi ko xud bhī chah bār kurān*  
 Maulvi DAT. Int. inclusive six times Quran  
*paṛhnī paṛtī hai*  
 has to read  
 'Even the Maulvi has to read the Quran six times (a day),'

On One's own – Intensifiers are also used for expressions such as: *On One's own*. The following sentence illustrates this interpretation.

- (19) *rām kahtā hai ki vo apne āp baṛa ādmi*  
 Ram says COMP he Int. big man  
*ban jāyegā*  
 would become  
 'Ram says that he would become big on his own.'

It is interesting to note that the intensifier while expressing this interpretation is sometimes reduplicated in Indo-Aryan

languages such as Bengali, Assamese and Oriya. But notice that a true reflexive cannot be reduplicated. The following sentences illustrate that the reduplicated intensifier conveys the interpretation of *On One's Own*.

B : (20) rām bhābe je      še nije nije boga babe  
 Ram thinks COMP he Int.      big would become  
 'Ram thinks that he would become big on his own.'

O : (21) rām { *nije nije* } mote sobu kōhila  
                                  { *ape* }  
Ram Int.                   to me everything said  
‘Ram told me everything on his own.’

Another important difference between the reflexive and the intensifier is that the form used to indicate the reflexive and the intensive meaning is *not* universally homophonous.

It is true that in Indo-Aryan languages the reflexive and the intensifier are homophonous, but this cannot be regarded as an universal phenomenon. For instance, in Telugu, the reflexive and the intensive form as well as mechanisms used are not identical.<sup>5</sup> Besides Dravidian languages such as Telugu, there are languages such as Mono (the verbal reflexive is *na-* and the intensifier is *pī'-su*), of the Numic subfamily and the Luiseno (the reflexive is *pro + coax* and the intensifier is *Pro + xay*) of the Takic subfamily where the two are morphologically distinct.<sup>6</sup>

It is interesting to note that though Bhat (1978) acknowledges the distinction between the reflexive and the intensifier, he fails to make a clear distinction between a true reflexive and an intensifier. The following sentence of Bhat (1978) is worth mentioning:

E : (22) The rats have learnt to swim by themselves.

According to Bhat (ibid) the aforementioned sentence represents 'cumulative reflexive meaning'. But, notice that *by themselves* in sentence (22) is *not* an instance of the reflexive; it

<sup>5</sup>Subbarao and Saxena (1984) shows that the reflexive meaning in Telugu, is conveyed by means of a coreferential pronominal + *kon*, the verbal reflexive. A coreferential pronominal is composed of:

a coreferential pro + case marker + a pronominal copy of NP<sub>i</sub>. For example, in the first person, *nannu-nānu* is the coreferential pronominal which consists of *nannu* 'I + ACC.' with a pronominal copy of NP, i. e., *nānu* 'I'.

But to express the intensive meaning, in the first person, *nāmaṭuku nēnu* 'my + Int + I' occurs

<sup>a</sup>Mono and Luiseno data are from Langacker (1976).



gives the intensive meaning. The verb *swim* is an intransitive verb and therefore, the question of occurrence of a reflexive with an intransitive verb does not arise.

Langacker (1976) claims that the intensifier could be considered as a part of the head noun phrase, but incorrectly states that the following sentence is ambiguous between a true reflexive sense and an intensive sense.

E : (23) The girls did it by themselves.

Commenting on Langacker's sentence, Bhat (ibid) argues that sentence (23) has the interpretation of the reflexive only because in sentence (23) *themselves* occurs with a preposition.

But it should be pointed out here that sentence (23) does not have a reflexive interpretation at all; it has only the intensive meaning. As stated earlier, only the reflexive can be questioned and not the intensifier alone. If we apply this test on sentence (23), we can question *girls* + *Int.* and never the *Int.* alone.

To summarize, in this section, we observed that though both the reflexive and the intensifier are bound anaphors and in languages such as Hindi, the form used to indicate the reflexive and the intensive meaning is the same, they belong to two distinct categories and thus perform different functions.

We shall now discuss how intensifiers should be represented at some abstract level of representation.

Linguists who discussed intensifiers have restricted their attention to its general characteristic alone, except Moravcsik (1972).

Moravcsik (ibid) regards the intensifier as *a copy of the head*<sup>7</sup> and gives the following arguments in support of her contention:

- (a) Intensifier itself 'looks like a pronoun' in that the morphological structure of the intensifier is similar to that of the pronoun in many languages;

<sup>7</sup>It is an interesting observation that the intensifier is a 'copy of the head' because it has the same morphological shape as that of a pronoun and it is coreferential with the head noun. One can also say the same thing for reflexives too by extending the same logic. But as pointed out in Saxena (1984) such a view is untenable.

- (b) the intensifier is coreferential with the head noun phrase.

Thus, she concludes:

'intensifier can perhaps be accounted for in terms of the same reflexivization rule which yields verb complement reflexive pronouns' (Moravcsik *ibid*: 277).

Moravcsik's contentions are correct in so far as the data from Hindi and other Indo-Aryan languages are concerned. However, her conclusion is incorrect because as pointed out in the previous section, reflexives and intensifiers belong to two distinct categories, conveying two different semantic contents. Thus, the intensifier *cannot* be derived by the reflexivization rule which yields verb complement reflexives as Moravcsik points out.<sup>8</sup>

The question that arises now is: How are intensifiers represented in the underlying representation?

Since an intensifier adds to the shade of meaning of a sentence, it should not be transformationally derived. It should be posited in the *base*. There could be two alternatives:

- (a) Posit an empty node for the intensifier, or
- (b) posit the feature [INT] in the base which would indicate the intensive meaning.<sup>9</sup>

Notice that if we accept alternative (a), then we would be faced with a question such as: Are empty nodes meaning bearing elements or are they null? If they are null, then how can we introduce a meaning bearing element by means of a transformation? Introducing meaning bearing elements would give vast powers to transformations. And, secondly, if the empty node is a meaning bearing element, then how can we regard it as empty? This shows that alternative (a) is *ad hoc*. McCawley (1982) too argues against empty nodes. Further, Subbarao (1973) rejects the proposal of having empty nodes on the basis of evidence from extraposition in Hindi.

<sup>8</sup>One may wish to propose that the intensifier be derived transformationally by creating a new node. Such a view is not acceptable because as we have shown earlier an intensifier adds to the shade of meaning of the sentence.

<sup>9</sup>Another alternative can be: Posit the full intensifier in the base (in consonance with Jackendoff's Interpretive approach of reflexivization). But notice that Jackendoff's approach of reflexivization is too complicated and at the same time, the output is not very convincing. See Subbarao (1983) and Saxena (1984) for arguments against Jackendoff's approach of reflexives). Similar arguments can also be given against positing the full intensifier in the base.



In this paper, we claim that the feature [INT] should be posited in the base for the realization of the intensifier. We shall label our approach as the *Base approach*. The basic assumption for positing [INT] in the base is that an intensifier has its own meaning and it is not merely a dummy. Notice that though intensifiers and reflexives have distinct syntactic and semantic properties, as pointed out in section 3.0, they both have one basic property in common, namely, both are bound anaphors. By positing intensifiers as well as reflexives in the base in terms of [INT] and [SELF]<sup>10</sup> respectively, we are able to capture the commonness between the two, still keeping them as two distinct categories in the base.

We shall now consider the conditions required for the realization of the intensifiers in Hindi and shall also observe how the Base Theory explains the facts regarding the intensifiers in Hindi.

We shall first discuss the conditions required for the realisation of the intensifiers in Hindi. One essential condition required for triggering the intensifiers is the Subject Antecedent Condition. The intensifier in Hindi must have the subject NP as its antecedent<sup>11</sup> and not any other noun phrase of the sentence. This is due to the Subject Antecedent Condition which leads to its unique reference noun phrase. The Subject Antecedent Condition states:

The feature [INT] is realized as an intensifier only when the NP which is its head noun phrase, is in the *subject position*.

<sup>10</sup>See Subbarao (1983) and Saxena (1984) for justifications for positing [SELF] in the base for the realization of reflexive.

<sup>11</sup>In Hindi, in certain restricted usages, *xud*, the intensifier, can refer to the object noun phrase too.

The following sentence is illustrative.

- |     |                  |        |            |               |                 |
|-----|------------------|--------|------------|---------------|-----------------|
| (v) | jab              | log    | <i>xud</i> | <i>rām kī</i> | nahī̃ sunte to  |
|     | when             | people | Int.       | Ram poss      | not listen then |
|     | uske             |        | bāp        | kī            | kaun sunegā     |
|     | his (Poss. Pno.) | father |            | poss          | who will listen |
- 'When people don't listen to Ram himself then who will listen to his father'.

Notice that in this aforementioned sentence *xud* can refer to *rām* if said with a contrastive intonation. And notice further that if we move *xud* to the right *rām* then it will refer to *māĩ* 'I' and not to *rām*. It is important to mention that such sentences in which intensifier refers to the object nounphrase are very few.





Let us now see how the Base Theory explains the facts regarding intensifiers in Hindi. Consider a sentence such as (24).

- (24) *rām ne apne ap rāvaṇ ko mārā*  
 Ram ERG. Int. Ravan to killed  
 'Ram himself killed Ravan.'

The underlying representation of this sentence, following the Base Theory, would be:

- (24. a) [ [ *rām* [INT] ] [ *rāvaṇ* *mārā* ] ]  
           S NP           NP VP           VP S  
           Ram           Ravan           killed

Notice the [INT] would be realized as *apne ap* and *svayam* and *xud* if the Sentential Ancestry Condition and the Subject Antecedent Condition are met.

As pointed out above, *xud* and *svayam* can occur only when the head noun is [+Human]. One might raise a question as to how to stop generating ungrammatical sentences such as:

- (25) *per xud gir paṛā*  
 tree Int. fell down  
 'The tree fell down by itself.'

Such a sentence poses no problem because we can stop generating such sentences by putting a condition, such as the following in the grammar of Hindi.

*xud* or *svayam* occur only when the head noun is [+Human].


To summarize, in this paper we have dealt with the characteristics of the intensifier in Hindi and the conditions required for its realization. We have further shown that though the intensifier and the reflexive have some commonness, they perform distinct functions and therefore they should be treated differently. We have further dealt with the question as to how the intensifiers are represented at the underlying level. We have argued that the intensifier should not be derived transformationally, rather, the feature [INT] should be posited in the base to represent the intensifier.

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## **TENSE SHIFT IN SALEM TELUGU DUE TO CONTACT WITH TAMIL**

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### **1. Introduction**

The variations in the tense system of Salem Telugu dialects are examined here. Salem is predominantly a Tamil speaking area, being the second largest town in Tamil Nadu with a population of over 5.2 lakhs (based on 1981 census figures). Due to commercial viability and geographical proximity to other commercial centres of the state including the adjoining Bangalore city (of Karnataka state), the town is comprised of a cosmopolitan population. Apart from Tamil, these people use many other languages, viz., Telugu, Kannada, Saurashtra, Urdu, Hindi, English. Telugu speakers of Salem number around 12% of the total population (based on 1961 census figures), and in contrast to other language speakers, are known to have settled in this area five to six centuries ago.

The tense system of Salem Telugu has retained certain old and middle Telugu forms apart from structural readjustment with the dominant language Tamil. Even within Salem Town, there are different varieties of Telugu attested on caste/ethnological lines. These dialects are mutually exclusive due to social distance between the speech communities and thus the developments are confined to specific dialects or varieties of the language. The time difference in the date of migration of these communities could also be considered for the mutually exclusive developments in the dialects.

The two varieties of Telugu studied here are those of Arya-Vysya and Naidu castes. Socially, both the castes occupy a higher strata. Speakers of these communities are settlers in Salem ranging between one and six centuries. The socio-educational set-up of Salem permits the study of Tamil alone in the

school since the past five or six decades. Earlier to this, the number of schools were limited and the speakers did not show as much interest in education as in commerce. Few speakers who could afford education had the facility to avail it in Telugu or Tamil depending on their economic position. But at the present time, there is no way of learning Telugu in Salem by native Telugus. This has lead to zero literacy in Telugu for these speakers. Most of the present generation Telugus are literates either in Tamil (the local dominant language) or English (the educationally dominant language). Telugu is confined to home situation whereas Tamil is used practically for every other purpose. Even during socialization with various Telugu communities, Tamil is preferred to Telugu by the speakers due to differences in their respective Telugu dialects and the poor competence in Telugu usage for non-domestic purposes. Using Tamil again helps in enhancing social identity in the peculiar socio-political set-up.

Tamil is used by all Telugu speakers irrespective of sex, age, education, social, or economical back-ground. All Telugu speakers are thus seen to learn Tamil from their very childhood and are competent bilinguals. There are instances when many native Telugus are seen to show superior command in Tamil to their own native languages. Such a situation leads to language convergence (cf. Weinreich 1953, Karunakaran 1980).

The impact of language contact and the resultant language developments in the tense system of Salem Telugu due to its contact with Tamil are examined here. The popular idea of filling a structural gap in such developments are not necessarily true (cf. Nadkarni 1975), for it could be seen that there never existed a structural gap in the tense system of Salem Telugu, the observed developments are one of structural readjustment with Tamil, the local dominant language.

Tamil and Telugu form part of South Dravidian I and II respectively. Being members of the Dravidian family, these languages were known to share common features in the early stages of their development. The tense shift in Salem Telugu is hence analysed in the light of the old and modern Telugu tense developments. Structural symmetries between Telugu and Tamil are prime in retaining old Telugu forms in the present day Salem Telugu, and the other developments in the tense system could be attributed to factors including language contact, diffusion, etc., or intensive and extensive bilingualism as preferred by Nadkarni (1975:673).



## 2. Analysis of tense shift in Salem Telugu

The developments in Salem Telugu tense system are discussed here with reference to old, middle, and modern Telugu forms. Comparisons are also drawn from Rajapalayam Telugu, a non-native variety of Telugu as well from Tamil, the local dominant language, wherever necessary. The study concentrates on two major caste dialects of Salem Telugu, viz. Arya-Vysya and Naidu. The old Telugu forms of Krishnamurti (1961) are the forms which were in use upto 16th century A. D. and the later forms are denoted as modern Telugu by him. Sastri (1969) indicates the forms upto 10th century A.D. as old Telugu, those between 11th and 16th centuries A. D. as middle Telugu, and the later ones as modern/new Telugu. With this background, the Salem Telugu tense system is analysed here.

### 2.1 Salem Arya-Vysya Telugu: past-tense

The past tense forms in the Arya-Vysya dialect of Salem Telugu are as follows. These forms are shown in comparison to related forms in other varieties of Telugu. The structure of the fully formed verb is:

verb stem + tense - mode suffix + personal suffix.

	Salem Arya-Vysya Telugu	Old Telugu (k) & middle Telugu(S)	Sub-standard (new) Rayalaseema Telugu
ammu 'to sell'			
I Sg.	amm-iti-ni	-iti-ni	-iti-ni
Pl.	amm-iti-ni	-iti-mi	-iti-mi
II Sg.	amm-iti-wi	-iti-wi	-iti-wi
Pl.	amm-iti-ri	-iti-ri	-iti-ri
III Sg.M.	amm-in-aaDu	-e-nu	-e-nu
F/N.	amm-e	-e-nu	-in-di
Pl. H.	amm-i-ri	-i-ri	-i-ri-
N. H.	amm-e	-e-nu	—

Where K and S in parenthesis denote Krishnamurti and Mahadeva Sastri respectively, Abbreviations:

Sg = Singular, Pl = plural, M. = masculine, F. = feminine,  
N. = Neuter, H. = human, and N. H. = non-human.

-ti- appears as a variant to -iti- after stem alternants ending in *S* (as in *cees-ti-ni* 'I did') and -ṭi- after alternants ending in *n* (as in *win-ṭi-ni* 'I heard'). The first and second person forms conform to the old-Telugu forms of Krishnamurti (1961) and middle Telugu forms of Sastri (1969). Sub-standard

variety of Rayalaseema (new) Telugu also shows these forms according to Sastri (1969:248). The third person feminine neuter singular and the non-human plural forms of Salem Arya-Vysya Telugu are similar to those of old Telugu forms shown by Sastri (1969:209) as in *icce* 'gave', *Koffe* 'beat', etc. (of 7th to 10th centuries A. D. Telugu). While Krishnamurti (1961:189) also lists these forms, the ones attested in the present day Salem Arya-Vysya Telugu lack the gender-number-person markers (ie. personal suffix) indicated by him. The third person singular masculine form seems to be an innovation in Salem Arya-Vysya Telugu not conforming to any of the above varieties of Telugu. The third person feminine/neuter singular has an occasional alternant *-in-di* which again is an innovation in line with its masculine counterpart. Modern Telugu uses the form *-in-di* and *-i-aay* for singular feminine/neuter and plural non-human third persons respectively, where, *-i-aa* is morphophonemic spelling and phonemically it is *-ææ* according to Krishnamurti (1961:213). Unlike modern Telugu, Arya-Vysya Telugu has not innovated the third person non-human plural\*. The structural preservation here is one of old Telugu and conforms to an extent to that of colloquial Tamil system. The Tamil past-tense system (diglossic) is as follows for the verb *Vaa* 'to come'.

Tamil	Colloquial	Literary
I Sg.	Van-d-ææ	Van-d-een
Pl.	Van-d-oō	Van-d-oom
II Sg.	Van-d-ee	Van-d-aay
Pl.	Van-d-iinga	Van-d-iirxa!
III Sg. M.	Van-d-aā	Van-d-aan
F.	Van-d-aa	Van-d-aa!
N.	Van-d-icci	Van-d-adu
Pl. H.	Van-d-aanga	Van-d-aarxa!
N. H.	Van-d-icci	Van-d-ana

## 2.2 Salam Naidu Telugu: past tense

The variety spoken by Salem Naidu speakers shows the following past tense forms. Related forms are listed along with it.

\*i-ay, but maintains its singular counterpart itself to denote plurality.



ammu 'to sell'	Salem Naidu Telugu	Rayalaseema (new) Variant (S)	Middle & New Telugu (S)
I Sg.	amm-in-aanu	-in-aanu	-in-aanu
Pl.	-in-aamu	-in-aamu	-in-aamu
II Sg.	-in-aawu	-in-aawu	-in-aawu
Pl.	-in-aaru	-in-aaru	-in-aaru
III Sg.M.	-in-aadu	-in-aadu	-in-aadu
F/N.	-in-di	-in-di	-in-di
Pl. H.	-in-aaru	-in-aaru	-in-aaru
N. H.	-in-di	—	-in-avi/ayi

While first and second person forms are similar to those of middle and new Telugu forms, the observed variations are in the third person forms. Singular masculine of third person, where nazalization is shown by Sastri for middle and new Telugu forms (1969: 234) and Rayalaseema (new Telugu) variants (1969: 248) are not attested in Salem Naidu Telugu. Kumaraswami Raja (n.d.: 83) shows past tense constructions in Rajapalayam Telugu (non-native) which are close to those of Sastri's middle and new Telugu forms.

The other deviation is observed in the third person non-human plural, where the plurality of middle and new Telugu forms are not employed by Salem Naidu Telugu. Same is the case with Rajapalayam Telugu. It is important here to note that these deviations centre around gender-number-person suffix and not that of the tense marker as such. It could be added that old Telugu word structure, viz, verb stem + Tense-mode suffix + Personal suffix is preserved in the third person non-human plural of Salem Naidu and Rajapalayaum Telugu dialects.

Retention of *-iti-* / *-in-* forms in the past tense of Salem Telugu dialects could be due to the impact of similar past tense markers occurring in Tamil. (Modern Telugu past tense marker is *-ææ-* except in third person feminine/neuter singular, where it is *-in-*). Tamil, according to Arden (1891: 149) has four basic past tense markers, viz. *-nd-*, *-tt-*, *-in-*, and *-d-* along with seven other modified forms, viz. *-nd-*, *-nR-*, *-tt-*, *-RR-*, *-t-*, *-R-*, and *-kk-*. The proximity of Tamil past tense forms to those of Salem Telugu forms indicate the possible phonological impact and the subsequent retention of these tense forms, dating upto the 16th century A. D., instead of adopting the modern Telugu past tense form *-ææ-* that deviates greatly from any of these forms.

### 2.3 Salem Arya-Vysya Telugu : non-past

The developments in the non-past/future-habitual in Salem Telugu reveal more interesting facts on language contact and structural readjustments. Modern Telugu uses one and the same form to denote future-habitual as well as non-past (Krishnamurti, 1961). Old Telugu showed a hortative form that included non-past as well. Salem Arya-Vysya Telugu, in contrast to these, has developed different forms for definite habitual and future. It is permissible to use the future forms to denote habitualness by Salem Arya-Vysya Telugus; in addition to this, they have developed a separate set of tense forms denoting "definite habituality", thus, adopting to a two way tense distinction in non-past as is the case with Tamil. Tamil shows a present and future distinction in the non-past. Arden (1891 : 137) points out that in Tamil, "Future is often used of indefinite time, and to express habit or custom," and continues to state (1891 : 265) that, "The present tense, besides its ordinary use to denote action taking place in present time, is sometimes used for the future tense, to denote certainty or rapidity..... The present tense is also sometimes used to express habit or custom". It should be noted here that, unlike Tamil, the non-past tense system of Salem Arya-Vysya Telugu is split as definite habitual and future; and the definite habitual not always functions as the Tamil present tense. This development is not one of filling a structural gap, but one of structural readjustment with the local dominant language Tamil. It is interesting to note here that Kumaraswmi Raja (n.d. : 83) has identified present and future tense systems in Rajapalayam Telugu (the non-native Telugu dialect) as well. He equates his present tense forms to that of colloquial Tamil present tense form *-r-* and continues to state that they denote "future" as well in contrast to his future tense system which denotes "indefinite future". Basing on the data supplied by him, his statement would sound better if the terms *future as well* and *indefinite future* read as *definite habitual* and *indefinite habitual* respectively.

ammu	Salem Arya-Vysya Telugu:	Rajapalayam Telugu:
'to sell'	definite habitual	Present
I Sg.	amm-ee-nu	amm-ee-nu
Pl.	amm-ee-mu	amm-ee-mu
II Sg.	amm-ee-wu	amm-ee-wu
Pl.	amm-ee-ru	amm-ee-ru
III Sg. M,	ammu-t-aadu	amm-ee-nadu
F/N.	ammu-t-aandi	ammu-tun-di
Pl. H.	ammu-tu-ru	amm-ee-ru
N. H.	ammu-t-aandi	— — —



In contrast to Salem Arya-Vysya Telugu, Rajapalayam Telugu has extended the range of its present tense marker to third person forms as well, except in third person feminine/neuter singular, and non-human plural (form not donoted in the above list). The variations in the third person cannot be discussed thoroughly since the very set is an innovation both in Salem and Rajapalayam Telugu. Also a discussion is not possible at this stage until the source for this particular tense marker is established in one of the native Telugu dialects, data on which is not available at the moment for verification. It could but be hypothesised here the tense form *-ee-* above could have been derived from old Telugu hortative marker *-eda-*, a concrete evidence for which is awaited as yet.

The developments in the future tense system of Salem Arya-Vysya Telugu in relation to Rajapalayam Telugu and native Telugu are as listed delow.

ammu 'to sell'	Salem Arya-Vysya Telugu : future	Rajapalayam Telugu:future	Sub-standard (new) Rayalaseema Telugu (S) : non-past
I Sg.	ammu-tu-nu	-tu-nu	-tu-nu
Pl.	-tu-mu	-tu-mu	-tu-mu
II Sg.	-tu-wu	-tu-wu	-tu-wu
Pl.	-tu-ru	-tu-ru	-tu-ru
III Sg. M.	-tu-du	-nu	-tū-du
F/N.	-nu	-nu	-ta-di
Pl H.	-tu-ru	-tu-ru	-ta-ru
N. H.	-nu	—	-ta-wi

Where S in parenthesis denotes Mahadeva Sastri.

The first and second person non-past forms of Sastri's (1969:249) Rayalaseema sub-standard new Telugu, and the future tense forms of Kumaraswami Raja's (n.d :83) non native Rajapalayam Telugu conform to those of Salem Arya-Vysya Telugu. The third person plural human forms are also alike in these varieties.

The third person masculine singular form in Salem Arya-Vysya Telugu is an innovation while the feminine/neuter form is a retention of the old Telugu habitual form (cf. Krishnamurti 1961:189) In contrast to this Rajapalayam Telugu retains the old Telugu forms both in masculine and feminine/neuter third person singulars. It could be seen here that the future tense is unmarked (ie.  $\phi$ ) in these forms (cf. Krishnamurti (1961;189). But Kumaraswami Raja (n d.:83) identifies the *-nu* form as tense scffix and states that,

"The future tense suffix /tu/ has the allomorph /nu/ when it occurs before the personal endings meaning 'he', 'she, it', which are unmarked". This could be a case of wrong morphological identification by Kumaraswami Raja.

A comparison of past (SeC.2.1), future, and definite habituals in Salem Arya-Vysya Telugu would reveal that gender-number-person is unmarked in the past, tense is unmarked in the future while both these are marked in definite habituals of the third person singular feminine/neuter and plural non-human.

Another interesting point in the above tense developments is the retention of old Telugu form in the third person non-human plural of Salem Arya-Vysya Telugu in contrast to the development observed in the standard new Rayalaseema Telugu.

Salem Naidu Telugu however has not developed separate forms for definite habitual. Non-past cum habitual future of this variety deviates mainly in the third person forms from that of Krishnamurti's (1961:213) modern Telugu and Sastri's (1969:249) Circar's (new) Telugu. The first and second person forms are alike in all these varieties.

The variations are as follows:

ammu 'to sell'	Salem Naidu Telugu future-habitual/no-past	Circar's (new) Telugu (S)	Modern Telugu (K)
I Sg.	ammu-t-aanu	-t-aanu	-t-aanu
Pl.	-t-aamu	-t-aamu	-t-aamu
II Sg.	-t-aawu	-t-aawu	-t-aawu
Pl.	-t-aaru	-t-aaru	-t-aaru
III Sg. M.	-t-aadu	-t-aadu	-t-aadu
F/N.	-t-aadi	-tun-di	-tun-di
Pl. H.	-t-aaru	-t-aaru	-t-aaru
N. H.	-t-aadi	-t-aayi	-t-aayi

Where S and K in parenthesis denote Mahadeva Sastri and Krishnamurti respectively.

The third person feminine/neuter singular form of Salem Naidu Telugu is an analogical creation. This could have been strengthened by the fact that Tamil uses the same tense form for all persons. The third person non-human plural in Salem Naidu Telugu is a structural retention of the old Telugu forms, and the modern Telugu development in gender-number-person suffix has not extended to this form.

### 3. Conclusions

The analysis of the tense system brings out interesting facts on grammatical changes due to language contact. They may be summarized as follows:



- (1) The retention of past tense elements in Salem Telugu could be due to the phonological impact of the past tense system of the local dominant language, Tamil.
- (2) The dominant language structure retards grammatical innovations in the minority language. This may be noted in the non-development of certain features in the dialects of Salem Telugu (and Rajapalayam Telugu) as opposed to such developments in native language situations (i.e. modern Telugu). Thus, non-development of separate set of third person non-human plural forms in the non-native varieties of Telugu is notable, which conform to colloquial Tamil system.
- (3) The more broader structural aspects are transferred to minority languages when they are in prolonged contact with the dominant language; and these are not prompted by the phenomena like structural gaps, etc. The development of separate set of definite habitual forms in Salem Arya-Vysya Telugu (and present tense in Rajapalayam Telugu) indicate to this fact of structural readjustment with the dominant language, Tamil.
- (4) Though correlated with forms of old, middle, and new/modern Telugu, it must be noted that these forms should have been retained between 13th and 16th centuries A. D., when the actual migration of the Salem Telugu speakers is expected to have taken place. Kumaraswami Raja (n.d.:83) notes that the Rajapalayam Telugus migrated to Tamil Nadu about three centuries ago. The social isolation of these speakers from their native population (cf. Labov 1963) may be considered to account for the present developments in the non-native Telugu varieties.
- (5) The retention of old forms in the non-native varieties help in fixing the date of migration of these speakers from their native language belts.

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## THE ITALIC GENITIVE SINGULAR IN $\bar{i}$

(with an excursus on the vedic demoninatives  
like *rathīyati*)\*

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The genitive singular in IE is a problem and especially in the context of the thematic non-feminine singular. The genitive singular (and incidentally this is the form for the ablative singular as well) of all the athematic stems is *\*-es/os*.

Compare the following examples:

	Nominative		Genitive
1. Greek	pos (pōd-s)	:	podos 'foot'
Sanskrit	pād	:	pādas
Latin	pes (ped-es)	:	pedes
Old Latin	Senatu	:	senatuos 'senate'
	homo (n)	:	homonis 'man'
Hittite	nepiš	:	nepišaš 'sky'
	laman	:	lamanaš 'name'

On the other hand, there are four endings attested for the thematic masculine-neuter stems in the various historical IE languages. It may not be out of place to mention that in the thematic class nouns the genitive and the ablative endings are different as in Sanskrit *devasya* : *devāt*. The following four endings are attested for the thematic stems.

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- |        |   |                |
|--------|---|----------------|
| attaš  | : | attas 'father' |
| arunaš | : | arunaš 'sea'   |
| pedan  | : | pedaš 'place'  |
2. -oso : Old Church Slavic *ceso* 'whose'  
Germanic *dagis* : *dagis* 'day'. Greek, *hippos* : *hippeu*
  3. *osyo* : skt. *devas* : *devasya*, GK *hippos* : *hippoio*
  4. -r̄ : Latin *urbanī*, *latini*, old Irish  
*Moqī as in Moqī Deceddas avi*

Turanias '(The store) of the son of Deces, grandson of Turanias'. The ending no 1 (-es/-os) is well attested. This es/-os alternates with -s as in *madhvas* < *medhu* + *os*; *satros* < *ketreu* + *s*. Sometimes the same stem attests both the forms as *madhvas* in RV but AV *madhos*. Thus an ending -es/os/-s is to be reconstructed for the Indo-European. However, if the evidence of very old paradigms like Avestan *panta* : *patho* is taken into consideration, we should reconstruct an ending -es/os and the ending -s may be due to accentual shift and the general tendency to have non-alternating stems.

Notice in 1.1 above Hittite shows the same ending -as both in the nominative as well as in the genitive singular. Many theories have been proposed to explain the ending -as of the genitive singular in Hittite. Pedersen (1938 : p. 26 and references there) thinks that the Hittite -as is on the analogy of the athematic stems. It has also been argued that the nominative and the vocative singular were alike at an early stage (differentiated, of course, by accentual differences), a stage still attested in the dual and the plural. With the renewal of -s in the nominative singular, perhaps on the analogy of pronouns, the genitive singular and the nominative singular become homophonous (see Vaillant, 1937, Knobloch, 1950, Lehmann, 1958, Winter, 1969). If this theory is correct then Hittite attests an extremely archaic stage.

For Greek, Indo-Iranian and Armenian we need to posit a morpheme \* -osyo. In Greek two forms are attested, -oia and -ou/ō, Meillet-Vendryes (1948:437), Chantraine (1964:39), Schwyzler (1939:555) think that -oia > or > ou/ō. Why there are two reflexes of -oia, these scholars do not explain. Kiparsky (1967:630) has suggested a better solution. In GK -osyo develops into -oyyo and then into -oia in Lesbian and Thesslian, while -osyo -oyyo > -oo > -ō -ou in the other dialects. This solution generally accords with the treatment of the consonant clusters in various Gk. dialects.



Now what is the source of *-osyo*? The handbooks suggest that the form *-osyo* spread from the pronouns. But they still do not explain how *-osyo* came to be used in the pronouns in the first place. We suggest a different solution. In Hitt. there are two connecting particles; e.g. *-ya*, and *-a*. The particle *-ya* occurs after vowel and the particle *-a* occurs after consonants. Compare Hittite: *ape-ya* 'and they'; but *appasa* 'and he'. These elements were not compulsory. Compare, for instance, Hittite, *attaš annaš* 'pater materque'; *adanna akuwanna* 'to eat and to drink'; they occur fairly frequently. We suggest that these particles *-ya* and *-a* are attested in *-osyo* and *-eso* of the various I. E. languages. The element *-ya* is the same as in the relative pronoun in Greek and Skt. (*yas*, *hos*) and, we may note in passing that *yas yo*-type of relative pronoun is not attested in Hittite.

This explanation of the origin of *-osyo* also explains a curious fact that in Vedic the gen. sg. ending *-sya* never has disyllabic scansion. It is likely that *-sya* was felt by the Vedic poets as *sya*. Hence it is always *-sya* never *siya*.\*

Notice also that *osyo* is not attested in Hittite and it is not allowed phonologically since *-os > zš* will require an *-o > a* in Hittite. The particle *-yo* becomes a relative pronoun in some Indo-European languages perhaps due to focusing.

#### Italic and Celtic Ending in *-i*

Numerous theories have been proposed to explain the aberrant *-i* form of the genitive sg. of the thematic stems of Italic and Celtic. Sommer (1902:371) suggested that *-i* is an ancient suffix of belonging and derives motivated feminine forms in I. E. For example Vedic *devi* 'goddess', Latin *divi* < \**deiwi* 'zum Gottes gehorige' (371 footnote), are formed in the same way. These forms in *-i* are also attested by the addition of other suffixes as in Latin *divi-nus*, *regina* etc. (see also Leumann, 1929:204). In the second edition of his book (1914:340), Sommer accepts Wackernagel's theory and gives up his own theory. Wackernagel (1902:125; and 1957:1347) rejected Sommer's identification of *-i* in Latin *divi* with Skt. *devi*. Wackernagel claimed that the feminine form *devi* cannot

\*I use the sign  $\neq$  in order to indicate that *ya* was not just a morpheme but a kind of sentence connector and hence *sya* could not be scanned as \**sia*. It needs to be pointed out that *cya* (where *c* stands for a consonant) can be scanned as *cia* if there is a morpheme boundary between *c* and *ya* or *cya* forms part of a root.

be related to the genitival value of *divī*. He compares the Latin construction *multī+facio*, *compendī+facio* and the Skt. construction *mithunī-karoti* to make love'. He claims that the *-ī* in *mithunī* corresponds to the *-ī* in the gen. sg. of the thematic nouns of Italic and Celtic. Pisani (1934:295-96) pointed out that the adverbial compounds like *mithunī*, *phalī*, etc. are foreign to the Vedic language. These compounds became productive in the latter language.

Let us look at the philological data. In the Rigveda there is only one example with *-ī* : *akhkhalī-kṛtya* 'croaking' at 7.103.3. This hymn is surprisingly modern in language, style, and context. As Geldner remarks 'Im ersten Fall ware das Lied eine Parodie in andern eine Travestie' (1951: ad loc). The form *akhkhalī-kṛtya* occurs in a humorous hymn in the R.V. This hymn is addressed to the frogs.

In the Atharva-Veda is attested *vātī-kṛta-*, at 6.44.3, 6.109.3 and *vātī-kārā-* at 9.8.20. Both these forms are of doubtful meaning and as Hoffmann (1952:54) remarks about these forms 'kein hoheres alter beanspruchen'. All other examples of such construction attest *-ā-* not *-ī-*. Compare the following example:

4.18 6	ālālā-bhavant-,	'sounding merrily';
8.43.8	Jañjanā-bhavant-,	'sparkling';
6.53.7	kikirā-kṛnu,	'tear to tatters';
	babharā-bhavat-,	'became confounded';
	bibibā-bhavat,	'crackling';
SB 3.85.8	śūlā kuryā't	'may he roast on a spit'.

The Vedic construction *guhā kr*, *guhā dhā-*, 'to make hidden' also belongs here. All the above examples, excepting *guhā kr-*, in the R. V. are onomatopoeic and occur only with the verb *bhu-* and *kr-*. The forms in *-ī* are not old. Only one example occurs in the Atharva-Veda.

There are other serious objections to Wackernagel's theory. Wackernagel has not noticed that the forms in *-ī* alternate with accusative sg. form in *-am*. For instance.

T. S. 2.6 5.1: *krūram iva va etat karoti, yat khananti, apo ni śāntyā* 'he does violence, when they dig, indeed he brings forth water for expiation'.

Notice here we have *-kruram-kr* But at SB 1.2.4.16 we read, *yātra va syai khānantas krūrī kurvānty apaghnāti śā'ntīr āpās tad adbhis śāntya samayati*. "They (the priests) dig her (earth).



They do violence, They destroy. Waters are expiation. He expiats with waters as expiation." Notice here the construction is *krūrī kurvanti*. In the corresponding passage in the Kāṇva recension of the ŚB *krūrī-kr* is lacking. Compare also M. S. 3 8.5. *yad evasya udghnantas krūram akrāms tad akruram akas* 'when they dig, they do violence, then he does non-violence (through expiation). Notice here again we have *krūram kr*. It has been pointed out by Winternitz (1920:419) that the construction *krūrī-kr* occurs in the more recent layers of Vedic literature. Thus the relationship between skt. *mithunī-kr-* and Latin *mutlifacio* is very doubtful.

Another objection to Wackernagel's theory is that if *multifacio* is parallel to *mithunī-kr-*, then instead of the verb *-kr-* and *bhū-*, we would expect the verb *dhā-* in Skt. The verb *dha-* is cognate with Latin *facio*. We find in Gk. and Skt. a parallel use of the root *dhā-* Gk. Compare for instance,

Z 139 *kái min tuphlòn éthēke krónouáis*  
'the son of Kronos made him blind';

Z 300 *tē'n gàr Troēs éthēkan Athēnaies hiéreian*  
'whom the Trojan had made the priestess of Athena';  
These examples are from the *Iliad* of Homer.

R. V. 3.29.7 *yām devā'sa īdyam viśvavidam havyavā'ham ādadhur*  
*adharvésu*  
'whom the goes made to be called upon all knowing,  
offer carrying among the sacrifices'.

These examples indicate that I. E. *dhē* < \**dheH* means 'to put', 'to establish', 'to make'. This *dhā-* is cognate with Latin *facio*. Now if the construction *krurīkr-* is old and of-I.E. date then why does Latin use *facio* and Skt. *-kr-* and *bhu*? We believe that there is no relationship between skt. *mithunī kr-* and Latin *multifacio* type of construction.

Wackernagel seems to have been led to the identification of *multī-facio*, *krurī-kr-*, and the *-ī* of the genitive sg. of the thematic stems by his notion of the function of the genitive. According to Wackernagel the primary function of the genitive case is adverbial and the secondary function is adnominal. Compare the following two statements:

'Waren die *-i* Formen der *-o* Stämme, soweit sie grundsprachlich bereits genitivisch waren sicher adverbaler Bedeutung' (p. 147); 'Wird *-i* am spätesten adnominal geworden sein' (p. 136)•

But such a theory is no longer acceptable. The primary function of the genitive is adnominal (objective genitive, subjective genitive), and the secondary function of the genitive is adverbial (see Kurylowicz, 1964:32, 184; Jakobson, 1966:51-89). See also Bloch (1959-60: 182-242). Thus Wackernagel's identification of Italic multi-facio and Sanskrit *mithuni kr* is not correct.

#### -osyo Formation in Celtic and Italic

Pisani (1955:315-325) derives the *-i* of the genitive sg. of the thematic stems from *-osyo*; *osyo* becomes *--oyyo> -eyye> iyye> i* (y) *i > i*. At another place (1962:103) he remarks that *-i* 'e probabilmente la continuazione di una forma in \**osyo*'. But such a derivation is phonologically untenable. The genitive sg. in *-osyo* is no doubt attested in Italic. Italic *kaisiosio* indicates *-osyo* (see also Sommer, 1914:443; Szemerényi, 1955) and also in Latin *-osyo(s)* *-skt. asya*; 'this', Latin *quouis* < *quosyo* (s): Skt. *kasya* 'whose'. The gen. sg. in *-osyo* is also attested in Celtic. Compare old Irish *a* (leniting) < \**esyo* 'his' and in Middle Welsh *-aw* < \**-esyo* (see Watkins, 1966:38). Thus \**osyo* formation did exist in Celtic and Italic. Thus the *-i* in the thematic stems as marker of the genitive must be recent.

#### The origin of *-i*

Watkins in renewing the old suggestion of Sommer, has suggested (1966:38) that the *-i* formation corresponds to Skt. nouns and adjectives in *-i*. The *-i* forms were historically adjectives of appurtenance and relational adjective. The adjectives became substantivized and came to function as nouns. The adjectival function is still attested in the historical language. Compare the following examples from the Rig Veda :

#### *rāṣṭrī-* 'ruling'

- 6.4.5. *vāyúr na rā'ṣṭry áty eti aktū'n.* 'Er uberdauret wie der herrschende Wind die Nächte' (Geldner).  
 8.100.10 *sā'ṣṭrī devā'nām* (Vāc) 'vōx) regina deorum'  
 10.125.3 *ahám rā'ṣṭrī samgāmanī vāsūnām* 'I am the ruler, (ruling on, to whom the rule pertains), the gatherer of goods'.

#### *Svarī-*

- 10.177.2 *tā'm dyotamānā'm svarīām manīṣā'm ṛtāsya padé kāvaya ní panti* 'the wise ones protect that bright resounding poem in the step (in the house) of the Reality'.



Geldner translates *svariām* 'sonnenhafte' with a question mark. He, apparently, takes it from *svar* 'sun'; but Grassmann, S. V. translates *svari* 'rauschend' (brüllend (see also Kurylowicz 1956:129).

*rathī(m)* charioteer\*, -pertaining to the chariot'

3.6.8 *a-yemiré rathyó agne áśvās* '(whose) horses, pertaining to the wagons, are yoked'.

Notice also *rathyo asvas*, where the adjectival value is well marked. *rathī* → *rathia*


6.37.3 *asarāṇā'sas śavasānām áchéndram sucakré rathia'so áśvās.*

'The horses, belonging to the wagon, with beautiful wagons, hurry forth towards the mighty Indra.'

Here the adjectival nature of *rathia* is also underscored by the ending *-āsas*. The nom pl. ending *-āsas* is mostly confined to the adjectives (cf. Macdonell 1910:260; Wockernagel 1930:100 and Kurylowicz 1964).

Within the history of Skt. *-ī* formations were either substantivaized or lost their function of 'belonging to'. The morpheme *-ī* is still productive, deriving feminine adjectives or verbal adjectives from the athematic stems. The function of 'belonging to, pertaining to' was replaced by a new derivative in *-ya*. Compare the following examples.'

<i>rāṣṭrī'</i>	:	<i>rāṣṭriya</i>	'belonging to king, kingly'.
<i>yamī'</i>	:	<i>yamiya</i>	'paired';
* <i>damī'</i>	:	<i>damiya</i>	'domesticus';
* <i>āpī'</i>	:	<i>āpiya</i>	'friendship';
<i>kṛṣṇī'</i>	:	<i>kṛṣṇiyā</i>	'black';
* <i>hṛdī</i>	:	<i>hṛ'diya-</i>	'hearty';
<i>yajñā-/-ī</i>	:	<i>yajñiyā-</i>	'honor worthy'
* <i>hotrī</i>	:	<i>hotriya</i>	'belonging to hotar'
<i>Indrī'</i>	:	<i>indriya</i>	'belonging to Indra'



Notice also that the formation of the *-ya* adjectives is different from that of *-iya*-adjectives. The *-ya* adjectives are formed from an *-ī* stem while *-iya* adjectives formed from an *-ī* stem. Compare the following contrasting pairs:

<i>-ī ávi-</i>	:	<i>ávya</i>	'sheep'
<i>kavī-</i>	:	<i>kavyā</i>	'poet'
<i>vanī-</i>	:	<i>vanyā</i>	'wish'
<i>-ī jānī</i>	:	<i>jāniya</i>	'common'

<i>a'sya-</i>	* <i>a'svi'</i>	:	<i>aśviya</i> : Latin <i>equinus</i> <* <i>ékwi</i> + <i>nos</i>
	<* <i>ekwi</i> + <i>Hnus</i>		
<i>devī</i>	: <i>devīya</i>	:	Latin <i>dīvīnus</i> <* <i>deiwi</i> + <i>nus</i>
	<i>da'miya</i>	:	Latin <i>domī</i> , Homeric <i>dmōiē</i>
			'slave women'
	<i>vīriya</i>	:	Latin <i>virī</i> ;
	<i>devīya</i>	:	Latin <i>dīvī</i> ;

This replacement of an *-ī* formation by a *-ya* formation is perfectly normal since *-ya* is a productive suffix indicating "Zugehörigkeit zum Grundwort" (Debrunner, 1954:812). Compare the following examples:

Gk. *patēr*: *pátrios*; Latin *pater*: *patrius*; Vedic *pitā'* (r): *pitrya-* 'father'

Vedic *divyá*: Gk. *dīos* 'divine';

Vedic *Jāmbha*, *jambhiya*, Gk. *gomphos*, *gomphios*; 'Jaw'

Vedic *áśva*, *áśviya*: *hippos*; *hipios* 'horse'

Vedic *ájra*, *ájrya*: *āgros*; *āgrios* 'field'

The possessive adjective value of the forms in *-i* as in *rathī* is further supported by the fact that *rathī-* can be replaced by *rathin*.

Compare for instance:

1.9.8 *indra tā' rathínīr iśas* '(give us) Indra those foods in wagons (belonging to wagons).

but

3.30.11 *iśó rathī's sayújas sū'ra vā'jan* '(Grant us) hero (Indra) foods in wagons (belonging to the wagons), and the collected booty'.

Notice *rathínīr iśas*: *iśó rathī's*

The suffix *-in*, zero grade of *-yen/yon*, means 'pertaining to' 'belonging to', 'one who does something'; etc. Compare the following examples:

Gothic	: <i>fisk</i>	:	<i>fiskya</i> 'fisher man';
	<i>maurpor</i>	:	<i>maurprja</i> 'murderer';
Latin	: <i>pellis</i>	:	<i>pelio</i> , <i>pelionis</i> , 'tanner'
	<i>restis</i>	:	<i>restio</i> , <i>restionis</i> , 'ropemaker'
Vedic	: <i>vartín</i>	:	Gothic <i>-wairpja</i> 'turn'
	<i>praśnín</i>	:	'questioner': Old Frisian <i>friccea</i> 'herald'

The suffix *in* is used to derive possessive adjectives in Indo-Iranian. The interchange between *-i-* and *-in* establishes beyond doubt the possessive value of the suffix *-ī-*.



Thus the possessive value of the suffix  $-\bar{i}$   $-ya$  in Skt., and Latin  $-\bar{i}$  is beyond doubt. The genitive sg.  $-\bar{i}$  of the thematic stems in Italic and Celtic is an old possessive adjectival suffix. Thus the suffix  $-\bar{i}$  forms the genitive sg. of the thematic stems. It also formed motivated feminine stems and adjectives. As Benveniste states succinctly: "génitif et féminin sont des modalités de la notion générale d'appartenance que l'adjectif exprime" (1935: 178).

Thus we establish the identity of  $-\bar{i}$  ending of the genitive singular in Italic (and Celtic) and the Vedic derivative in  $-\bar{i}$ . Here, we also satisfy Meillet's requirement of three languages (sub-families) to firmly support the genetic relations.

The use of an adjective as genitive is widespread in the Indo-European languages. Compare Gothic *meina*, *peina*, *unsara*, *izwara*; Vedic *asmākam* 'our'. The Armenian genitive plural in  $-ç$  represents an adjective in  $-sko + y o-$  (See Meillet, 1936: 82). In Greek dialects a patronymic adjective is used instead of the genitive singular of the father's name, as in Homer *Telamō'nios Áias*. This is the regular construction in Lesbian, Thessalian and Boeotian, although examples in other dialects are also occasionally met with (see Buck, 1955: 134). Moreover a possessive adjective can replace the genitive sg. in the historical languages. Compare *patria össa* 'his father's voice'; Pindar 0.6, 62, and in Homer *domos pēlē'ios* 'house of Peleus' (see Schwyzer, 1950: 177). Thus the genitival function of the adjectival suffix  $-\bar{i}$  in Italic and Celtic is not surprising.

In the preceding pages we have shown that  $-\bar{i}$  of the Vedic type *rathī* and Italic  $-\bar{i}$  in the genitive sg. of the  $-o$  stem nouns and adjectives are related and are of the same origin, that is  $-\bar{i}$  was basically a suffix of belonging. Another, though indirect, support for our thesis comes from some denominatives. There is a class of denominatives derived from the  $-o-$  stem nouns and adjectives (Vedic  $-a-$  stems, of course) in Indic and Italic. We may schematically put it as

$$o \rightarrow \bar{i} / - [+ \text{denominative}]^1$$

<sup>1</sup>This is the traditional derivation as given by Macdonell (1910: 399); Delbruck (1874: 202); Brugmann (II.1.226); Whitney (1889: 389). However, Debrunner (1954: 845) believes that the type *rathiyati* (he quotes *tavisīyati*) can be either from the  $-a$  stem or from the  $-i$  stems. Grassmann (S. V.) also takes *tavisīyati* from *tavisī* but takes *rathiyati* from *ratha*. I believe that  $-iyati$  type denominatives should be taken from  $-\bar{i}$  stems. Thus *rathī*; *rathiyati* and where the forms in  $-\bar{i}$  are not attested as in \**putrī* they can be assumed to have existed.

Compare, for instance, Latin *equus*: *equire* 'to desire horses' (It is said of the mares in heat. Pling 10.63.83) and compare Vedic *putra*<sup>1</sup>: *putriya*'ti 'desire sones'. Leumann (1929:319) doubts the relationship between *equire* and *putriyati* but does not give his reasons.

The denominatives generally indicate the relationship of 'belonging', 'desiring', 'functioning' etc. Thus *gavya* 'desire to seek after cows' and is equivalent to *go-* construed with *is-* 'to desire' or *adhvariya* 'to be priest' is equivalent to *adhvara* (i) construed with *as-* 'be'. Compare for instance, *tva'm adhvariya*si 'you are priest' at R.V 2.1.2 is equivalent to *uta' gnā' agnir adhvara' utó* 'you Agni (lead) the divine women, and you are priest' at R.V. 4.9.4. Similarly *rathī*'ya- 'pertaining to chariots' is equivalent to *ratha*(vat) construed with *vī* 'pursue' etc. compare :

7.27.5. *gómād a'svāvad ra'thavad vyanto*

'we pursue the wealth consisting of cows. horses and chariots'

but at 1.166.5: *rathīya-*

*rathīyanti*va *pra' jihīta*śadhih

'Das Kraut eilt voraus, als ob es eine Wetlfahrt machte'\*  
(Geldner)

Thus the denominatives express the relationship of belonging, wishing, becoming etc. in the broadest sense.

In the Rigveda the following denominatives in *i* from the thematic *-a* stems are attested :

<sup>1</sup>. Brugmann (1916. II. 1. 226) makes no connection between *equire* and vedic *putriyati*. He argues that *putriyati* is on the analogy of the semantically related *janiyati* 'to desire wife'. However, *-i* of *janiyati* is secondary. The inherited form is *jani* <genH attested in the R. V. Brugmann also quotes *matriyati*. This form is later and was added by Kāśika to Panini 7.4.27 and is not attested anywhere else, Thus Brugmann's explanation is not helpful.

\**rathīya* - is used here in pregnant sense. The chariots were often used for racing and fighting the vedic society.



1. *adhvara*<sup>1</sup> : *adhvariya* at 1.23.16,  
2.1.2; 4.9.5, 6.2.10; 10.91.10, 11.
2. *a'nnā* : *a'nniya*<sup>2</sup> 'desire food' at 4.2.7
3. *ca'rana* : *caraniya*' 'strive' 3.61.3
4. *putra*' : *putriya*' 'desire sons' 7.96.4
5. *taviṣa*' : *taviṣiya*' 'be stong' 8.6.26, 2.30.8, 5.85.4.
6. *ra'tha* : *rathiya*' 'desire chariots' 1.66.5

There is only one instance in the AV '*śapathiya* 'to swear'  
In Latin the following examples are worth quoting:

<i>equus</i>	:	<i>equire</i>	'desire horses'
<i>catulus</i>	:	<i>catulire</i>	'behave like a puppy'
		Varro RR. 2.9.11	
<i>servus</i>	:	<i>servire</i>	'to desire servants'
<i>superbus</i>	:	<i>superbire</i>	'to be haughty'
* <i>balbutus</i>	:	<i>balbutire</i>	'stammer'

(A complete list of such verbs, without any comment as regards to their formation, is given by Ernout (1946:241 ff.))  
*balbutus* is not attested in Latin, but attested as *balbuthas* ('personal name' in RV at 8.46.32 *śata'm dāsē balbuthé vipras ta'rukṣa ā'dade*

'I' the poet, received hundred (gifts) from Balbuthas Dass Tarukṣa' However, there is one problem. The verb *balbutire* and the noun *balbuthas* are clearly onomatopoeic. Do we have the right to reconstruct such onomatopoeic forms for the Proto-language? Let us take another example. In Hittite there is a root *šeš* 'sleep'. It has cognates in Vedic *śas* and Avestan *hah*. (at Y. 34.5, 29.11). Now are we supposed to reconstruct a root *ses* for IE? If we do so then it violates the canonical form of IE root, since the same consonant can not be repeated in a root. As we do need to have a root *ses*, we can posit a noun \**balbutos*.

Thus the formation of *equi* : *equi-yo* is parallel to the formation of the vedic *rathiyati*. It has been shown above that

<sup>1</sup>There is another denominative *adhvaryati* attested in the RV.; it is built on -r stem athematic noun (see Renou BSL. 37 P 23 ff. for a detailed analysis of the denominatives in -r and -n.)

<sup>2</sup>*ānniyant* has wrong accent. It is most likely on the analogy of the noun *anna*. The -i is short. Metrically *ānniyate* (Dat. sg) does not fit, since -i is not allowed before the cadence in the hendecasyllabic metron (see also Oldenberg 1909 *ad. loc*).

the formation *equi* is of the same origin as the Vedic *rathī*. Thus *equus* : *equi* : *equio* and, the Vedic *ratha-rathī* : *rathiyati* and, it can be safely assumed that *rathiyati* and *equire* are formed on *-i* derivatives. This parallelism between Latin and Vedic offers further evidence of relationship between the Italic and Celtic genitive sg *-i* of the thematic *-o-* stems and the Vedic derivatives of the type *rathī*'. Furthermore, this explanation avoids the analogical origin of the forms like *equire*, *rathiyati* as given by Brugmann (II.1.226 ff) Delbruck (1874 : 201); Buck (1933 : 272); Leumann (1929 : 319) among others.

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## AUXILIARY VERBS IN BUNTS TULU

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The present paper deals with the simple syntactic behaviour of auxiliary verbs in Bunts Tulu, a non-brahmin dialect spoken by the people belong to Bunts community, dwelling mainly in South Kanara District of Karnataka State and Kasaragod District of Kerala State.

Like in any other Dravidian languages, Bunts Tulu also has many verbs which function as main verbs as well as an auxiliary verbs. An auxiliary verb does not denote any action by itself but the main verb denotes an action by itself. Auxiliary verbs can be considered as grammatical category just like other grammatical categories and in the deep level they function as main verbs. Auxiliaries are subordinative constituents to the main verbs. They have certain subtle semantic nuances when they occur with the main verb. But they do not change the meaning of the main verb.

An auxiliary verb in Bunts Tulu occurs with one of the following forms of the main verb: i) infinitive, ii) Non-past and past adverbial participles, and iii) the root of the main verb.

A list of the auxiliary verbs along with their main verb meanings, is given below:

<i>Auxiliary verb</i>	<i>Auxiliary meaning</i>	<i>Main verb meaning</i>
uppu	durative, perfective, suppositional	'to be'
poo	completive	'to go'
aa	completive	'to become'
buḍu	completive	'to leave'
paaḍu	completive	'to put'
-onu	reflexive	



-oli	permissive, probability, possibility, willingness, suggestive, etc.	'can/may'
boodu	necessity, obligation	'must'
booci	unwantedness, prohibition	'must not'
aandu	prohibition	'should not'
balli	prohibition	'should not'

It is to be noted here that "there will be no pause between the main verb form and the auxiliary. Pause can, however, occur between the two main verbs, only when the second verb is not used as an auxiliary" (Subrahmanyam, 1973).

For example,

1. aaye tindudu — buɖye (as a main verb)  
'Having eaten, he left'
2. aaye tindudu buɖye (as an auxiliary verb)  
'He ate (it) away'

Auxiliary verbs can be divided into two classes on the basis of their semantic nuances, namely, 1) Aspectuals and 2) Modals.

#### Aspectual auxiliary verbs:

- a) Usually the aspectual auxiliary verb occurs after the past adverbial participle of a main verb. But it also occurs after negative adverbial participle followed by a negative marker *uj* or *j*.

For example,

3. aaye giitanillada maata boorlenu maardu buɖye  
(affirmative)  
'He has sold out all the oxen of Geetha's house'
4. jaye illadu anyayi malteɖa aayanamme  
pettu korandɛ buɖpuje (negative)  
'Jaya's father beats him without fail if he does the mischief in the house'.

- b) The aspectual auxiliary verb also occurs either with the past adverbial participle or negative adverbial participle of a main verb which may be transitive or intransitive.

For example,

#### With transitive verbs:

5. aaye baredu buɖye (affirmative)  
'He wrote (it) away'

6. aalw aventu kerandε budpujolu  
'She kills that without fail' (negative)

With intransitive verbs :

7. goapale teltwubudye (affirmative)  
'Gopal has laughed'  
8. avu jeppandε budpuji (negative)  
'It sleeps without fail'

- c) The aspectual auxiliary verb also shows the concord relationship between a subject and a predicate.

For example,

9. yaanw baredwubudye 'I wrote (it) away'  
10. cñkulu baredwubudya 'We wrote (if) away'  
11. aaye baredwubudye 'He wrote (it) away'  
12. aali baredwubudyolu 'She wrote (it) away'  
13. avu baredibudñdu 'It wrote (it) away'  
14. agulu baredw budyeri 'They wrote (it) away'

- d) The aspectual auxiliary verb gives the basic meaning of completion of an action or process

E. x:

15. ittε kattalεdwpooñdu (action)  
'It has become dark now'  
16. ra : me illađdwi poodubudye (process)  
'Rama has gone away from the house'

Aspectual auxiliary verbs denote the state of the action of the main verb, whether the action conveyed by the main verb is durative, perfective, suppositional, completive, reflexive and so on. The following are the aspectual auxiliary verbs found in Bunts Tulu:

/uppu/ 'to be'

As already mentioned, this verb has the durative, perfective and suppositional notions when it is used with the participle forms of a main verb. This verb has the 4 allomorphs namely, /uppu~ -u/ ~un~ -it/.

E. x:

17. aaye barondulle 'Rama is coming'  
18. yaanw poadittε 'I had gone'  
19. avu ađegw iitw portugu pooduppu  
'It would have gone there by this time'.



The auxiliary verb *uppu* occurs with the infinitive form of the main verb. The dative case marker *-gu* can be optionally added after infinitive. It denotes the meaning of one's engagement in particular work.

E. x.

20. *eñkũ oodarẽ (gu) ittũñḍũ*  
'I was to read'
21. *aayagũ barrẽ (gu) uñḍũ*  
'He has to come'
22. *alegũ kelasamalparẽ (gu) uppu*  
'She may have to work'

### Completive auxiliary verbs:

There are four verbs used as auxiliaries to denote the 'completive' meaning, namely, *poo* 'to go', *aa* 'to become' *buḍu* 'to leave' and *paaḍũ* 'to put'. Besides the completive meaning, they denote the other semantic nuances such as unexpectedness or accidental, intentional, uncontrollable, accomplishment, definiteness or certainty, unfortunate of an event, sequential, desire to finish, sense of relief, abruptness, adventure and other affective, depending on the contexts.

The verb *aa* 'to become, happen' occurs in III Person neuter singular when it is auxiliary verb but when it is a main verb, it does not. The other three auxiliaries such as *poo buḍu* and *paaḍũ*, maintain concord with the subject in both the cases. Though all these four auxiliary verbs give the completive meaning, subtle meaning differences can be seen if their function is closely observed. Compare to *poo* and *paaḍũ*, the auxiliary verbs *aa* and *buḍu* have the wider occurrence. That means, the *aa* and *buḍu* occur with almost all the verbs and the *po:* and *paaḍũ* occur with limited number of verbs.

E. x:

a: & *buḍu*

- |                              |   |                           |
|------------------------------|---|---------------------------|
| 23. <i>aalũ uñḍudaanḍũ</i>   | } | 'She finished (her) meal' |
| 24. <i>aalũ uñḍubuḍũyolu</i> |   |                           |

po: & *pa:ḍũ*

25. *avu saytũpooanḍũ* 'It died'
26. *aaye naaynũ kerdũpaaḍũye* 'He has killed the dog'

By the examples given above for *poo* and *paaḍũ* it seems that they are in complementary distribution. Therefore, all these four

auxiliary verbs can not occur after one and the same verb, denoting the completion of the action of the main verb.

E. x:

- |                      |   |              |
|----------------------|---|--------------|
| 27. avu saytudaanḍu  | } | 'It is dead' |
| 28. avu saytubuḍḍu   |   |              |
| 29. avu saytupoḍḍu   |   |              |
| 30. *avu saytipaaḍḍu |   |              |

In the case of the example,

\*avu saytu paaḍḍu given above, (No, 30), the auxiliary verb paaḍḍu cannot be used in such a context.

**Reflexive auxiliary verb -on :**

The reflexive auxiliary verb *-on* can be added directly to the verbal stem of the main verb. The personal terminations are preceded by this auxiliary verb, in the reflexive construction.

E. x:

- |                          |                                  |
|--------------------------|----------------------------------|
| 31. aalu kuṇṭu ardonḍolu | 'She washed her clothes herself' |
| 32. aaye barevonve       | 'He writes himself'              |

**Modal auxiliary verbs:**

According to Yeshinobu Hakutani (1972) "The so-called modal auxiliaries are related to mood, i.e., their purpose is to signal the hypothetical situations: possibility, necessity, ability, obligation, intention, permission, assertion".

The modal auxiliary verbs in Bunts Tulu, show a great semantic complexity. There are five modal auxiliary verbs found in Bunts Tulu, namely, *-oli*, *boḍu*, *boḍci*, *aandu* and *balli*.

*-oli* It can be added directly to the root of the main verb in order to indicate the different moods like permission, possibility, etc.

E. x:

33. aalu inibayyagi baroli  
'He may come today evening'  
(permission, possibility, etc.)
34. elle kaṇḍa naḍoli  
'It may plant the field tomorrow'  
(Probability)

It is also used to denote the suggestiveness and willingness.

E. x:

35. agulu ontḍ duura naḍapoli  
'They can walk a small distance'
36. rayluḍḍu bassuḍḍu beega baroli  
'One can come quickly by bus rather than by train'



Few verbs function as a main verb as well as an auxiliary verb. Such verbs usually lose their lexical meaning of the main verb in their auxiliary function and gives different meanings.

*bo:du, bođci*

Usually these modal auxiliary verbs occur with the roots of the main verbs. But *wen boođu* and *bođci* appear with the root of the main verb, these auxiliary verbs lose their initial consonant *b* and the long *o* of *boođu* becomes short *o*.

E. x:

37. *panu* 'to tell' + *bo:du* 'wanted' — *panođu* 'must tell'
38. *panu* 'to tell' + *bođci* 'unwanted' — *panođci*  
'must not tell'

In the case with few roots of the main verbs, the modal auxiliary verbs *ba:du* and *bođci* lose their initial syllables *bo:* and *bo* respectively:

E. x:

39. *poo* 'to go' + *boođu* 'wanted' — *po:đu* 'must go'
40. *poo* 'to go' + *bođci* 'unwanted' — *po:đci*  
'must not go'

These modal auxiliary verbs occur with all the aspectual auxiliaries.

E. x:

41. *aaye avenu maata tindu buđuđu*  
'He must eat them all'
42. *ii aa kelasoleni maata matwubuđuđu*  
'you (sg.) must do all those works'

The auxiliary verb *boođu* can be conjugated with the help of the verb *uppu* 'to be' or *a:* 'to become' to denote the time and tense distinction.

E. x:

43. *aalu iđegw barođittinđu*  
'She should have come here'
44. *baari sulabođu alegw madme malpođaanđu*  
'In a very easily manner, the marriage has been arranged to her'.

These modal auxiliary verbs lose their main verbs meaning even in their auxiliary function. As a main verb *boođu* denotes 'wantedness, necessary or desire' and *bođci* denotes 'unwantedness

or not necessary' and as an auxiliary verb they denote 'obligation' and 'prohibition' respectively.

E. x:

45. eñkw niirtubooðu (main verb)  
'I want water'
46. iiniirtu paruðu (Auxiliary verb)  
You (sg.) have to drink water'
47. eñkw peeru boðci (main verb)  
'I don't want milk'
48. iipeeru paruðci (Auxiliary verb)  
'you (sg.) don't drink milk'

These two modal auxiliary verbs also denote the other semantic nuances such as request, command and wish depending on their contexts.

*aandw, balli*

When these two auxiliary verbs are used as main verbs they denote the meaning 'inability (of a person)'. Both *aandw* and *balli* occur with nouns along with a dative or instrumental case marker. As auxiliary verbs, these occur with the infinitive form of the main verb. In their auxiliary usage, these two auxiliary verbs denote the meaning of 'prohibition'.


E. x:

49. avu aayagw } aandw (Main verb)  
aayaðdw }  
'That is not possible for him'
50. nigulu untarə aandw (Auxiliary verb)  
'you (pl.) must not stand'.

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## NEED FOR A DUALISTIC THEORY OF LANGUAGE

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### Introduction

During the past fifteen years or so, a number of scholars have voiced their intuitive feeling that there is something basically wrong in Chomsky's theory of language. But none of them appears to have so far succeeded in uncovering the actual basis for this feeling. The arguments that they have put forth in support of the above-mentioned claim have also not been really convincing. Further, the theories of language that these critics themselves have put forth as alternatives to Chomsky's theory also appear to suffer from the same or similar mistakes in that they too give rise to the same intuitive feeling, namely that there is something basically wrong in them as well.

My purpose in this paper is to raise certain fundamental questions regarding these contemporary theories of language which, I believe, might reveal the basis of the above-mentioned intuitive feeling. For example, Chomsky has been asserting, again and again, that the goal of his theory is to characterize the *implicit* or internalized grammatical knowledge of the speaker-hearer; but what he has been actually trying to do, through his theory of language, is only to *explicate* the various phonological, syntactic, and semantic aspects of linguistic expressions. Can an *explicit* grammar, established in this fashion, succeed in characterizing the *implicit* grammar of the speaker-hearer? Would there not be fundamental and irreconcilable differences between these two kinds of grammars?

It must be noted in this connection that one of the most important contributions of Chomsky to our understanding of the phenomena of language has been his discovery of the fact that the

*explicit* variety of grammatical knowledge, as it actually exists in the minds of the ordinary speaker-hearers, is too deficient and ill-organized to account for the enormous complexity and regularity of the sentences that the speaker-hearers can normally produce and understand. Chomsky has argued, quite convincingly I think, that there is an absolute need to postulate an *implicit* or internalized variety of grammatical knowledge (which is highly complex and perfectly organized) as existing in the minds of ordinary speaker-hearers and as forming the basis of their speech. This discovery of Chomsky has completely revolutionized the study of language, and has given an entirely new direction to it. It has also made many of the contemporary linguists to regard their goal to be the characterization of this *implicit* variety of grammatical knowledge.

However, while establishing his theory of language, Chomsky appears to have failed to take into account two important aspects of this discovery. First, he has not apparently recognized the importance of the fact that the highly complex and perfectly organized system of grammatical knowledge that he is now assigning to the ordinary speaker-hearers is only an *implicit* one functioning only implicitly in their brain. The relevance of this particular property in establishing the structure and the way of functioning of that knowledge has never been carefully examined.

Second, the ordinary speaker-hearers are now to be regarded as possessing *two* distinct systems of grammatical knowledge, namely the explicit and the implicit, and not just a single one; that is, this discovery of Chomsky forces us to postulate a *dualistic* theory of grammatical knowledge; but, the theory that has been actually put forth by Chomsky (or by any of the various contemporary theorists) is only a *unitary* one. The relevance of this two-fold distinction, occurring in reality in the grammatical knowledge of speaker-hearers, has also not been carefully examined by Chomsky (or by other theorists) while establishing the characterization of the speaker-hearer's knowledge of language (or of the phenomena of language itself).

It is true that the explicit knowledge of grammar, as found in the minds of ordinary speaker-hearers, is too deficient and ill-organized to be able to account for the *whole* phenomena of language. But the question that is being raised here is not whether it can solely account for the phenomena of language, but rather as to whether there are any important functions in language whose nature is such that they can be carried out only with the help of this explicit variety of knowledge. What I am claiming here is



only that the attempt to account for the *whole* phenomena of language solely with the help of the implicit grammatical knowledge of the speaker-hearer might turn out to be as big a mistake as the earlier one of attempting to account for it solely with the help of his explicit knowledge (which Chomsky has rightly denounced).

Before trying to examine these two fundamental questions which have been very clearly neglected by the contemporary theorists while establishing their characterization of language, I wish to indicate briefly some of the important differences between the explicit and the implicit varieties of grammatical knowledge. This is necessary because, my claim that the implicit variety of grammatical knowledge cannot be directly characterized by writing an explicit grammar, or that the phenomena of language cannot be accounted for solely with the help of the implicit knowledge (and therefore a theory of language must necessarily be *dualistic*) would be based upon some of these important differences between the implicit and the explicit varieties of grammatical knowledge.

### **The Implicit-Explicit Distinction**

The most important difference between the implicit and the explicit varieties of grammatical knowledge is the one that is being denoted by their names themselves, namely that the former is *implicit* and is therefore completely out of reach of its possessor's awareness or introspection, whereas the latter is *explicit* and is hence open to his awareness; the possessor can make explicit statements about the nature of the latter variety of knowledge, and hence there would be no difficulty whatsoever in establishing the exact amount and kind of explicit grammatical knowledge that a given speaker-hearer actually possesses. Further, its functioning would be open to the awareness and introspection of its possessor and hence, a speaker-hearer can easily describe to the theorist the exact manner in which he makes use of that knowledge.

Whereas the amount and kind of implicit grammatical knowledge that a speaker-hearer possesses can only be *inferred* by the theorist on the basis of the various language activities (like producing and understanding its expressions) that the speaker-hearer is able to carry out with the help of that knowledge. Similarly, its functioning in the speaker-hearer's mind or brain would be out of reach of his own awareness or introspection and hence the exact way in which it helps him to carry out the production and comprehension of speech would also have to be inferred by the theorist. He cannot ask his subject to describe that functioning.

There are certain important questions that need to be raised in connection with this particular difference between implicit and explicit varieties of grammatical knowledge. First of all, what prevents the implicit knowledge from being open to its possessor's awareness? Alternatively, what specific property of explicit knowledge makes it possible for its possessor to be aware of it?

My answer to this question is that the explicit knowledge occurs in an *encoded* form in its possessor's mind (i.e. in the form of statements, grammatical rules, formulas, etc.) and that is the reason why it can function as the *object* of his awareness or understanding. Whereas the implicit knowledge can be considered as occurring only in an *uncoded* form in his brain, i.e. in the form of the neural mechanism which helps him to produce and understand sentences. This could be the reason why this latter variety of knowledge cannot function as the *object* of that mechanism or of understanding (see Bhat 1983).

That is, we can regard explicit knowledge as a second-order entity, having an independent existence of its own in the speaker-hearer's mind, and the implicit knowledge as a first-order entity having no such independent existence of its own, and occurring only in the form of the neural structure which forms the basis of the implicit production and comprehension of speech. Such a postulation can help us to account for this crucial difference between the two, namely that only the former variety of knowledge is open to its possessor's awareness but not the latter. Linguists who postulate an independent existence to both these varieties of knowledge in the speaker-hearer's mind and regard both of them as encoded entities, cannot satisfactorily account for the above-mentioned difference.

The second question that needs to be examined here is the following: Would this distinction between implicit and explicit varieties of knowledge have any influence upon their structure and functioning? Chomsky (1980: 70, 92) has categorically stated that it would have only negligible influence upon them and that the distinction is therefore relatively uninteresting. Whereas I have argued elsewhere (Bhat 1983) that the distinction can give rise to a number of *major* differences between these two varieties of grammatical knowledge, and hence it is of crucial importance for the theory of language.

I have pointed out, for example, that when a person is trying to develop an explicit variety of grammatical knowledge, i.e. a knowledge that he can be aware of and can use consciously for various purposes, he needs to make use of the various devices of *explication*



such as idealization, categorization, systematization, rule-formation, etc. He needs to restrict the individual statements or formulas that form part of his explicit knowledge to the most relevant factors under consideration (because of the constraint that one can be aware of only very few factors at a time), and further, he needs to divide and sub-divide the subject of his study into smaller and smaller subsections as he tries to make it more and more explicit. He also needs to organize these subsections and his statements about them into a compact system in order to make them more explicit. There would also be a need to make the statements or the formulas precise, economical, and also, if possible, esthetically pleasing.

However, when a person is trying to acquire an *implicit* knowledge of the grammar of his language, he would not have to make use of any of these devices of explication. The knowledge is going to remain out of reach of his awareness, and its functioning is also going to be completely implicit. In fact, the assumption, made earlier, namely that the implicit knowledge is going to be an *uncoded* knowledge would make it impossible for any of these devices of explication to influence that knowledge.

However, the structure of this implicit knowledge would be heavily influenced and constrained by the structuring of the nervous system into which it needs to be incorporated. For example, the fact that this latter system is hierarchically organized would make it necessary for the implicit production of sentences to be hierarchic, and this fact would be reflected in the structure of the sentences as well. It could form the basis of many of the syntactic constraints of natural language that have been noticed by linguists, such as for example, the "island" constraint of Ross.

This particular difference between implicit and explicit varieties of grammatical knowledge is of special importance in evaluating the contemporary theories of language because, even though many of these theorists regard the characterization of *implicit* knowledge to be their primary goal, they have been mainly concerned with the various ways in which the grammar of a given language can be made *explicit*. That is, they have been trying to develop a model that can be considered as the most adequate one for building an *explicit* knowledge of grammar. It is difficult to see how questions concerning such a model can have any relevance for the characterization of implicit knowledge.

For example, the question as to whether the case relationships (like Agent, Patient, Location, etc.) are to be considered as the basic deep-structure elements, or whether the syntactic

categories (like Noun Phrase, Verb Phrase, Complement, Auxiliary, etc.) or the grammatical relations (like Subject, Direct Object, Indirect Object, etc.) are to be made use of for that purpose is a question of explication; it only tries to find out the most suitable way of *presenting* the syntactic structure of natural language sentences in an explicit form. It would therefore be relevant for the establishment of an explicit grammar, but not for the characterization of the implicit grammar. In the latter case, the knowledge would be occurring only as the mechanism of sentence production and comprehension, and further, the structure of this mechanism would be such that the sentences resulting from its activation would be showing the influences of *all* these and several other aspects of syntax.

Another important influence that this explicit-implicit distinction can have upon the structure of grammatical knowledge is that in the case of the explicit knowledge, the fact that it would be open to its possessor's awareness would make it possible for him to acquire it directly from others, and also to develop it for its own sake; whereas in the case of the implicit knowledge, the fact that it is not open to its possessor's awareness would make it possible for him to acquire it only indirectly. That is, he would be consciously trying to develop the ability to carry out the various linguistic activities, and while he is doing this, his nervous system would be building up on its own (i.e. without his being aware of it) the neural mechanism for implicitly carrying out those activities. It is actually his possession of this neural mechanism that would be considered as his possession of the implicit grammatical knowledge. Thus, the acquisition of explicit knowledge is direct and *knowledge-oriented*, whereas that of the implicit one is indirect and *goal-oriented*.

Because of this acquisitional difference between explicit and implicit varieties of grammatical knowledge, the former would be occurring in a chaotic and ill-defined form in the speaker-hearer's mind, whereas the latter would be occurring in a consistent, complete and well-organized manner. The former could include both correct as well as incorrect formulations, whereas the latter could never be evaluated as correct or incorrect; it would always be relevant and adequate for the function (goal) for which it has been acquired.

A person can develop and also make use of his explicit knowledge of grammar through the process of simulation because of the fact that the knowledge and its functioning is open to his



awareness. He can apply the explicit rules of grammar mentally to the relevant situations, and further, he can decide as to whether the final results of this application are adequate or inadequate for the situation concerned *before* actually making use of them in that situation.

Whereas in the case of the implicit knowledge, the underlying process would have to be regarded as something quite different from simulation; the application of the knowledge to the relevant situation would be implicit and automatic; an individual would be able to know its adequacy or inadequacy to a given situation only *after* it has been actually put to use in that situation; further, any modifications that might occur in this knowledge because of its inadequacy in an actual context would also be implicit, and can only be inferred from the future actions of its possessor.

### Characterizing the Implicit Knowledge

The third question that needs to be examined here in connection with the explicit-implicit distinction is the following: Would it be possible to characterize the grammatical knowledge which exists and also functions only *implicitly* in the speaker-hearer's brain by formulating an *explicit* grammar? Most of the contemporary linguists like Chomsky, Lamb, Chafe, Langacker, Jackendoff, etc. appear to believe that they *can* establish such a characterization, because they have been actually formulating such explicit grammars with the avowed aim of characterizing the implicit knowledge.

Whereas my contention here is that such explicit grammars would not be in a position to directly characterize the implicit knowledge. The basis of this claim is the fact that the differences which exist between the explicit and the implicit grammars would be so great that the possibility of finding even very remote correlations between the two would be very slim. It would be somewhat like trying to find correlations between the structure of the *statements* which describe the way in which the taxi-fare is to be calculated and the structure of the *mechanism* which actually occurs and carries out such a calculation in a taxi-meter.

The main problem here is that the explicit knowledge would have the structure of the code that has been used for encoding it, whereas the implicit knowledge would have the structure of the mechanism (nervous system) into which it would be absorbed or incorporated. The two would actually be functioning in two entirely different levels; in fact, the latter would be *supporting* the former

when necessary, just as the transistor circuitry in a calculator would be supporting its illuminated digits when necessary.

Hence, any attempt to characterize the implicit grammar of a speaker-hearer with the help of an explicit grammar would be similar to the attempt to characterize the transistor circuitry of a calculator with the help of an explicit description of the arithmetics that is involved in the computations that it can carry out. Because the claim that a speaker-hearer possesses an implicit knowledge of grammar is very similar to the claim that the calculator possesses an implicit "knowledge" of arithmetics. In both these cases, the knowledge concerned would be occurring as nothing more than the *mechanism* that carries out certain specific activities, such as the implicit production and comprehension of sentences in the former case, and the internal computation of arithmetic problems in the latter case. The structure of this knowledge would be neurological in the former case and electronic in the latter case.

I am not claiming here that the so-called implicit grammatical knowledge of the speaker-hearer cannot be characterized at all, or that the linguist's explicit grammar would not be of any help whatsoever in establishing such a characterization. I am only trying to point out that the two systems of grammar would be so different from one another that any help that the linguist's explicit grammar would be able to provide in characterizing the implicit grammar would be very remote and indirect. Whereas some of the statements of contemporary linguists appear to imply that the two would be almost identical.

There are certain fundamental questions that the linguist will have to ask before he can even think of using his explicit grammar for characterizing the implicit grammar. I have already pointed out two of these questions, namely (i) why does the implicit knowledge remains implicit? and (ii) what possible impact would this characteristic of being implicit have upon the structure of that knowledge? It is true that both these questions are basically neurological in nature and as linguists, we are not competent enough to answer them, but to neglect them completely and to restrict our study to only those aspects of language that we are sufficiently competent to deal with (such as the structure of linguistic expressions), and at the same time to claim that our aim is to characterize the *implicit* grammar, would be somewhat like searching for the key under the street lamp just because there is plenty of light there.



The point to be noted here is this: If our aim in writing an explicit grammar is to characterize the *implicit* grammar and not simply to develop an explicit description of language, then we would have to be fully aware of the basic differences between these two varieties of grammars. We would have to know what it means to be an implicit grammar as against an explicit one, so that we would not be making the mistake of imposing some of the inherent limitations of the latter upon the former, and further, we would not be failing to comprehend some of the inherent characteristics of the former which are not actually revealed by the latter.

It might perhaps be claimed that if a linguist's aim is merely to establish an explicit grammar that can correctly and economically describe the structure of natural language sentences, there would be no need for him to bother about these neurological or biological factors or about the actual brain mechanisms which underlie the production and comprehension of those sentences; he can simply examine and analyse the various linguistic elements which occur in those sentences and describe the structures which underlie their use. This, in fact, is the contention of some of the contemporary linguists like Pike, Halliday, Sanders, Perlmutter, etc.

However, a proper understanding of the underlying processes and mechanisms might turn out to be extremely relevant even for providing an explicit description of the structure of sentences. This point is very well illustrated by the case of phonetics in which the study of the underlying processes, namely the *articulation* of sounds, has provided an extremely important and useful basis for the description and classification of sounds. In the absence of such a study, our understanding of the nature of sounds would be extremely deficient. This could also be true of the study of syntax in the sense that a linguist who disregards the neural mechanism which underlies the production and comprehension of sentences might fail to properly understand the structure of those sentences.

### Need for a Dualistic Theory

There is yet another (fourth) question that needs to be examined here in connection with the explicit-implicit distinction, namely the following: Would it be possible for an individual to make use of an explicit knowledge, functioning on its own, without the help of an additional underlying implicit knowledge? I wish to claim here that this would be an impossibility because, in view of the fact that the explicit knowledge is a second-order entity, made

up of *encoded* statements, rules and formulas, there would very clearly be a need to have an entirely different implicit knowledge (a first-order entity) for supporting it; this latter system of knowledge would have to occur in an *unencoded* form, i.e. as the mechanism for producing and understanding the constituent elements and structures of the former, namely its encoded statements, rules, and formulas.

Many of the contemporary theorists, whose aim has been to produce the so-called "generative grammars" of natural languages, appear to have completely overlooked this very obvious but important characteristic of *explicit* knowledge. They have been trying to develop explicit grammars that can fully characterize (or "generate") the speaker-hearer's knowledge of language, even though in view of the above-mentioned point, it is evident that producing such an explicit grammar (i.e. a grammar that can be both explicit as well as fully generative) would be an impossibility. The crucial point to be noted here is that in order to be *explicit*, a grammar would have to necessarily contain encoded rules and formulas, but in order to contain these, it would have to be necessarily supported by an underlying encoding and decoding mechanism, i.e. by an entirely different system of *implicit* grammar.

I had pointed out earlier, in answer to the third question that I had raised, that an explicit grammar cannot directly and correctly characterize the implicit grammar because of the fact that there are several inherent differences in the formation and functioning of these two varieties of grammatical knowledge. What I am claiming here is that an explicit grammar cannot even *exist* and *function* in the absence of an implicit grammar because of the fact that the former is an encoded second-order entity; it needs the support of the latter even for its very existence. Trying to establish a *unitary* theory of explicit grammar, i.e. a theory which does not concede the fact that such a grammar would have to be supported by an underlying implicit grammar, is like trying to produce the illuminated digits of a calculator without realizing the fact that there would be a need to have transistors and other internal circuits for supporting those digits.

Thus, any effort to establish a system of explicit grammar must necessarily be *dualistic*; it has to concede an entirely different underlying system of implicit grammar; otherwise, the explicit grammar would simply be hanging in the air with nothing to support it. A careful examination of the contemporary theories of generative grammars would reveal that the failure to recognize this



particular point has led to several puzzles and paradoxes in those theories. This is especially striking in the case of the study of meaning, as I would be pointing out later on in this paper.

The above-mentioned limitation of explicit grammar makes it even more evident that the attempt of some of the contemporary linguists like Chomsky to characterize the implicit grammatical knowledge of the speaker-hearer *solely* with the help of an explicit grammar suffers from a very fundamental misconception.

Another important point that needs to be noted here is that even the ordinary speaker-hearers have the capability to use an explicit variety of grammatical knowledge in addition to the implicit one, and hence a theory of language which tries to characterize fully the speaker-hearer's knowledge of his language would have to be necessarily a dualistic one. It would have to explicate not only his normal use of the implicit knowledge, as found for example, in his production and comprehension of ordinary sentences, but also his "special" use of the explicit knowledge, as found for example, in his activities of interpretation, evaluation (as "true" or "false"), analysis and modification of sentences (see Bhat 1983 for details).

We can establish this need to regard the phenomena of language as not being based upon just a single system of grammatical knowledge (i.e. the implicit one) as claimed or assumed by many contemporary linguists, but on two distinct systems (namely the implicit and the explicit), on the basis of two different kinds of arguments. First, it can be shown that there are certain important functions in language that can be carried out only with the help of an *explicit* system of grammatical knowledge; and as I have pointed out above, a speaker would need to possess an additional *implicit* system in order to make use of such an explicit system.

Second, there are certain *conflicting* characteristics in language which can be satisfactorily accounted for only by postulating two different but complementary types of mechanisms as forming the basis of language. The implicit mechanism would be giving rise to what might be called the "biological" characteristics of language, whereas the explicit mechanism (simulation) would be giving rise to its well-known "logical" characteristics. Such an explanation, however, would be completely out of reach of a unitary theory of language.

An interesting piece of evidence which supports the claim that the adequate functioning of language requires an explicit knowledge in addition to an implicit one is the fact that the rules of grammar are to be regarded as "rules" rather than as "laws". An individual has the capability to either follow these rules faithfully (and implicitly), or to wilfully violate them. These grammatical rules are quite different from physical "laws" such as that of gravitation on this point; no one would be able to violate these latter "laws".

However, a person would be able to violate a given grammatical rule wilfully only if he has an explicit knowledge of the same. In the absence of such a knowledge he might be able to go against it only accidentally but not wilfully. That is, the ability to wilfully violate grammatical rules results directly from the ability to possess and make use of an *explicit* variety of grammatical knowledge.

Similarly, a speaker's ability to modify the sentences of his language, as for example, for making them simpler, more precise, or less ambiguous, would also depend upon his ability to possess and make use of an explicit knowledge of its grammar. This ability would be found in all the speaker-hearers of a given language, even though some would turn out to be more competent than others in this regard. There are also other important functions in language, such as for example, the ability to analyse its sentences (which has been highly developed by the linguists), which can be carried out only with the help of an explicit grammatical knowledge.

It might be noted in this connection that if the speaker-hearers had been provided with only the implicit variety of knowledge, and not with the explicit one, the very profession of the linguist would have been completely non-existent. This is also true of the profession of the logician or of the philosopher because, one needs the explicit variety of knowledge in order to evaluate sentences, develop reasoning, or even to build formal languages which are actually derived by modifying the sentences of natural languages.

In support of the second point mentioned above, it might be noted here that there are several conflicting characteristics in the functioning of language which can be accounted for only with the help of a dualistic theory of language. For example, there are certain ambiguities, such as the one between generic and non-generic sentences, or the one between specific and non-specific noun phrases, which appear to be language-universal in nature. Speakers




do show their awareness of these meaning differences, especially if their attention has been drawn to them, and further, the languages also possess different kinds of affixal or lexical devices for specifying those meaning distinctions; however, these distinctions are ordinarily left unspecified in the sentences concerned, and the sentences are thereby allowed to be ambiguous.

The puzzling question that arises here is this: Why is it that the natural languages uniformly show this property of not specifying certain meaning distinctions even when they do possess the devices for specifying them and thereby disambiguating the relevant sentences? A unitary theory cannot provide any satisfactory answer to this question, but a dualistic theory can do so by regarding the ambiguities as resulting from certain inherent limitations in the functioning of implicit knowledge, and their disambiguation as resulting from the absence of those limitations in the functioning of the explicit knowledge.

For example, in the case of the explicit knowlege, the various experiences (data) would be individually recorded upon the mental model, and a generalization would be consciously derived from them. Hence, while making use of this explicit knowledge, a person would have before him both the generalization as well as the specific experiences upon which it has been based; he can therefore very easily establish the distinction between generic and non-generic sentences or between specific and non-specific uses of noun phrases in an explicit interpretation or modification of sentences.

Whereas in the case of the implicit knowledge, the experiences would be absorbed by the nervous system only as a modification in its structure. This modification, in its turn, would be able to produce, implicitly, certain alterations in the individual's response (i.e. in his production or comprehension of sentences). There would, however, be nothing other than this modification in the nervous system to specifically represent those experiences. Hence at the time of producing or comprehending the relevant sentences, both the experiences as well as the generalization about them would be reflected in the nervous system only by a single entity, namely the relevant neural modification. This could account for the above-mentioned deficiency of sentences that are produced implicitly in natural languages, namely the uniform occurrence of the specific-nonspecific and generic-nongeneric ambiguities in them (see Bhat 1983).



Another instance of this conflict in the functioning of language is the following: There is an interesting distinction between biology and logic, namely that the former involves judgements of graded acceptability and family resemblance, whereas the latter involves sharp and clear-cut yes-no judgements (see Jackendoff 1983 : 157). The natural languages appear to allow both these types of judgements to be used side-by-side, in spite of the fact that the two conflict with one another. The occurrence of this conflict can also be explained satisfactorily by a dualistic theory of language in that it can regard the graded judgements as resulting from the functioning of implicit knowledge and the binary judgements from that of the explicit knowledge.

### Two Kinds of Meaning

This need to establish a dualistic theory of language can be seen even more clearly in the case of the study of meaning. Linguists have generally found it rather embarrassing even to talk about meaning because, as Quine had once remarked (Quine 1953:47), while doing so, they appear to be literally in the position of not knowing what they are talking about. Because of this fundamental problem about the concept of meaning, the concerned subject, namely Semantics, has come to be regarded variously as invaluable, worthless, impossible, trivial, the salvation of mankind, and a harmless hobby (Fodor 1977:1). It has also attracted all kinds of puzzles, paradoxes and contradictions that can possibly be thought of.

I wish to point out in this connection that all these problems and difficulties can be traced back to two fundamental mistakes that the semanticists have committed while establishing their conception of meaning, namely (i) a failure to distinguish between the explicit and the implicit varieties of meaning, and (ii) a failure to recognize the fact that the explicit (encoded) variety of meaning can be made use of only with the help of an underlying implicit (uncoded) variety of meaning. The contemporary semanticists have recognized only one variety of meaning which, even though generally considered to occur *implicitly* in the speaker-hearer's mind, is taken to be an *encoded* entity. That is, instead of postulating two distinct varieties of meaning in order to account for the conflicting characteristics that need to be assigned to "meaning", namely of being implicit and being encoded, they have merely postulated a single variety of meaning and have assigned both these characteristics to it. This has given rise to all these different kinds of puzzles and paradoxes.

In order to appreciate this fundamental criticism of contemporary semantic theories, it is necessary to examine some of the



basic differences between two different kinds of activities that the speaker-hearer can carry out in connection with "meaning", namely *interpretation* and *understanding*. The contemporary theorists have been using these two terms rather interchangeably, and further, they have been referring to an *implicit* activity (such as that of understanding) with the help of either of these two terms, even though the term "interpretation", in its normal use, refers only to an *explicit* activity of the speaker, namely that of providing the interpretation or "meaning" of a given expression to a hearer who has not properly understood that expression.

In this ordinary sense of these two terms, interpretation refers to an activity of the *speaker* where as understanding refers to an activity of the *hearer*; the former involves an *encoded* meaning which the speaker has to use in order to convey that "meaning" to the hearer, whereas the latter involves only an *uncoded* meaning which gets activated in the hearer's brain as he listens to and understands a given expression. That is, in the case of this latter activity, the hearer would only have to *decode* the given expression; he would not have to further *encode* its meaning because, he is not expected, as a hearer, to convey it to someone else; he is not even expected to be directly aware of that meaning. Thus, interpretation would involve two distinct encoded expressions, namely the "form" and its "meaning", whereas understanding would involve only a single encoded expression, namely the "form" (or the expression used by the speaker).

This two-fold distinction between interpretation and understanding allows us to establish a corresponding distinction between two different kinds of meanings as well, namely I-meaning and U-meaning respectively. The former would be an encoded second-order entity which is used by a speaker in order to convey the "meaning" (i.e. U-meaning) of a given un-understandable expression to the hearer; whereas the latter would be an *uncoded* first-order entity which gets activated when a hearer listens to and understands a given linguistic expression. Unlike the I-meaning, however, this U-meaning, even though existing in the hearer's brain, would not be directly open to his awareness. That is, it would not be the *object* of his understanding (like the I-meaning), but would only be the *mechanism* for his understanding of the given expression. We can therefore identify the U-meaning with the neural structures which get sensitized as the hearer listens to and understands a given expression.

The most important point to be noted here is that I-meaning is only an *expression* in the language; it differs from the corresponding "form" only functionally, i.e. in its being readily understandable to the hearer. Since both this I-meaning as well as the corresponding "form" are proper expressions in the language under consideration, both of them would have U-meanings of their own; further, the two would be *differing* from one another in their U-meaning because, we do not expect two expressions which differ formally from one another to give rise to exactly identical understandings. However, when a speaker uses a particular expression as the I-meaning of another expression ("form"), he would be assuming that the hearer would *disregard* those differences of U-meaning. That is, the establishment of I-meaning would involve *idealization* or abstraction (of U-meaning).

When the semanticists use certain formal devices such as the so-called semantic components and projection rules, or the variables and other formal concepts of the logicians (in order to establish their own "representations" of meaning), they would only be replacing the ordinary language expressions with these more precise and less ambiguous expressions of the formal language. They would still be dealing with *encoded* entities, and therefore with I-meaning rather than U-meaning. In fact, the very act of encoding the meaning would have the effect of taking away U-meaning from the scope of such a study, and thereby limiting it to the study of I-meaning.

What I am claiming here is that the semanticists who are trying to establish the semantic representations are only formulating special kinds of I-meanings; compared to ordinary language expressions, these would evidently be more precise, less ambiguous, but also more abstract or idealized. They would be "representing" U-meaning in exactly the same way in which the ordinary language expressions would be representing it, namely through codification or symbolization. They would not, however be characterizing the U-meaning because, there would be a fundamental difference between the two, namely that the semantic representations would be *encoded* entities whereas the U-meanings would be *uncoded*. Hence, there would be no basis whatsoever for the claim that these semantic representations could characterize some specific aspect of the *implicit* understanding of linguistic expressions.

Theorists like Fodor (1976) have tried to argue that even this implicit understanding of linguistic expressions can be regarded as



involving an activity of encoding, such as for example, the *translation* of the given expressions into an inner code called "mentalese"; if we can postulate such an inner activity, it is evident that the semantic representations formulated by the linguists can be regarded as characterizing the "expressions" of this inner code.

However, the basic claim itself is mistaken here in that it fails to recognize the most important difference between explicit interpretation and implicit understanding, namely that the latter would not be using any encoded entities. If we do not concede this point, we would find it impossible to account for the fact that the underlying elements of the latter, namely the U-meanings are out of reach of our direct awareness or introspection.

It can be shown, I think, that the above-mentioned claim about inner code or "mentalese" has originated from the mistaken assumption that the process of implicit understanding would be the same or similar to that of explicit interpretation. Fodor (1976:116) had actually found it necessary to postulate two different *kinds* of understanding, of which one would involve the "translation" of linguistic expressions into mentalese expressions, and the other would involve no translations as such, but only the occurrence (or activation?) of the relevant mentalese expressions. If these latter expressions can be "understood" by an individual without actually decoding them, it is difficult to see how they can be regarded as *encoded* entities.

Further, as I would be pointing out later on, the activity of translation involves the idealization or abstraction of meaning, and this latter process is mainly meant for satisfying certain inherent requirements of *awareness*. This implies very clearly that the concept of translation can have a place only in an explicit mental activity and not in an implicit one. The latter would only involve the first-order neural structure and not any second-order encoded structures.

Semanticists have considered it necessary to establish the formal representations of meaning, especially the so-called "semantic components" which result from the decomposition and atomization of meaning, in order to explicate and also to properly understand the various kinds of semantic relationships and properties like synonymy, hyponymy, analyticity, meaninglessness, entitlement, translatability, etc. Some have even claimed that the native speakers would have to decompose and atomize meaning *implicitly* in order to make use of these semantic relationships and properties in their production and comprehension of sentences.

Before trying to evaluate these claims, however, it would be useful to divide these semantic relations and properties into two distinct groups, mainly on the basis of the fact that some of them, like synonymy, analyticity, and translatability, can be established only on the basis of the concept of I-meaning (or encoded meaning) whereas others like hyponymy, meaninglessness, entilement, etc. can occur as part of the implicit functioning of language (i.e. without any need to encode meaning). However, in order to *explicate* these latter relations and properties, we would need the concept of I-meaning.

Consider, for example, the concept of synonymy or paraphrase relationship. It has been rightly pointed out by several scholars that no two distinct linguistic expressions can be considered as giving rise to exactly identical understandings in a given context. That is, we cannot think of two distinct expressions as having identical U-meanings. But, it is very necessary for the proper functioning of language, especially for providing interpretations to un-understandable expressions, to regard certain expressions as the synonyms or paraphrases of certain other expressions. And the only way to establish this relationship is through idealization or abstraction, i.e. by disregarding some of the U-meaning differences as not of any particular relevance to the context under consideration.

In fact, the establishment of I-meaning involves both idealization as well as disambiguation. In the former case, certain aspects of U-meaning of the original expression would be disregarded, whereas in the latter case, certain additional aspects of U-meaning, which the original expression had failed to properly encode, would be overtly indicated. The contemporary semanticists use both these devices while establishing their "semantic representations", but rather surprisingly, they fail to notice that these would be needed only for the *explication* of meaning (i.e. as part of the activity of encoding it in a *different* and more readily understandable fashion) but not for the implicit understanding itself of linguistic expressions.

The concepts of analyticity and translatability are completely dependent upon the concept of synonymy, and hence, their establishment would also crucially depend upon that of I-meaning. Hence, the dispute as to whether these former concepts (i.e. analyticity and translatability) are valid or invalid is a pseudo-dispute; from the point of view of I-meaning they can be regarded as quite valid, whereas from that of U-meaning they are to be considered as completely invalid. There cannot be any absolute



synonymy as such, and hence, there would be no possibility of establishing perfect translations or perfect analytic sentences.

The semantic relations and properties that have been placed in the second group above, namely hyponymy, entilement, meaninglessness, etc. are quite different from the above ones in that the encoding of meaning (and therefore its decomposition and atomization as well) would be needed only for making them explicit, but not for their actual occurrence in the functioning of language, as in the case of synonymy, analyticity or translatability. For example, we would simply have to understand a given sentence in order to say what it entiles or implies; it is only when we wish to explain the nature of this relationship between two different sentences that we would find it necessary to decompose and atomize meaning and also to encode it. The semanticists who assume that a process similar to the above one of explicating the relation would form the basis of the hearer's understanding of a sentence and his derivation of its implications or entilements, I think, are making this fundamental mistake of not properly distinguishing between explicit and implicit mental processes.

Another aspect of meaning that has given rise to acrimonious dispute in contemporary linguistics concerns the distinction between syntax and semantics. Some linguists have considered it possible to establish a "deeper" level of syntactic structure as distinct from the semantic structure, whereas some others have questioned this possibility. Some have even questioned the possibility of establishing any kind of distinction between syntactic and semantic structures. Even though linguists who uphold this latter position are very few today, the basic question raised by this particular dispute is yet to be satisfactorily resolved.

In fact, this basic question regarding the nature of form-meaning dichotomy has a long history in semantics. We can find it in the dispute between the so-called "sense" theorists who considered meaning to be distinct (and therefore distinguishable) from "form", and the "use" theorists who considered it to be nothing more than the use of the "form". There had been no satisfactory resolution of this particular dispute either, even though it remains practically forgotten today (Caton 1971).

The basic problem that is involved here is that even those linguists who consider the syntactic structures to be quite distinct from semantic structures have not so far been able to come up with even a *single* characteristic that can be assigned exclusively to either of them. They are not even sure as to which specific properties

or conditions in language can be regarded as purely syntactic or semantic. They appear to have only an intuitive feeling that the distinction must be valid, but in the actuality they have not been able to characterize it.

I wish to suggest, in this connection, that this particular problem about the distinction between form (syntax) and meaning (semantics) can very easily be resolved with the help of the above-mentioned distinction between I-meaning and U-meaning. For example, it can be argued that when the "sense" theorists claim that meaning is distinct from form, they are actually talking about I-meaning, whereas when the "use" theorists claim that meaning is nothing but the use of the form, they are actually talking about U-meaning. Both are correct in the relevant contexts and hence the dispute is actually a pseudo-dispute.

Similarly, when the so-called "interpretive" semanticists argue that the syntactic structure is distinct from the semantic structure, they are referring to the distinction, *in a given context*, between an expression functioning as "form" and another expression functioning as its "meaning" (i.e. I-meaning). Whereas, when the "generative" semanticists argue that the two structures cannot be differentiated from one another, they are actually referring to the fact that *in general*, the two could be using one and the same formal apparatus. As in the case of the previous dispute, there is no need whatsoever to regard these two claims as contradictory to one another because, they have been made in entirely different contexts.

The dispute as to whether the deep structure (syntax) of a sentence can be distinguished from its semantic structure or not can also be resolved in a similar fashion. Notice that in order to establish the deep structure of a given sentence, a linguist would have to make use of the devices of idealization and disambiguation; these would also be the devices that the semanticist would have to use while establishing his semantic representations or the I-meaning, as I have pointed out above. No wonder then, that the linguists have found the actual rules that are required for explicating the syntax of a given sentence to be the same as the ones which are needed for determining its semantics (McCawley 1976). In fact, the two activities cannot be differentiated from one another except from the point of view of the *purpose* for which they are being carried out.

Notice, however, that we cannot raise a similar question regarding the distinction between the deep structure and the



U-meaning of a given sentence. The difficulty in this case is that the deep structure would be an encoded entity, whereas the U-meaning, as I have pointed out earlier, would only be uncoded. The former would have the structure of the code (or formalism) that has been used for encoding it, whereas the latter would have no structure of its own, but only that of the mechanism of understanding, namely the nervous system. The former would be a second-order entity whereas the latter would only be a first-order entity; hence, we cannot directly correlate them with one another. Failure to recognize this very important point about U-meaning or the activity of implicit understanding can only lead to confusions.

### Conclusion

I have tried to examine in this paper some of the fundamental assumptions of contemporary theories of language. I have pointed out certain basic misconceptions in these theories which, I believe, are the reasons for the intuitive feeling, expressed by several scholars, that there is something basically wrong in these contemporary theories of language. I have argued that only the postulation of a *dualistic* theory of language can help us to remove these misconceptions.


Specifically, I have argued that the phenomenon of language is based upon two distinct systems of grammatical knowledge namely the explicit and the implicit. The former occurs in an *encoded* form and is therefore open to awareness and conscious use, whereas the latter occurs in an *uncoded* form and is therefore not open to awareness. The latter exists only as the *mechanism* of understanding and sentence-production. The effects of these two bases upon the functioning of language are found to be contradictory; only a dualistic theory can account for the occurrence of this contradiction. Further, an explicit system would require an underlying implicit system for its very existence, and hence the attempts of many of the contemporary linguists to characterize the implicit grammar of the speaker-hearer by writing only unitary explicit grammars are bound to be unsuccessful.

I have also argued that the puzzles and paradoxes that have affected the contemporary studies of meaning can be resolved only by postulating a dualistic theory of meaning which can very easily be derived from the above-mentioned dualistic theory of language.

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## NOTES AND DISCUSSIONS

# LANGUAGE AND CULTURE OF MUDUGAS

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A section of the people was notified as Scheduled Tribes in India under the President's Order 1950. Before declaring a group as a tribe it is necessary that we should consider their physical features, area of settlement, social distance from the advanced groups, marriage systems, taboos, religious conventions, material culture, language etc. Luiz opines that 'the existence of discrimination, culture and customs combined with the fact that they are nomadic, primitive and still observe taboos and conventions likely to be described by modern society as derogatory and antisocial is proof to confirm a group as a tribe. If habitations are far from civilization and if the external features of a tribe are present, these will certainly strengthen the decision<sup>1</sup>. According to the 1971 Census report the tribal population in India is 380.15 lakhs, i.e., 6.94% of the total population of the country.

Though the need for a clear classification of the tribes of Kerala has been pointed out by some scholars, it has not been attempted so far successfully. The list published by the Government of Kerala consists the names of 41 tribes<sup>2</sup>, whereas Luiz describes about 48 tribes<sup>3</sup>. Based on these two lists, Somasekharan Nair opines that the total number of tribes in

<sup>1</sup>Luiz, A. A. D. (1962).

<sup>2</sup>Notification No. 1 Educational concessions for Pre-Matriculation Studies for Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes, other eligible Communities including Kudumbis, other Backward classes and converts from them (Kerala Gazette No. 20). Harijan Welfare Department, Government of Kerala, Trivandrum, 1972.

<sup>3</sup>Luiz, A. A. D. (1962).

Kerala is inbetween 41 and 54<sup>4</sup>. The main tribal concentrations in Kerala are in the Cannanore, Wynad, Calicut and Palghat districts. The tribal population of these four districts constitute 74.6% of the total tribal population of the State. According to the 1971 Census, Kerala State has a total population of 213.47 lakhs of which the tribal communities constitute 2.69 lakhs, i.e., 1.26% of the total population.

In the present paper I would like to do three things:

- (i) To describe Muḍuga
- (ii) To explain some important features of the Muḍuga language in the phonological, grammatical and lexical level to show that it is a new member of the Dravidian family of languages.
- (iii) To give a few interesting aspects of the Muḍuga culture.

The hill tribe Muḍugas live in the remote forest settlements of the Attappady tribal area. Attappady, one of the prominent forest regions of Kerala is situated in the north-eastern part of the Palghat district of Kerala, in South India. This 763 square Kiiometres of area is bounded on the east by the Coimbatore district of Tamil Nadu, north by the Nilgiris, south by the Palghat taluk and on the west by the Karimba, Pottassery and Mannarghat revenew villages of the Mannarghat Taluk of the Palghat district and the Ernad Taluk of the Malappuram district. Also, there are a few Muḍuga families in the Nilgiris and Coimbatore of Tamil Nadu. There are 18 Muḍuga hamlets in Attappady. They are (1) Chundakki (2) Thazhachundakki (3) Veeranuru (4) Karuvare (5) Ommale (6) Kallamale (7) Kottamale (8) Chitturu (9) Chandakulam (10) Koravanpady (11) Ummathupadiga (12) Molakambi (13) Thekkumpanna (14) Abbannuru (15) Kottiyuru (16) Pettikkallu (17) Kakkuppady and (18) Mukkali. According to the 1961 Census their population was 1881<sup>5</sup> which increased to 2370 in 1971<sup>6</sup>.

As a tribe Muḍugas are shy and do not like the company of the non-tribal people in the plains. They consider themselves as superior to the Irulas and Kurumbas, the other two tribes of the Attappady tribal area. But they help each other in agricultural

<sup>4</sup>Somasekharan Nair, P. (1976).

<sup>5</sup>Source: *Census of India, 1961*

<sup>6</sup>Source: *Census of India, 1971*.



operations, hunting, fishing, etc. Muḍugas have not changed much by contact with the civilized people or by any of the welfare schemes which the Government has implemented for the development of the tribes. They have a limited culture of their own which they maintain in isolation. Regarding their language the Anthropologists and Sociologists who have conducted field work in the tribal areas of Kerala, pointed out that the language of Muḍugas is unintelligible to Malayalam speakers and it is a dialect of Tamil with many Tulu words and phrases.<sup>7</sup> A descriptive analysis of the Muḍuga speech shows that, even though it has got some similarities with Tamil in the area of grammatical structure, it cannot be treated as a dialect of Tamil.<sup>8</sup> The influence of Kannada, Malayalam and Tulu can also be observed in the vocabulary.

Twentysix segmental phonemes are identified in this language. They are five vowel phonemes (/i, e, a, o, u/), twenty consonant phonemes (/p, b, t, d, R, ɽ, ɖ, c, j, k, g, m, n, ŋ, l, ɭ, r, v, y, s/) and one phoneme of length (/:/). Except /o/, all the vowels occur with or without length in the initial, medial and final position. /o/ occurs with or without length in the initial and medial position, and only with length in the final position. The front vowels /i/ and /e/ and the back vowels /o/ and /u/ have the onglides of [y] and [w] respectively when they occur in the word initial position. All the consonants other than /ɖ/, /ŋ/, /ɭ/ and /y/ occur in the initial position. All the twenty consonants occur medially. However, no consonant occur in the word final position. Diphthongs are not found in this language. Only two consonant and three consonant clusters occur. Three consonant clusters occur only in the medial position while two consonant clusters occur initially and medially.

/-R-/ and /-uR-/ are the present tense markers and /-v-/ and /-uv-/ are the future tense markers present in this language. (e.g. va + R + a > vaRa '(she) comes', po: + R + e > po:Re '(he) goes', col + R + a > colRa '(she) says'; viɭa:ɽ + uR + a > viɭa:ɽuRa '(she) plays', und + uR + e > unduRe '(he) pushes' po: + v + a > po:va '(she) will go', cey + v + e > ceyve '(he) will do', no:ɽ + uv + a > no:ɽuva '(she) will look') There are nine past tense markers. They are /-R:-/ (e.g. to: + R: + a > to:R:a

<sup>7</sup>Luiz, A. A. D. (1962)

<sup>8</sup>*Description of the Language of Mudugas*, Rajendran, N. (1978)

'(she) failed'), /-t-/ (e.g. cey + t + e > ceyte '(he) did'), /-d-/ (e.g. tin + d + a > tinda '(she) ate'), /-t:-/ (e.g. o!e + t: + a > o!et:a > '(she) called'), /-t-/ (e.g. cuṭ + t + a > cuṭ:a '(she) roasted') /-ḍ-/ (e.g. veraṇ + ḍ + a > veraṇḍa '(she) frightened') /-n-/ (e.g. po: + n + a > po:na '(she) went') /-nd-/ (e.g. kuk:a: + nd + a > kuk:a:nda '(she) sat') and /-in-/ (e.g. e!ut + in + a > e!utina '(she) wrote').

The negative markers are /-a:t:-/, /-at-/, /-a/, /-ale/ and /ma:t:-/. /-a:t:-/ and /-at-/ occur before the relative participle marker /-a/ and the verbal participle marker /-e/ respectively. (e.g. ninek: + a:t: + a > ninek:a:t:a 'that which will not think; ka:n + at + e > ka:nate 'without seeing). /-a/ occurs after the verb stem /ve:t-/ (e.g. ve:t:a 'do not need') /-ale/ gives the past negative meaning while /-ma:t:-/ gives the emphatic negation in future tense (e.g. varale 'did not come', no:tale 'did not see'; vara ma:t:a '(she) will not come' col:ama:t:a '(she) will not say').

As is found in other major South Dravidian languages personal markers are present in the Muḍuga also. The person marker /-e/ is used to denote the first person singular, second person singular and the third person masculine singular (e.g. vande '(I, you (Sg.), he came. /-a:mu/ is used for the first person exclusive plural where as /-e:Ru/ is for both the first person inclusive plural and for the second person plural (e.g. vanda:mu 'we (Excl) came'; vande:Ru 'we (Incl), you (Pl.) came'). The third person feminine singular marker is /-a/ (e.g. va + nd + a > vanda '(she) came') and the third person plural marker is /-a:Ru/ (e.g. var + uv + a:Ru > varuva:Ru '(they) will come').

There are six cases other than the nominative and vocative, viz. Accusative, Sociative, Dative, Genitive, Locative and Instrumental. The case markers with their examples are given below:

### 1. Accusative (Acc.)

- (a) -aṇa e.g. en + aṇa > en:aṇa 'to me (Acc.)'  
 em + aṇa > em:aṇa 'we (Excl.) (Acc.)'  
 nam + aṇa > nam:aṇa 'we (Incl) (Acc.)'  
 nin + aṇa > nin:aṇa 'you (sg) (Acc.)'  
 nim + aṇa > nim:aṇa 'you (Pl.) (Acc.)'  
 -a e.g. aval + in + a > avalina 'to her (Acc.)'  
 avaR + in + a > avaRina 'to them (Acc.)'  
 -e e.g. avan + e > avane 'to him (Acc.)'  
 mara + t: + e > marat:e 'to the tree (Acc.)'



## 2. Sociative (Soc.)

### (a) -o:je

- e.g. avan + o:je > avano:je 'with him (Soc.)'  
 mara + t: + o:je > marat:o:je 'with the tree (Soc.)'

## 3 Dative (Dat.)

### (a) -a:k:u

- e.g. en + a:k:u > ena:k:u 'to me (Dat.)'  
 nin + a:k:u > nina:k:u 'you (Sg.) (Dat.)'  
 nim + a:k:u > nima:k:u 'you (Pl.) (Dat.)'

### (b) -u:k:u

- e.g. avan + u:k:u > avanuk:u 'to him (Dat.)'  
 ava| + u:k:u > ava|uk:u 'to her (Dat.)'

### (c) -k:u

- e.g. ma:ni + k:u > ma:ni:k:u 'to the aunt (Dat.)'  
 co:le + k:u > co:le:k:u 'to the forest' (Dat.)

## 4 Genitive (Gen.)

### (a) -i:ɕ:a

- e.g. ond + i:ɕ:a > ondi:ɕ:a 'of one (Gen.)'

### (b) -tu

- e.g. ava| + tu > ava|tu 'of her (Gen.)'  
 male + tu > maletu 'of hill (Gen.)'

### (c) -u

- e.g. en + u > en:u 'my (Gen.)'  
 nin + u > nin:u 'you (Sg.) (Gen.)'

## 5. Locative (Loc.)

### (a) -ilu

- e.g. mara + t: + ilu > marat:ilu 'on the tree (Loc.)'

### (b) -lu

- e.g. ku:re + lu > ku:relu 'in the hut (Loc.)'

## 6. Instrumental (Instr.)

### (a) -a:le

- e.g. avan + a:le > avana:le 'by him (Instr.)'  
 ava| + a:le > ava|a:le 'by her (Instr.)'

The following chart illustrates the pronouns in the Muḍuga and other major south dravidian languages

	<i>Muḍuga</i>	<i>Malayalam</i>	<i>Tamil</i>	<i>Kannada</i>	<i>Telugu</i>
I P. Sg.	na:nu	n̄a:n	na:n	na:nu	ne:nu
I P. Pl. (Excl.)	em:a	n̄aṇ:aḷ	eṇkaḷ	na:vu	me:mu
I P. Pl. (Incl.)	nam:a	nam:aḷ	na:ṇkaḷ	na:vu	manamu
II P. Sg.	ni:	n̄i:	ni:	ni:nu	ni:vu
II P. Pl.	nim:a	n̄iṇ:aḷ	ni:ṇkaḷ	ni:vu	mi:ru
III P. Masc. Sg.	ave	avan	avan	avanu	va:ḍu
Fem. Sg.	ava	avaḷ	avaḷ	avaḷu	—
Ep. Pl.	avaRu	avar	avar	avaRu	va:ru
Neu. Sg.	atu	atu	atu	adu	—
Neu. Pl.	—	ava	avai	avu	avi
Non.Masc.Sg.	—	—	—	—	adi

In the third person pronouns Muḍuga has four types of distinctions viz. masculine singular, feminine singular, epicene plural and neuter singular. The neuter singular has no separate plural forms. Malayalam, Tamil and Kannada have a five types of distinctions viz. masculine singular, feminine singular, epicene plural, neuter singular and neuter plural. Telugu has four types of distinctions viz. masculine singular, non-masculine singular, epicene plural and neuter plural. Muḍuga language stands out from other South Dravidian languages in the case of neuter plural. I have checked very carefully whether the Muḍuga has got the neuter plural form and found that this form is not available. Except the non-existence of neuter plural, all other classifications are similar to Tamil, Malayalam and Kannada.

Some interesting vocabulary items in the Muḍuga language are the following:

agu-	'to cry'	aḍ:e	'necklace'
agra	'sweat'	aṇḍe	'bamboo bucket'
ac:a	'grand father'	aṇ:uve	'(he) will touch'
ac:i	'grand mother'	aṇ:i	'squirrel'
aṭiyamat:u	'lower lip'	at:ye	'husband's sister'
aṭ:a	'ceiling'	anga	'moustache'
aṭ:e	'leech'	an:a	'flour of grains'



am:a	'Goddess'	kap:e	'frog'
arime	'mosquito'	karuve	'blacksmith'
arya	'anger'	kaḷ:i	'granary'
ava	'she'	ka:ṭu	'agriculture,
ave	'he'		ḷungle'
av:e	'mother'	ka:ṭ:i	'bison'
aḷe	'cave'	ka:nu	'groove, gutter'
a:naḷu	'if so'	ku:re	'hut'
a:ngu	'there'	kop:e	'burial ground'
a:vḷi	'yawn'	gare	'border of clothe'
iṭḷu	'narrow'	gu:me	'owl'
inup:u	'sweet'	gelime	'cold'
inRu	'today'	gem:u	'petal'
iy:a	'lead'	goRk:u	'sneeze'
irumaḷu	'cough'	caṇ:i	'buttock'
i:p:i	'house fly'	caḷi	'dew'
uc:e	'urine'	ci:	'pus'
uṇḍika	'oblation'	ci:la	'hinge'
ula:vu	'taboo'	cu:ṇḍi	'mouse'
u:ṭ:u	'house'	cuṇḍu	'female genital
u:t:a	'anaemia'		organ'
u:ralu	'filaria'	cuḷ:a	'twig'
ec:e	'how'	cu:ru	'smell'
eṭa	'place'	ceṭ:u	'pollen'
ey:a	'porcupine'	cok:ana	'good'
elep:ap:u	'spleen'	coṭ:i	'baldness'
e:ṭ:i	'bank of river'	jaṇḍu	'trash'
e:me	'tortoise'	taṭ:u	'seive'
oṭ:e	'caryota urens'	tat:i	'egg of fish'
ob:e	'eye brow'	taRi	'stem of tapioca
oli	'current'		plant'
o:ri	'ox'	ta:va	'thirst'
kaṭa	'debt'	tuR:i	'flute'
kaṭeba:yi	'corner of	tu:vi	'feather'
	mouth'	toR:i	'beak of birds'
kaṇe	'bamboo spoon'	nagu-	'to laugh'
kaṇe:k:a	'ankle'	na:ti	'barber'
kaṇ:i	'thread, rope'	na:sve	'sister-in-law'

nure	'foam'	bik:u	'kidney'
net:i	'fore-head'	bey:a	'sunshine'
ne:ra	'Sun'	boḍ:e	'blunt arrow'
pakiṭu	'cheek'	mage	'rain'
pak:a	'near'	mad:e:na	'noon'
pan:e	'thin'	ma:Ru	'broom'
parya	'brideprice'	mu:nga	'bamboo'
paḷ:a	'pond'	ret:a	'blood'
pa:ni	'crockery'	vaṇ:e	'washerman'
piṭ:u	'food'	va:ṇi	'river'
pi:	'excrement'	vi:ṇi	'virgin'
pe:ramaka	'grand daughter'	vel:i	'star'
baṇḍe	'a fish'	sondu	'dandruff'
ba:ge	'plantain'		

In spite of the similarities with Tamil, Malayalam and Kannada in some aspects, there are many differences which make the Muḍuga language a separate dravidian language. The first person exclusive plural pronoun 'em:a', the second person plural pronoun 'nim:a', the negative marker '-at-', the accusative case marker '-aṇa', the genitive casemarkers '-u', the pronominal suffixes of the first person exclusive plural '-a:mu', first person inclusive plural and second person plural '-e:Ru', etc., and many vocabulary items are some of the features which make this speech form a distinct language from other South Dravidian Languages.<sup>9</sup>

In this paper I can make only a few observation about the culture of Muḍugas<sup>10</sup>. Muḍugas are believed to be the earliest immigrants of this region. They are of Tamil origin and are believed to be immigrants from the Coimbatore District of Tamil Nadu. The purpose of their immigration was an ambitious plan to extensive agricultural activities in the fertile virgin soil of Attappady forests. The history of their immigration dates back to 15th century or even prior to that. The religion of this tribe is akin to

<sup>9</sup>For more details about the Muḍuga Language see *Description of the Language of Mudugas*, Rajendran, N. (1978).

<sup>10</sup>For more details about the Culture of Muḍugas see the article "Cultural Description of Mudugas" Rajendran, N. (1979).



Hinduism. They were, during the past, subjects of the Vijayanagar Hindu Empire. The Muḍugas are worshippers of Lord Siva. Saivism (Worship of Lord Siva) is considered to be older than Vaishnavism (Worship of Lord Vishnu). As the Muḍugas are still worshippers of Lord Siva and are oblivious to any influence of Vaishnavism, it can be reasonably presumed that they had emigrated from the plains even prior to the propagation of Vaishnavism<sup>11</sup>.

The Muḍugas live in clusters with twelve or so households in each settlement. The Muḍuga hamlets are referred to as 'u:ru' and the huts as 'ku:re'. The small squatter huts are low ceilinged with the ceilings not exceeding five feet from the floor level. The huts are very sparsely furnished and consists only of mats made of grass and bamboo splinters. Mats are spread out to sleep and offered for the guests to sit. While these tribesmen are quite dexterous in producing household utensils from bamboo and canes they depend on the markets for the earthenware. The apparel of the men are sober and consists only of a handloom towel round the waist reaching upto the knee and the upper portion of the body is wrapped in a dhoti slung from the shoulders. The women's apparel consists of a brightly coloured strip of cloth five feet long and four feet wide referred to by them 'ce:la'. The 'ce:la' wraps this tribal women folk from the upper part of the breast to the knee.

Each hamlet is presided over by a headman (mu:p:e) and he is assisted in his administrative responsibilities by three men 'kuRutale', 'vaṇḍa:ri' and 'maṇ:uk:a:re'. The headman is kept informed of all the happenings in the hamlet. All the ceremonies are presided over by the headman, these include deaths, births, marriages, etc. All members are under the force of threat made to submit to the laws and morals of the tribal society. Non-observance of these laws will be counteracted with a fine of not less than Rupees 5/-. Without the sanction of the headman intercaste marriages are a taboo and is met with ostracism from the tribal society and also they forfeit the right to stay in the hamlet.

For the purpose of marriage alliances the Muḍugas are divided into four exogamous groups. They are (1) kaRuṭ:iga (2) veḷ:e:ga (3) kup:uṇ:iga and (4) a:Ru:ra. The 'kaRuṭ:iga' can take brides or give brides only to the member of the 'veḷ:e:ga'

<sup>11</sup>*Census of India 1961 Vol. VII, Part VI. G. Village Survey Monographs, Tribal Areas.*

group. They cannot have any marriage alliance with any other group. Likewise the members of the 'kup:uṇiga' group can have marriage relationship only with the 'a:Ru:ra' group. These people encourage cross cousin marriages i.e., marrying maternal uncle's or paternal aunt's daughter. Polyandry is prohibited, but polygamy is practised in a restricted way, i.e., when the first wife does not bear children or becomes unhealthy. Divorce and widow marriages are allowed. Marriages by exchange, by service and by elopement are also rarely seen among this tribe. Any death is considered to be the concern of the entire settlement and full honours are given to the departed soul by beating drum and playing pipes. All members of the hamlet including the headman should have to attend the death ceremonies. The corpse will be buried only on the third day of the death. The members in the hut observe pollution for 40 days. The pollution is dissipated by giving a feast to the members who took part in the death ceremonies. Generally Muḍugas do not have any other ceremonies by which the dead are remembered.

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## **PERSONAL PRONOUNS IN THE PANIYA AND ADIYA SPEECH FORMS OF KERALA SOME SOCIOLINGUISTIC OBSERVATIONS**

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Among the tribal speech forms of Kerala, the Paniya and the Adiya (PA), form a separate sub-group as they have some common innovations which are not shared by other tribal groups. One of the striking features of this sub-group which distinguishes it from other groups is the nature of its personal pronouns. The classification and the usages of these pronouns are discussed in this paper. The data were collected mainly through two field investigations conducted in the Mananthavady area of North Wynad during the years 1970 and 1973. (Somasekharan Nair, 1977, 1978) and later checked at some more points in the northern and southern parts of Wynad district, to clarify the validity of some findings.

According to the 1971 census, the population of the Paniyans and Adiyans is 45,562 and 7073 respectively. 'Raavuḷeeru' is the term used by the Adiyans to refer to their tribal group. They say that the name 'Adiyan' is given by the non-tribals. The field work done in the Bavaly area at the Kerala-Karnataka border reveals that the Adiyans are also known by the name 'Yeruvas'. One of the informants Mallan at Bavaly says that eventhough they are Adiyans, the Ooda Gowdas (URuḍeru), the migrants from Mysore call them 'Yeruvas' (yeRuvaru). Another informant Jogi at Mananthavady has also stated that he has heard from other Adiyans that they are known as 'yeRuvaru' in Coorg of the Karnataka state.

The main types of the Third person pronoun which are known to us so far are Masculine singular, Feminine singular, Neuter singular, Neuter plural, Epicene plural (Human plural) Non-masculine singular, Masculine plural, Non-Masculine plural,



etc. (Andronov, 1977, Krishnamurty, 1975 and Shaumugam, 1971). The Third person singular without any gender distinction is also reported from the Uralikuruma (Vetta Kuruma) speech form (Somasekharan Nair, 1982) *adu* in this speech means he, she and it. In addition to all these types of pronouns listed above, the PA speech forms provide us with two new types of pronouns viz. Third person non-feminine singular and Epicene singular. The personal pronouns in both speech forms are listed below with the oblique forms in brackets.<sup>1</sup>

**Personal pronouns in the Paniya and Adiya speech forms**

	<i>Paniya</i>	<i>Adiya</i>
First person Singular	<u>naa</u> <i>ṇu</i> / <u>naa</u> <i>nu</i> ( <i>en-ee-e-</i> )	<u>naa</u> <i>ṇu</i> / <u>naa</u> <i>ṇa</i> ( <i>en-</i> )
First person plural (Exclusive)	<u>naa</u> <i>ṅa</i> ( <i>eṅga-, eṅga!-</i> )	<u>naa</u> <i>ṅa</i> ( <i>eṅga-, eṅga!-</i> )
First person plural (Inclusive)	<u>naa</u> <i>mu</i> ( <i>nam-</i> )	<u>naa</u> <i>mu</i> ( <i>nam-</i> )
Second person singular	<u>nii</u> / <u>nii</u> <i>yu</i> ( <i>nin-</i> )	<u>nii</u> / <u>nii</u> <i>yu</i> ( <i>iṅj- ṇaa- iṇṇ-</i> )
Second person plural	<u>nii</u> <i>ṅa</i> / <u>nii</u> <i>ṅa</i> ,	<u>nii</u> <i>ṅa</i>
Third person Feminine singular	Prox. <i>iva</i> <i>a</i> <i>ḷu</i> Dist. <i>ava</i> <i>a</i> <i>ḷu</i>	<i>oo</i> <i>ḷu</i> <i>avoo</i> <i>ḷu</i> / <i>avoo</i>
Third person Non- feminine singular	Prox. <i>iven</i> Dist. <i>aven</i>	<i>ee</i> <i>nu</i> / <i>ee</i> <i>ayinu</i> / <i>ayi</i>
Third person Epicene singular	Prox. <i>idu</i> Dist. <i>adu</i>	<i>idu</i> <i>adu</i>
Epicene plural	Prox. <i>iveru</i> Dist. <i>averu</i>	<i>eera</i> <i>ayira</i>

<sup>1</sup>The Adiya forms given here are elicited from Mananthavady. A variation in the pronunciation of *naanu*, *ayinu* and *eeenu* is observed between the Mananthavady and Bavaly areas. In these forms, all the nasals are dental in Bavaly. See the following examples

*Mananthavady*

*naanu*  
*ayinu*  
*eeenu*

*Bavaly*

*naanu*  
*ayinu*  
*eeenu*

*Meaning*

I  
He (Dist.)  
He (Prox.)

A striking difference between the Paniya and Adiya speech forms with reference to the second person singular is that the Adiya has three oblique forms whereas the Paniya has only one, nin- as in Malayalam.

<i>Second person oblique from in the Adiya speech</i>	<i>Environment</i>	<i>Form with case markers</i>	<i>Meaning</i>	<i>Paniya form</i>
iññ	Before the accusative case marker-e	iññ+e>iññe	You (Acc)	<u>ninne</u>
ñaa-	Before the dative case marker -kku	ñaa+kku>ñaaakku	to you	<u>ninaakku</u>
iñj-	Before the genitive case marker -a	iñj+a>iñja	your	<u>ninna</u>

See the following sentences in the Adiya speech.

iññe aReyñjikkaavey 'I will beat you'

ñaaakku ñaa tandey 'I gave you'

iñja peerenneenumaa? 'What is your name (girl!)?'

In all these sentences, Paniya speech substitutes ninne, ninaakku and ninna for iññe, ñaaakku and iñja respectively.

The second person plural ñiñga is used as a plural form to refer to more than one person as in the following sentences:

ñiñgalokkaayimu barii 'You all come' (Adiya)

makka<sup>1</sup>lee ñiñga<sup>1</sup>le ñaañu aleppeen 'Children, I will beat you' (Paniya). But ñiñga is also used to address a single person to show respect as in Malayalam in which case it is termed as honorific plural. A very important diversion from Malayalam is that in the PA speech forms, ñiñga is used to address only the affinal relations especially the husband's and wife's elder brother or sister. Except these relations, and the people of the higher castes like Namboodiris, Nairs, Nambiars, Variars etc. all the other relations are addressed as ñii 'You (Sg.).<sup>2</sup> The informant Mallan from Bavaly has stated that the husband's and wife's

<sup>2</sup>It was observed during the field work in the Kani settlements of Southern Kerala that the Kani women in the old generation address their husbands as ñii. It was also reported that the Malamuttans, a tribe of Nilambur area in the Malapuram district, use this term to address their superiors.



brothers and sisters are addressed as *nīṅga* even if they are younger than the speaker. See the following acceptable and unacceptable sentences from the *Adiya* speech.

<i>Acceptable</i>	<i>Meaning</i>	<i>Unacceptable</i>
appaa <i>nīi</i> pooṇḍa	Father you need not go	appaa <i>nīṅga</i> pooṇḍa
baavaa <i>nīṅga</i> pooṇḍa	Brother-in law you need not go.	baavaa <i>nīi</i> pooṇḍa
periyaaṭṭii <i>nīi</i> ayine ceyduttaattee	Old lady please do it for me	periyaaṭṭii <i>nīṅga</i> ayine ceyduttaattee
appaa <i>nīi</i> ayine ceyduttaatte	Father, you please do it for me	appaa <i>nīṅga</i> ayine ceyduttaattee
baavaa <i>nīṅga</i> ayine ceyduttaattiruva	Brother-in-law you please do it for me	baavaa <i>nīi</i> ayine ceyduttaattiruva

This peculiar relation of *nīṅga* with the affinal relations is found only in the *PA* speech forms as far as know. Its usage to address the higher caste people may be a later development.

Regarding the third person pronouns, the *PA* need a new type of classification in the singular which is not attested in any other speech forms. The classifications like masculine singular, Non-masculine singular, feminine singular, etc. are much familiar to the Dravidian scholars. The differentiation between masculine and non-masculine exists in Telugu, Konda, Gondi, Koya, Kui, Kuvi, Kolami, Naiki of Chanda, Parji, Gadaba (Ollari), Malto and Gowda Kannada. In these languages, neuter and feminine genders are grouped together under non-masculine, and masculine alone forms another group. Thus a non-masculine pronoun means she (Prox. and Dist.), this and that. But in the *PA* speech forms, the Neuter is combined with Masculine. See the following sentences from *PA* with some unacceptable sentences in the brackets to show the difference between *aven* and *adu*.

<i>Paniya</i>	<i>Adiya</i>	<i>Meaning</i>
avaaḷu enna magaaḷu	avooḷu enRa magaaḷu	She is my daughter
aven enna magen	ayinu enRa mageen	He is my Son
aven enna uRaale	ayinu enRa Raale	He is my husband
aven enna maale	ayinu enRa maale	That is my chain
(*adu enna maale)	(*adu enRa maale)	
aven ureelu	ayinu ureelu	That is mortar
(*adu ureelu)	(*adu ureelu)	
aven tiippetṭi	ayinu tiippetṭi	That is match box
(*adu tiippetṭi)	(*adu tiippetṭi)	
aven ennette ?	ayinu enneye ?	What is that
(*adu ennatte)	(*adu enneye)	

These sentences show that the Masculine and neuter genders are one and the same and the Feminine alone forms a distinct gender. More precisely, PA distinguish two genders Feminine and Non-feminine, whereas in Malayalam we have Masculine, Feminine and Neuter. Thus *avaa!u* or *avoo!u*<sup>3</sup> means 'she' and *aven* or *ayinu* means 'he, and it' The usage of *adu* in the PA speech forms is strikingly different from other Dravidian languages. In languages like Tamil, Kannada, Malayalam, Kota(ad), Kodagu(adī), Kurumba, Irula, Pengo(adi), etc. and in most of the speech forms of the Kerala tribals, like Kanikkar, Malai Araya, Malai Ullada, Urali, Paliya, Kurumba Pulaya, Karavazhi Pulaya, Muthuva, Muḍuga, Kadar, Malamuttan, Mullakkuruma, Tenkuruma(Kattunaickans), Uralikkuruma (Vettakkuruma), Cholanaickans, Pathinaickans, Malavedan (attu, iccu) Mannan(attu, ittu), Thachanadan Mooppans (addu, iddu) etc. the corresponding form is *atu* or *adu*. (Languages which have forms that are not identical with *atu* or *adu* are given in brackets. In cases where there are two forms, the first is the distant one and the second, proximate). In all these languages and dialects, *atu* or *adu* is classified as the third person neuter gender pronoun. Though historically this is a neuter gender, it is not so in the PA speech forms. To illustrate this point some acceptable and unacceptable sentences (in brackets) are given below.<sup>4</sup>

<sup>3</sup>It will be interesting to compare *oo!u* 'She (Prox.)' and *avoo!u* 'She (Dist.)' of the Adiya with those of Malayalam.

Meaning	Std. Malayalam	Northern Malayalam	Adiya
She (Prox.)	<i>iva!u</i>	<i>iva!u</i>	<i>oo!u</i>
She (Dist.)	<i>ava!u</i>	<i>oo!u</i>	<i>avoo!u</i>

Here *oo!u* means 'She (Prox.)' in the Adiya and 'She (Dist.)' in the Northern dialect of Malayalam, though Adiya has also *i-* and *a-* as the proximate and distant demonstrative clitics (see *idu* and *adu*).

<sup>4</sup>In Malayalam, it is possible to use *atu* as a deictic word to point out any person. Compare the above sentences with the Malayalam sentences below.

- |                           |                         |
|---------------------------|-------------------------|
| 1. <i>atu muttaśśi</i>    | That is an old woman    |
| 2. <i>atu enRe acchan</i> | That is my father       |
| 3. <i>atu enRe amma</i>   | That is my mother       |
| 4. <i>atu enRe makan</i>  | That is my son          |
| 5. <i>atu enRe maala</i>  | That is my chain        |
| 6. <i>atu enRe maka!i</i> | That is my daughter     |
| 7. <i>atu enRe ceecci</i> | That is my elder sister |



<i>Paniya</i>	<i>Meaning in both</i>	<i>Adiya</i>
adu miraatti (*avaaļu miraatti)	She is an woman	adu periyaaṭṭi (*avoolu periyaaṭṭi)
adu enna appen (*aven enna appen)	He is my father	adu enRa appey (*ayinu enRa appey)
adu enna amme (*avaaļu enna amme)	She is my mother	adu enRa ammey (*avoolu enRa ammey)
aven enna magen (*adu enna magen)	He is my son	ayinu enRa mageenu (*adu enRa mageenu)
avaaļu enna magaaļu (*adu enna magaaļu)	She is my daughter	avoolu enRa magaaļu (*adu enRa magaaļu)
aven enna maale (*adu enna maale)	That is my chain	ayinu enRa maale (*adu enRa maale)
avaaļu enna acci (*adu enna acci)	She is my elder sister	avoolu enRa akki (*adu enRa akki)

From these sentences, it is evident that the demonstrative pronoun *adu* in the PA speech forms refers to male or female, and it cannot be used as a neuter singular. Except *periyaaṭṭi* 'old woman' *adu* refers to the relatives of the speaker. The persons belonging to the same generation will not be referred to as *adu*. When tested in various *Paniya* and *Adiya* settlements, all the informants have stated that *adu* is used to refer to only those persons who are older than the speaker. 'amme' (mother) cannot be referred to as *avaaļu* (She), but only as *adu enna amme* 'She is my mother', *adu enna appen* 'He is my father', *adu enna kuḍicci* 'She is my (mother)-in-law,' *avaaļu enna acci* 'She is my elder sister' *aven enna ayyen* 'He is my elder brother' are the acceptable sentences in the *Paniya* speech form. Generally the persons who are referred to as *adu* will be older than the speaker and belong to the first or second ascending generation. *adu* takes the pronominal suffix *-u* as in the *Paniya* speech *adu aaḍae uļu* 'She is there' and *appen naḍinju*<sup>5</sup> 'Father plants (the seedlings).

<sup>5</sup>Though all the *Paniya* and *Adiya* informants are aware that *adu* should be used to refer to the old people, some exceptions are also observed. One of the *Paniya* informants in Manathavady area used 'atu pulle' (that is a child) only once. In the *Paniya* it is a lone example contrary to the above statements regarding 'adu'. In Malayalam, *-t-* in *atu* 'that' and *eetu* 'which' is treated as neuter singular. The interrogative pronouns in the PA speech forms are *eetu* and *ee* respectively. These are used to refer to any gender. See the following sentences.

On the basis of the facts presented above, it can be seen that *adu* which is neuter singular in most of the Dravidian languages has slipped out of its original meaning in PA speech forms and functions as an epicene (human) singular pronoun to refer to a limited number of relatives, older than the speaker. It should also be noted here that the term 'epicene' does not cover all the human beings in this context. It is restricted to the old people of the tribe like father, mother, grand father, grand mother etc.

The plural form of all the three pronouns Feminine singular, Non-feminine singular and Epicene singular have a common plural form. See the following sentences from the Adiya speech.

Feminine singular : *avooļu enRa magaaļu* 'She is my daughter'

Non-feminine singular : *ayinu enRa mageenu* 'He is my son'

*ayinu enRa peṭṭi* 'That is my box'

Epicene singular : *adu enRa appey* 'He is my father'

Epicene plural : *ayira enRa magaaļumu, mageenumu, appenumu*  
'They are my daughter, son and father'.

The Non-feminine has no corresponding Non-feminine plural as we have the Non-masculine singular and Non-masculine plural in the Gondi Koya group of languages<sup>6</sup> So in the case of Non-feminine, the plural 'from *ayira*' represents only the masculine part

<i>Paniya</i>	<i>Adiya</i>	<i>Meaning</i>
<i>eetu maale</i>	<i>ee maale</i>	Which chain?
<i>eetu kooyi</i>	<i>ee kooyi</i>	Which fowl?
<i>eetu puļle</i>	<i>ee puļle</i>	Which child?
<i>eetu mireen</i>	<i>ee peruma</i>	Which old man?

In the Adiya speech also *adu* is used in a different environment in the following construction after the copula *aanRu* (Mal, *aaṇu*)

*nalla guṇa uļa aaļaanRatu* 'He is a good man'

*mayilu oru puļļu aanRatu* 'Peacock is a bird'

<sup>6</sup>The following languages have the Non-Masculine singular and Non-Masculine plural forms (Shanmugam 1971: 10-11).

	Non-masculine Sg. (that thing, that woman)	Non-masculine Pl. (those things, those woman)
Gondi	<i>ad</i>	<i>av</i>
Koya	<i>addu</i>	<i>avvu</i>
Kolami	<i>ad</i>	<i>adav</i>
Naiki (Chanda)	<i>ad</i>	<i>anda</i>
Parji	<i>anot</i>	<i>anov</i>
Gadaba (Ollari)	<i>ad</i>	<i>av</i>
Kui	<i>aari</i>	<i>aavi</i>
Kuvi	<i>aadi</i>	<i>aati</i>



of ayinu. For non-humans they use okka 'all' after the pronoun as in ayinokka enRa peṭṭi 'Those are my boxes' This Epicene plural is also used as honorific to refer to a non-relative respected person, sister-in-law (wife's elder sister), and brother-in-law (sister's husband). See the following sentences.

ayira tambira 'He is landlord'

ayira enRa RaatṭinRa akkera 'She is my wife's elder sister'

ayira enRa baavey 'He is my brother-in-law'

Compare these sentences with the following sentences where singular forms are used to refer to the consanguine relations.

avooḷu enRa akki 'She is my elder sister'

ayinu enRa aṇṇey 'He is my elder brother'

The peculiarities of the personal pronouns so far discussed are found only in the PA speech forms, as far as we know. However these have be checked in other tribal speech forms also which have not been investigated so far.

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## IS GENITIVE A CASE IN TAMIL?

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Tolkāppiyar has not defined the case in Tamil. But he simply states that there are seven cases and that if the vocative case be included, the number of cases will be eight (TC: 63, 64). If one attempts to define the nature and function of the case, then one will realise that the genitive case functions in an odd way, quite unlike the other cases.

This paper aims at pointing out how the genitive case functions in a way different from that of other cases. The second aim of this paper is to identity the grammatical nature of the genitive case.

The case stands for a grammatical relationship between a noun and a verb in a sentence. As there are different kinds of such relationship, correspondingly there are different cases, each case standing for a distinct kind of relationship between a noun and a verb. Each case has its own marker or markers used for denoting subtler distinctions of the same relationship.<sup>1</sup>

One exception to this general function of the cases is the genitive case in Tamil. It does not establish a relationship between a noun and a verb but relates one noun to another noun. The consequent question is, on what basis has it been considered a case at all? A close examination reveals that it has been considered a case on an erroneous assumption.

T. C. = Tolkāppiyam — Collatikāram

<sup>1</sup>The nominative case is never marked overtly. Structurally this is a type of significant absence.



This erroneous assumption of the grammarians is that the presence of a case is implied in the presence of a case marker. They point out to the case markers attributed to the genitive case from Tolkāppiyam down to modern times.

Tolkāppiyar considered '-atu' as the genitive case marker. Cēnāvaraiyar and Nacciṇārkkīṇiyar, the later commentators of Tolkāppiyam add Nacciṇārkkīṇiyar, the later commentators of Tolkāppiyam add '-a' also to the genitive case as plural genitive marker and cite examples like cāttana kaikaḷ 'chattan's hands', cāttana yānaikaḷ 'chattan's elephants' (Cēnāvaraiyar, T. C., p. 69; Nacciṇārkkīṇiyar, T. C. p. 61.).

Nacciṇārkkīṇiyar considers '-ātu' in addition as a genitive case marker. Tolkāppiyar neither mentions nor makes use of the later two. In modern Tamil, 'uṭaiya' is being used as post-position for the genitive case.<sup>2</sup>

It has been argued already that the genitive case does not denote a noun-verb relationship but that it denotes a noun-noun relationship. Then how could the grammarians have accepted it as a case at all? The only plausible conclusion is that they should have done so on the basis of those forms which they consider to be case markers.

To meet this argument, this paper raises the question, are those forms considered as case markers really case markers? The conclusion is that they are not really case markers but participle forms of predicates in expressions of different *casal* relationships. The following examples prove obviously the conclusion reached above.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>2</sup>The kiḷamai 'relation' denoted by the genitive case is of two kinds: 1) taṟkiḷamai 'inseparable relation as of an object with its parts, qualities, action, etc., eg. cāttanatu kai 'chattan's hand'; 2) piṟitin kiḷamai 'the inseparable relation as between a master and his servant, a lord and his property, etc.', eg. cāttanatu viṭu 'chattan's house'.

*kōṭṭa kaḷiṟu	=	kōṭu(ai) -a(=uṭaiya) kaḷiṟu	- Accusative <i>casal</i> phrase
neṭum poṟai micaiya konṟai	=	neṭum poṟai micai (il) -a (=uḷḷa) konṟai	- Locative <i>casal</i> phrase
maṇṇa kuṭam	=	maṇ (āl) -a(=āṇa) kuṭam	- Instrumental <i>casal</i> phrase
aracanatu nāṭu	=	aracaṇ(ku) - atu(=uriya) nāṭu	- Dative <i>casal</i> phrase

kōṭṭa kalirū 'the elephant which has the tusk'	<	kolirū kōṭṭai uṭaiyatu 'the elephant has the tusk'
neṭum porai micaiya konrai	<	konrai neṭum porai micaiyilullatu
'the konrai tree top the high hill'		'the konrai tree is on the top of the high hill'
maṇṇa kuṭam 'the pot made of clay'	<	kuṭam maṇṇāl ākiyatu 'the pot is made of clay'
aracaṇatu nāṭu 'king's land'	<	a) nāṭu aracaṇai uṭaiyatu 'the land has the king' b) nāṭu aracaṇukku uriyatu 'the land belongs to the king'

In modern Tamil, '-a' and '-atu' function as bound forms, while 'uṭaiya' functions as a free form in a genitive case structure.<sup>4</sup>

A comparison of the following two expressions will throw light on how a participle form is formed.

porakuṭam 'gold pot'	=	pon -āl iyaṇṇa kuṭam 'pot made of gold'
kōṭṭa kalirū 'the elephant with tusks'	=	koṭu- (ai) -a (= uṭaiya) kalirū 'the elephant which has the tusk'

'porakuṭam' is a casual compound in which the case marker and the purpose in relationship are understood. 'kōṭṭa kalirū' is an expression in which the case marker is understood but the purpose in relationship is explicit in the form of a defective relative participle. One should consider '-a' coming in this expression as a semantic equivalent to 'uṭaiya'. That means that here '-a' has the relative participle function with the possessive meaning.

<sup>4</sup>Some scholars consider 'uṭaiya' as a genitive case marker. Pon. Kothandaraman points out to two different relationships in 'uṭaiya' (1973, p. 101).

Overlooking the two different kinds of casual relationship (accusative and dative) existing between 'eṇ (ṇ)' and 'uṭaiya' a few scholars argue that since 'uṭaiya' follows the oblique base 'eṇ(ṇ)', it should be considered a case marker. But the irony is that 'uṭai' an alternant of 'uṭaiya' has followed the nominative form in Cilappatikāram and Kambarāmāyaṇam, two epics in Tamil

yāṇuṭaik kaṇṇi epparicu iṭaittukkāṭṭukēṇ  
'how can I explain my chastity' (Kambarāmāyaṇam; 503:4)  
yāmuṭaic cilampu muttuṭai ariyē  
'there are pearls in my anklet' (Cilappatikāram; 20:69)



In Sangam literature '-a' has occurred in the place of relative participles, such as 'irukkinra', 'uṭaiya', 'koṇṭa' 'ākiya', 'uḷḷa' etc., in different meanings (Athithan, A., 1979, p. 21.)

rāman vantān 'Rama came'	>	vanta rāman 'Rama who came'
kai enatu 'the hand is mine'	>	enatu kai 'my hand'

From the two examples, one understands how the participle form is formed. In some cases, the predicate and its participle may exist in the same form. 'kai enatu' is an example

In the expression 'kai enatu' 'enatu' is a defective finite verb coming as a predicate. When this defective finite verb changes into a participle, the expression becomes 'enatu kai'. Here '-atu' is a participle form.<sup>5</sup> Therefore '-atu' in 'enatu' should not be mistaken for a genitive case marker.

To conclude, the forms considered as genitive case markers are not really case markers but participles of predicates of different relationships.<sup>6</sup>

<sup>5</sup>kaḷiṟu kōṭṭai uṭaiyatu > kōṭṭ-ai uṭai-a kaḷiṟu > kōṭṭa kaḷiṟu

↓ ↓  
ϕ ϕ

nāṭu aracanukku uriyatu > aracan-ku uri-atu nāṭu > aracanatu nāṭu

↓ ↓  
ϕ ϕ

nāṭu aracanai uṭaiyatu > aracan-ai uṭai-atu nāṭu > aracanatu nāṭu

↓ ↓  
ϕ ϕ

nāy vivēkam-attu-ai uṭaiyatu > vivēkam-attu-ai uṭaiya nāy >

↓ ↓  
ϕ ϕ

kai enatu = kai enakku uriyatu > en-a-kku uri-atu kai > enatu kai

↓ ↓ ↓  
ϕ ϕ ϕ

<sup>6</sup>Tolkāppiyar states that in the rational class the case marker '-atu' becomes '-ku' (T. C: 90).

nampiyatu makan > nampikku makan  
'son of Nambi' 'son to Nambi'

If the surface structure is 'nampiyatu makan', the deep structure will be 'makan nampiyatu' in which the rational subject has a non-rational predicate. Hence it is inferred that in order to avoid such inconsistency, Tolkāppiyar had laid down the rule cited above.

Tolkāppiyar should have intuitively recognized the relationship between the participle form and case marker and hence he might have referred to the exceptional use of '-ku' preceding a noun of the rational class in the genitive case.

This article thus points out that the genitive case does not function in the normal manner in which a case is expected to function. Further this article proves that forms considered as genitive case markers are only participles of predicates of different casual relationships. The resultant conclusion is that there is no genitive case in Tamil.

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## **A CASE STUDY IN COMPARATIVE FICTION (INCLUDES A PROPOSED METHODOLOGY IN COMPARATIVE LITERATURE)\***

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The two case studies proposed are (i) a comparison between the historical novels of C. V. Raman Pillai (1858-1922), Malayalam novelist and two novels of Gabriel Garcia Marques, contemporary Latin American Nobel Laureate (ii) a comparison of KAYAR (The Coir) by Thakazhi Sivasankara Pillai, contemporary Malayalam Novelist and THE VIRGIN SOIL UPTURNED by Mikhail Sholohkov (1905-1984) Russian novelist.

There is need to have a rationale in comparing two authors distanced by more than six decades and two hemispheres. As Columbus did, we too will set out for India, that is, C. V. Raman Pillai and reach an America, called Marques. Do comparison of authors with such different time-relates and place-relates lead to sensible conclusions? Our answer is that these very distances are incentives to comparisons and promise worthwhile results. We are speaking here of literary realities cleared through the green channels of the customs barrier of time and place, so to say. We may formulate this finding as follows:

If Society  $S_1$  at a certain point of time  $t_1$  and Society  $S_2$  at another point of time  $T_1$  correspond in certain characteristics their literatures will reflect this correspondence in some measure, Further if, in the same way Societies  $S_1$  and  $S_2$  distanced by different place indices  $P_1$  and  $P_2$  bear mutual correspondences their literatures too will have analogies.

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We may thus attempt at our first consolidated formula in literacy comparison.

If  $S_1$  at  $P_1$  or  $p_1$ ..... and  $t_1$  or  $t_2$ ....  $>$   $S_2$  at  $P_2$  or  $P_3$  and  $T_1$  or  $T_2$ ..... then  $S_1 L_1 > S_2 L_2$  where  $S_1$  is a particular society,  $p_1 p_2$  etc. places where such society exists (there can be  $p_2$  etc as colonies)  $t_1, t_2$  etc. particular times  $S_2$ , a second society  $P_1, P_2 P_3$  etc. places at which  $S_2$  might reside  $T_1, T_2$  etc. times at which  $S_2$  functions,  $L_1$  the literature of  $S_1$  and  $L_2$  the literature of  $S_2$  and the arrow head sign means "is comparable to" (1)

We might condense this formula a little further as

If  $S_1 p_1 t_1$ .....  $>$   $S_2 P_2 T_2$ ..... then  $S_1 L_1 > S_2 L_2$

The comparability between  $S_1 L_1$  and  $S_2 L_2$  stated above can necessarily be only partial, though significantly so. For example, in the novels of C. V. Raman Pillai and Marques, there are elements which compare and those which do not. Scripts and alphabets resist comparison and words and sentences are convertible only on the semantic level. It follows that reliable inter-comparison of authors, of works and of literatures cannot but be partial and blissfully so since we are not then over run by the monotony of universality.

5. So for the specific purpose of our first case study here we make some statements based on formula I paragraph 3 above.

$L_1 R$  = the novels of C. V. Raman Pillai

- i Marthanda Varma (King Marthanda Varma) (1891)
- ii Dharmaraja (The Virtuous King) (1913)
- iii Ramaraja Bahadur (King Ramaraja Bahadur) (1918)

$L_2 M$  = two novels of Marques

- i On hundred Years of Solitude
- ii The Autumn of the Patriarch

We find that  $L_1 R$  is partly comparable to  $L_2 M$  and partly not comparable. We may put this in the form of statement as follows:

$S_1 L_1 R$  (ie)  $V_1 + C > S_2 L_2 M$  (ie)  $V_2 + C$  where  $R$  is Raman Pillai  $M$  is Marques,  $V_1$  and  $V_2$ , the variant element in  $S_1 L_1 R$  and  $S_2 L_2 M$  respectively and  $C$ , the comparable and therefore constant in both  $S_1 L_1 R$  and  $S_2 L_2 M$ . One purpose of a comparative case study is to identify these C-elements. Just as C-elements are identified in  $L_1$  and  $L_2$  several literatures  $L_3 L_4$ ..... can be so compared (2).



In the pictures of  $L_1 R$  and  $L_2 S$  under our consideration

$V_1 =$  1. Language. Malayalam

2. alphabet. Malayalam

3. words and sentences. Highly sanskritised vocabulary involved and complex sentences. But style has spontaneity and clarity. The fact that R dictated his novels to a scribe has contributed to the directness of the style. The composition is interspersed with classical quotations and allusions. One word in which this style can be described is 'majestic'.

4. Plot

5. Theme

(on  $V_1$ . and  $V_1$ . 5 please see notings below)

$V_2 =$  1. Language. Spanish. Examined version. English translation by Gregory Rabassa (Pan Books)

2. alphabet. English

3. words and sentences. English words and English sentences

4. Plot

5. Theme

(Notes on 4 and 5 given later)

Under  $V_1 -4$  (plot) we make the following noting :

The story of the political struggle which took place around the throne of the state of Travancore now part of the state of Kerala constitutes the plot of C. V. Raman Pillai's novels. The story in the first of the trilogy entitled Marthanda Varma is on rival claims to the throne. Rules of succession which prevailed then in the royal family were matrilineal. That is, a ruler was to be succeeded by his brother or sister's son. Accordingly Marthanda Varma, nephew was to succeed the first Rama Varma, with the events in the evening of whose life the novel begins. But things do not immediately happen that way. The king's wife was from Tamilnadu where patrilineal system of succession prevailed. And apparently the king had made a promise to his wife that her sons from him would have the right of succession. Marthanda Varma was a spirited young man and he stuck to his claims. Considerable tension and bloodshed followed. Eight families of aristocrats who belonged to the powerful Nair community sided with the Thampis, sons of the ruler. There were equally powerful supporters on Marthanda Varma's side. As a result the prince won through acts

of courage cunning and cruelty. He took revenge on his enemies in a blood thirsty manner. He evicted the woman and children of the eight families and handed them over to fisherfolk unchivalrously – an act heinous in the extreme, considering the caste equations in Travancore in the eighteenth century. Marthanda Varma was aided in his struggle by a wily Tamil Brahmin by name Ramaier who subsequently became his Minister.

The second and third of the three novels have the titles Dharmaraja (The Virtuous King) and Ramaraja Bahadur (The Honoured Ramaraja). Both titles refer to the same king who succeeded Marthanda Varma. His name was Rama Varma and the peace and stability he brought about was such as to procure for him the honorific Dharmaraja. This too, despite the fact that Hyder and Tippu father and son and successive rulers of Mysore invaded Travancore territory during his reign. Plot-wise, these two novels carry the story of the first novel forward. For the royal family continues and the hostilities created in the first generation are carried forward, sometimes, with greater intensity by the later generations. The Dharmaraja was written almost nineteen years after Marthanda Varma. The plot is much more complicated arena of action wider, the characters more monumental and perfidy and conspiracy correspondingly more fearsome. Ramaraja Bahadur carries the novelists maturity and success still further forward.

We see in the second and third novels the central figure of the king, at once sane, sober and stable just and compassionate. Around him are enacted the acts of heroism and cowardice, cruelty and kindness and magnanimity and pettiness. There are characters who take life in a heroic sweep and others who make hay while the sun shines.

While the first novel deals largely with the struggles of a prince to gain control of his kingdom the second and the third deal with the difficulties his successor had to face as a result of the attacks on his territory by the Sultans of Mysore. These attacks were worsened by the internal forces which conspired to side with the enemy against the king. In fact the three novels hang together as a saga in the continuity of the opposition of the of the same families towards the royal family and the ruler.

Parts of the plots of the novel triad are some unforgettable love stories in which unflinching loyalty plays its role. These involve young men and women of the aristocratic families whose emotions and deeds constitute the politics of the plot. Each of the three novels has thus a memorable love story or two. The



passions, hopes and despair of one generation are succeeded by those of the next in a new mileau and with new symbols and indices of suffering and fulfilment.

The novelist registers great success in integrating the political plot and the love stories. This is through narrating the love stories as contributories to the political action. The couples in the love themes belong to families either ranged against or royal to the ruler, more often the latter than the former. Inevitably therefore they are drawn into the action of the novels.

We shall, now, examine the variants  $v_2$  in  $L_2M$ . We examine only two novels of M, the more famous of his works.

$L_2M =$

1. a2. One Hundred Years of Solitude
2. b2. The Autumn of the Patriarch

The basic data on these works has been given under para 7 above and is not repeated here. The style used in the translation is that of a straightforward narrative. It has been described as 'beautiful' by critics. Something special to mention about the technique is the well-known 'magical realism' about which there will be more occasion to speak in this paper.

This technique in which fact blends with fantasy has been in use in Latin American literature even before Marques wrote. Happenings which are not justified by man's normal sense-awareness of the universe and reality around him constitute the stuff of magical realism. Such magical happenings are intended to convey a realistic idea. Hence it's name 'magical realism'. We are familiar with several incidents in the Puranic lore of India which will fall under the category of 'magical realism'. The famous story of Ahalya, the wife of the sage Gauthama, may be remembered. She was turned into a rock according to the Ramayana. Here is a case of a human being turned into rock -an obvious magic. But it has a realistic meaning, that is, that misled emotion is equivalent to death. We shall shortly examine the similarity between  $L_1R$  and  $L_1M$  as far as their contents of magical incidents are concerned.

$L_2v, 4$  may be very briefly summarised as follows: It is the story of a family which has settled down in the village of Macondo. The novelist follows the trail of successive generations of the members of the family. There is violence, feud, incest and death. The story of the family is intertwined with the stories of other families in the village and of institutions like the municipality. Coupled with the life of the family is the life and deeds of

Melquiades a magical figure with magic-sized life duration and deeds. The last adult member of the family whose history we are told is Aureliano. He was the one who had an incestuous love affair with his aunt Amaranta Ursula. The child born of the union had a pig's tail—an obvious element of magic in the novel. The child dies and the mother too. Then Aureliano sits in an old room in the house and examines a horoscope of the family written in Sanskrit in code language. It had been written by Melquides. Then a storm starts and the entire village is wiped off the surface of the earth. I shall later on point out the analogy of the magic of this episode with some thing corresponding to it in  $L_1R$ .

The elements in the plot of *One Hundred Years of Solitude* which constitute a point of contrast with C. V. Raman Pillai's novels become evident with a qualitative appraisal of the status of the families involved. For  $L_1 Ra_1b_1c_1$  and  $L_2 Ma_2$  are both stories of families pursued by the concerned novelist, from generation to generation. In  $L_2 Ma_2$  the families are thoroughly middle class. In  $L_1a_1b_1c_1$  the families are aristocratic. The story of  $L_1R$  itself takes place around a royal throne. Rulers of neighbouring states and aristocratic families of Travancore are involved.

Marques' *The Autumn of a Patriarch* is the story of a tin-pot dictator. The man has thoroughly ordinary, even bastard beginnings. But through cunning and dishonesty he sets himself up as a dictator. But he is careful to establish his image of a benevolent father figure. Afraid of attempts on his life he contrives to have a double—a man made the exact replica of the dictator through some acts of maiming. For some years this man was taken for the ruler. He even sleeps with the real dictator's wives without the women getting any the wiser. Then the double dies. The public believes that the real dictator had died. They take out a majestic funeral procession in which the body is venerated to no end. Suddenly there is trouble. There is an army revolt. And popular rebellion too. Rebels drag the body and spit on it. The dictator was watching all this through the blinds of his window. Then his faithful commander, his crony of old days steps in and the rebellion is crushed with the help of palace guards. Then the dictator appears before his former Ministers etc. who had assembled in the palace to divide the spoils of the fall of the regime. His very appearance was enough to scare them away. They disappeared in one instant. We thus have the second half of his regime inaugurated; it was crueller and conducted with more cunning than the first. Until he dies, and his body is left



to the mercy of vultures to the palace. He had gloried in this second half in the reputation of a resurrection.

12. We might invite attention at this stage to the formulation given under para 6 above. This reads :

$$S_1L_1R, \text{ ie. } V_1+C > S_2L_2M, \text{ ie. } V_2+C$$

Already some statements have been made on the  $V_1$  and  $V_2$  elements in  $L_1R$  and  $L_2M$ . We shall now examine the  $C$  - parts in the works of the two novelists. It is not claimed that a cent per cent constant can be identified in the two authors. But a substantial element of the constant can be found. We may say that we have

$$S_1L_1RC > S_2L_2MC \text{ in the following respects.}$$

(i) the family oriented structure of the novels. We have already noted that both  $L_1Ra_1b_1c_1$  and  $L_2Ma_1$  are stories of familiest. The three novels of C. V. Raman Pillai examined here are woven round the exploits of certain families. These are the royal families of Travancore, the aristocratic Nair families of this state and the royal family of Mysore. Of course, there are a few middle-class and lower middle class families too involved. But they do not supply the main logic of the story. Even when some member of such a family takes arms it is for the sake of the king or some other aristocrat. An important stake for which arms are taken and battles are fought in  $L_1Ra_1b_1c_1$  is family honour.

In *One Hundred Years of Solitude* too we hear a lot about the honour of the family. Some characters are obsessed with the idea. There are duels fought for the sake of honour.

Some kind of family concept is there in  $L_2Mb_2$  too. While the dictator has a bastard's origin there is an attempt on his mother and to attribute miracles to her. We see here an attempt on his part to sanctify his beginnings and have the seeds sown to have a holy family tree. In other words despite his emergence into an age of populist politics or deception played on it there is the urge of the traditional family instinct in him.

(ii) The concepts and beliefs of the two traditional societies form part of  $C$  in the two novel complexes. Critics point out the Mayan and the Inca connection of Latin American Society. As regards the affinity between Indian and Latin American beliefs which  $L_1R$  and  $L_2M$  show the following points may be noted.

(a) a similar concept of Time is cyclical in the Indian view. Remember the phrase 'kalachakra'. Also the concept of re-incarnation. The human returns to the human life after several births in non human forms. There is also the concept that in deluge every thing ends and is re-born too.

In *One Hundred Years of Solitude* Pilar Ternera reputed to be one hundred and sixty years old says the Buendia family would have gone on for ever if the axle of the wheel had not got worn out. A cyclical scheme of time is implied here.

We also get simultaneity and sequence, two experiences based on time getting mixed up in the works of Raman Pillai and Marques. The complete security granted by a linear concept of time is disrupted. There are magic elements in the rituals performed by a Haripancananan, the Fierce in Raman Pilla's novel. There is also reference to the wheel of karma and result in their inevitable cyclical process. Perhaps the magic which time plays is no where clearer in *One Hundred Years* than in the life and doings of Melquides, a kind of magical mystical gypsy. It was he who cast a horoscope of the family in Sanskrit in two codes. In it were predicted the day to day events of the Buendia family one hundred years ahead of time. It was written in Sanskrit, Malquides mothertongue and it was in two codes, the even lines in the private cipher of the Emperor Augustus and the odd ones in a Lacedemonian military code. Melquides had not put events in the order of man's conventional time, but had concentrated a century of daily episodes, in such a way that they co-existed in one instant.

The very concept of a horoscope assumes the predictability of events. This has a degree determinism about it. Events which are to take place cast their shadows in advance. Time itself becomes a predictable quantity here.

(b) the belief in yogic or near-yogic practices. Pilar Ternera wants her body to be buried in a sitting position, a practice harking back to the days of the yogis in India. When Sanyasins die they are buried in a sitting posture. The practice is even now observed by atleast one section of people in Kerala in our own time.

(c) the wages of sin are death according to a number of traditional societies. Curses have been patterned and coined on this basis in popular parlance. May death visit upon you-the enraged one would say. The unseen strings of belief which guide the characters and actions in C. V. Raman Pillai's novels are made of such popular notions. For example one of his characters says that inexorable is the way of divine justice. And death awaits most of his bad strong characters. In *One Hundred Years* the child born out of the incestuous love between Aureliano, the last of Buendia family and his aunt Amaranta Ursula has a pig's tail and



is dragged by "all the ants in the world towards their holes along the stone path in the garden". The prediction made in the parchment horoscope of the family by Melquides the gypsy with supernormal powers have come true. It read: "The first of the line is tied to a tree and the last is being eaten by the ants".

(d) Yoga, man and nature.

A particular incident from the second of Raman Pillai's novels, namely, Dharmaraja is worth quoting in this connection. The occasion marks an exchange of ideas between king Dharmaraja and Kuncaikkutti Pillai, a revered elder soldier whose advice the king was seeking. They discussed the causes of the defeat of the Travancore forces in the battles with the Mysoreans. The general is not without some reservations on whether the king himself is not without some responsibility in the matter and he speaks out. There is a misunderstanding and the general walks away. He walks a few miles, climbs a mountain in the area, meditates on its top, on the bank of a lake, reads his horoscope and throws it into the lake. He then performs a particularly potent yoga and attains nirvana with the breath escaping through his cracked pate. Synchronous with this incident here on the top of the mountain there was a flood in the war zone in the northern districts of Travancore where Mysore and Travancore fought. The flood prevented the advance of the Mysore forces. The incident is typical of the strong bond which eastern philosophies conceive as existing between man and his environment. The intensity of the concentration in man releases natural forces. "Things have a life of their own. It is simply a matter of waking up their soul" declares Melquides the gypsy magician in 'One Hundred Years of Solitude' at the start of the novel. The meaning of this statement is completed when at the very end of the novel an incident takes place analogous to the old general's self asseertion through yoga in Raman Pillai's novel. Aureliano, the last adult member of the family shuts himself up in a room after his wife's death in delivery and the child's death and destruction by ants. Aureliano then read Melquides' horoscope of the family referred to above. Intensely absorbed in reading the horoscope Aureliano did not notice the storm which was being released outside, till it ripped off the doors and windows. Let me quote the novelist to picture the moment faithfully. "Macondo was already a fearful whirlwind of dust and rubble being spun about by the wrath of the biblical hurricane when Aureliano skipped eleven pages so as not to lose time with facts he knew only too well, and he began to decipher the instant that he was living,

deciphering it as he lived it, prophesying himself in the act of deciphering the last page of the parchments, as he were looking into a speaking mirror. Then he skipped again to anticipate the predictions and ascertain the date and circumstances of his death. Before reaching the final line however, he had already understood that he would never leave that room, for it was foreseen that the city of mirrors would be wiped out by the wind and exiled from the memory of men at the precise mement when Aureliano Babilonia would finish deciphering the parchments, and that everything written on them was unrepeatable since time was immemorial and for ever more, because races condemned to one hundred years of solitude did not have a second opportunity on earth”.

I have quoted the lines in which the novel ends because in them are invoked some of the non-western conceptions of time, at once eastern and Latin American, traditional and contemporary which guide the bulk of the peoples of these area of the world. Earlier we are told in the parchment that the ‘first of the line is tied to a tree and the last is being eaten by ants. We are also introduced to the popular belief that destiny will have its course. Incest engender the mythological animal that was to bring the line to an end. A comparison may also be made here of the episode of the Elder general in Raman Pillai’s novel and Aurelianos’ experience. In both cases Nature in her ferocity is revealed as a result of an intense pre-occupation of man with his own mind. A mind-nature equation operates here, a thought product of philosophical systems where a complete dichotomy between mind and nature had not yet been worked out.

(e) Before concluding this section on the C-element we might say a word on the elements of the ordinary man’s religiosity and superstition with which Marques’ novel ‘The Autumn of the Patriarch’ is lined. There is the dictator’s attempt at endowing an aura round his mother, and at making other people believe that his quite natural survival of the death of his double was his own resurrection from death. There are also other acts which assume for their success deep-rooted popular religiosity and superstition. In fact The Autumn of the Patriarch is convincing only in such traditional society on which modernity has descended in the form of a smog.

As far as Raman Pillai’s novels are concerned they are suffused with an atmosphere of feudal religious magic ritual, yogic practice, hymn-chanting belief and in prediction.



While we are at the C-element in  $L_1R a_1b_1c_1$  and  $L_2Ma_2b_2$  a stylistic analogy might also be noted. This is between the Raman Pillai novels and the *Autumn of the Patriarch*. In our accepted scheme of comparison style comes under v the variable element. But where a close analogy is found it may be considered under the C-element. The long sprawling sentences which form the unit of composition in the *Autumn of the Patriarch* form a particularly noteworthy feature of the work. A sentence will sometimes spread over a page or two or even more. About this style one may say with a critic that 'with each rolling incantation the tyrant is invoked'. Out of the hypnotic shift and flow of the narrative, backward through time, through the eyes of those who adored and served him, of those who feared and despised him, the despot general the man takes shape an editorial comment on the book announces. The novelist's purpose is to picture an empty, dishonest and decadent dictatorship and this purpose is well served by an outsized, disconnected, and sprawling composition.

In  $L_1R$  too style appears to be guided by the subject matter. His characters are outsized men and strong courageous women and he is describing actions which have heroic dimensions. A style, niggardly in the choice of words will probably look out of place for such works. R's classical diction derives its logic from its subject matter. Looking closely one might even find a commentary on a certain view of life in this style. R inherited his culture's belief in the vanity of all human achievements. Death decimates life, belittles its achievement. Did the word-rich, description-rich classical style of Raman Pillai in juxtaposition with the enormous ambitions of those it brings to life and the ultimate failure of their ambitions convey an idea of the discrepancy between life and its achievement?

It is hoped here that a study of the societies in the background of which Raman Pillai and Marques wrote and the characteristics of the literatures they produced can lead us to employ the formulations 1 and 2 given in paras 3 and 6 above.

## CASE STUDY 2

KAYAR (THE COIR) by Thakazhi Sivasankara Pillai (1912 –  
and

- |                             |                     |
|-----------------------------|---------------------|
| i. THE VIRGIN SOIL UPTURNED | } Mikhail Sholokhov |
| ii. QUIET FLOWS THE DON     |                     |
|                             | (1905 – 1984)       |

We shall give notational re-designation to the authors and works as follows:

$L_1Ta_1$  and  $L_2Sa_2b_2$  where T is Thakazhi Sivasankara Pillai and S is Mikhail Sholokov.  $a_1$  is Kayar and  $a_2$  and  $b_2$  are respectively The Virgin Soil Upturned and Quiet Flows the Don. We may also add the proposed comparison is largely between Kayar and The Virgin Soil Upturned.

Formula (2) in para 6 above may be remembered. Adapted it will read:

$$L_1Ta_1, \text{ i.e. } v_1 + C > L_2Sa_2, \text{ i.e., } v_2 + C$$

Further,

- $L_1T a_1-v_1$
- i. Language: Malayalam
  - ii. Alphabet: Malayalam
  - iii. Words and sentences: largely non-sanskritic diction and simple sentence structures. The narration is in the form of informal and effortless story telling. Story telling one might remember, has always been a familiar pastime of village folk. The author has adopted this style for this work.
  - iv. Plot.
  - v. Theme

The novel is on the changes which took place in a village in the water-logged coastal areas of the Travancore part of Kerala. The changes start with a land classification which Government undertakes to fix land tax assign ownership of land etc. The novelist records the changes during a period of four decades. The novelist records the changes in land tenure in social customs, in social relations in cultural attitudes, marriage laws, family relationships etc. not through a sustained narration of the life of one or two families, but through an exploration of the lives of several families through the decades. The most important thing which took place in the period under notice is the disintegration of the Nair joint family in which succession was through the children of the women in the family. Consequent to such a disintegration and the advent of money in the form of coins in the place of the barter system ownership of land changes from the old feudal class into the hands of the new class of merchants and salaried people. Old land holders working in salaried jobs in the cities lost their interest in their lands in the villages and absentee



landlordism and consequent loss of ownership became pretty common. The mesmerism of land was lost on a new generation.

And what is the theme of the novel? It is not difficult to pin point the theme. Man's relationship with land is the central theme. Associate with it is the phenomenon of change.

The  $V_2$  element in  $L_2Sa_2$  (Virgin Soil Upturned) are

- i. Russian. The comparison is with an English version published by Progress Publishers. Moscow First printed in 1957. Translation by Robert Daglish.
- ii. Alphabet. English.
- iii. Translation, simple and straight forward.  
Style, Realistic descriptive and dramatic.

iv. Plot. The story is on the collectivisation of land in the village of Gremyachy Log. Dravidov deputed for the job arrives at the village. Sholokhov narrates an action packed tale of the village collective taking the place of individual ownership of land and other property. It is a story of forced change accompanied by blood and tears. The rich peasants, called kulaks the middle peasants and the poor peasants are all on the anvils of change. And there is counter revolution, fight and the success of change. The novel ends sadly. While collectivisation succeeds the two keymen who had worked out the change, Davidov and Nagulnov group secretary are killed by the anti-collectivisationists. The novel has also its romantic moments when the heart shows its weakness for emotions. Sholokhov paints the love that Varya bore for Davidov. The closing chapters of the novel has lyrical pictures of their love. Also touching is the love that Nagulnov has for Lishka who, however, breaks his heart marrying the son of a rich kulak.

We find that  $V_1$  and  $V_2$  as differing elements in  $L_1 T a_1$  and  $L_2Sa_2$  present the following aspects.

- i. the difference in the length of the period covered. Thakazhi's work covers a period of four decades. The Virgin Soil Upturned covers a short period, perhaps a few weeks from the spring of 1930. Consequently the tempo of actions in the Russian Novel is much faster than in the Indian novel. We feel that in the latter, change takes place with the slow inevitability of a placid river on a plain. The force and function of the human will is more discernible in Sholokhov's work than in Thakazhi's. There is more purposive action in Virgin Soil Upturned than in Kayar.

ii. The style in the Sholokhov work is much more dramatic and lively than is the Malayalam style of the Indian author.  $L_1Ta_1$  uses a very controlled, economical and matter of fact style. Dramatic narration is conspicuous by its absence even where it would appear to be called for. That is the kind of style which this author has developed over the years. While it was suitable in short works the same cannot be said about its suitability in long works like *Kayar*. While in the Russian author a realistic technique does not preclude drama it appears to do so with the Indian author.

C - elements in  $L_1Ta_1$  and  $L_2Sa_2$

i. Land and man is the theme in both. While the story is woven around a land survey in the former, the latter is a story on collectivisation.

ii. in both land reforms are ordered from above. In  $L_1Ta_1$  official descends on the village with an order from Government to carry out a classification of land. In  $L_2Sa_2$  too Davidov an industrial worker comes to the village to introduce collectivisation.

iii. Both novels bring out man's eternal relationship with land. He is born there, is sustained by it and gets back to it. Both novels show that land, among all of man's property, is the one with the closest link with him. Land is also the barometer for measuring human relationship.

iv. Both novels depict peasant life which is roughly the same all over the world. The same reservoir of folk beliefs of superstition and of innate sturdiness of mind and superstition.

"All these white people practice black magic. Only some are not as bad as the Portuguese. It's only that we get some relief from their black magic through timely sacrifice and other observances. These will prevent the entire population from being affected by this black magic"

(*Kayar*, Section 47)

"Of late Grandad Schuckar had been positively unlucky in everything he undertook, that he was ever lucky, but today of all days had been so replete with disappointments, great and small, and even disasters, that by the end of it Schukar, utterly overwhelmed by the multitude of troubles that had fallen to his lot, felt more superstitious than he had ever left before."

(*Virgin Soil Uplifted*, Ch. 18)




And what was the form of his superstition? Before day break he had dreamed that a piebald wolf was chasing him. Why did that wolf have to be piebald? 'That was a rottenest sign you could get, so this here trip is going to land me in the soup bound to' Schukar concluded. I have quoted this passage at length to show that a peasant is superstitious even if he may be on the threshold of a revolutionary change like collectivisation.

The two novels when compared, have an area of analogy justifying the use of the formula.

$$L_1Ta_1 (ic) v_1 + C > L_2Sa_2 (ic) v_2 + C$$

In conclusion it may be pointed out that the two case studies attempted above are on two types of situations of literacy comparison. In the first, a comparison was made of two authors who are not contemporaries; in the second, the comparison is between contemporary authors. In both situations it is found that the comparative statement can be made concisely within the framework of formulae which reflect certain requirements and characteristics of literacy comparison. These two formulae may be described as (i) on social determinism of literature (para 3) and (2) a variant-constant comparative statement (para 6)



## **KINSHIP TERMS OF REFERENCE IN KUMAUNI**

**(A Socio-Linguistic Appraisal)**

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**A Note on Abbreviations and Phonetic Values of Roman Characters  
of terms of reference :**

F(Father), M(mother), H(husband), W(wife), B(brother),  
S(sister), Z(son), D(daughter), e(elder), y(younger); ai(=E),  
au(=o), (There are no diphthongs in this language) n{=nasality).

The study of kinship terminology of a social organization is one of the most reliable and authentic parameter for understanding the intrinsic structure and cultural values of it. For, it not only reflects various levels of social reality, but also manifests a definite socio-cultural ethos of the society concerned.

Within the frame work of kinship organization the social relationship is established on two counts, viz. by birth and by marriage. Technically, the relations belonging to the former class are termed as 'consanguinal' and the latter class as 'affinal'. But all the studies conducted on this aspect of the social organization of various societies confirm that there is a socially recognized ordering of these relations in every society independent of others, and for relations of every order there are separate sets of kinship terms' terms of reference and terms of address, varying in their use and connotations. Infact, 'Kinship, terms are category words by means of which an individual is taught to recognize the significant groupings in the social structure into which he is born.' (Leach, E. R. 1958 : 143). **Kin Categories:** The speech community selected here for this study belongs to the Himalayan region of the state of Uttar Pradesh, known as Kumaun. As in other societies in Kumauni society, too, the function of these category words, for all practical



purposes, is to identify a member of the organization vis-a-vis another member of it, may be consanguinal or affinal. Besides the absolute kin terms, there are terms used for addressing and referring to a socially related person. The study of these terms, alongwith the study of kinship term is equally important to understand the structure of kinship of a social organization and the duties and rights of its various members. Moreover, like their other social behaviours, their linguistic behaviour also is regulated by this relationship. There, within the pale of kinship, every speaker has to behave, linguistically or otherwise, in the manner prescribed by social codes of the society concerned.

In Kumauni the general term of consanguinal kins is *swārā*, *birādar* and for affinal kins *mitur* and such a relationship is called *mitrāmi*. These terms are further qualified by terms *shakai/shakkai* (emph) and *natak/ristmen* to specify a close (real) kin and a distant kin, as in *shakkaibirādar* 'a real consanguinal kin' with whom pollution and purity of death and birth is shared, *sakkai mām* (real maternal uncle), *rist men mām* (maternal uncle in distant relation). However, in a polygamous situation *shakkai bhai* (real brother) or *shakki baini* (real sister) means the kin having natal relationship with the ego, whereas the non-natal kin is modified by the term *šautiya*. If a woman with children from previous husband, marries to another person then there can be a *šautiya bāb* (step father) and *šautiya chele/cheli* (step sons/daughters), *šautiya mai* (step mother) etc.

Within the clan the term *kāka-barānka* (belonging to father's younger and elder brothers) is used to differentiate parallel cousins from one's real (*shakkai*) siblings. But these modifiers are used only as reference terms.

In this language, in most of the cases, the terms of address are identical (with phonetic variations here and there). The only term that is used as reference term and never as the term of address, is *šālo* (wife's younger brother). As in other societies, in Kumauni society too, the kin terms both reference and address, have their specific functions to perform, but it is interesting to note that in this highly caste ridden society the kin terms when used as terms of address, with reference to a non-kin, are absolutely free from any social stigma and function as general terms of address, whatsoever may be the social differences between the interlocutors.

**Social and regional variants :** Before taking up the actual problem of analysis of kinship terms in their socio-linguistic relevance, it may not be out of place here to say something about the social

and regional variants of these terms. The Kumauni society is a highly stratified society in which socio-linguistic differences are highly marked. Besides, the regional variants, too, are not less marked. From kin terms alone one can easily detect the social hierarchy and the regional location of the speaker concerned. In such a situation some times a speaker suffering from his social or regional complex is very judicious about the selection of a term. These differences were sharp enough in the past but now on account of greater mobility among the inhabitant of various regions and spread of education, some of these terms which had earned the stigma of social and regional backwardness have fallen into disuse and there are some more which are on the verge of it. But, on the other hand, due to some socio-psychological reasons, a tendency of borrowing kinship terms, particularly from Hindi is on its increase, which in many ways, is affecting the pattern of kinship terminology in this language, which otherwise is a very reliable linguistic source to unfold the cultural nuances of it.

#### **Delimitation of the scope of this study**

The scope of the present study of kinship terms of reference has been delimited to the terms pertaining to members of a joint family unit only. In this language the term for a family is *Kabilo/Kuṭam/parwar* and the general term for kinship is *nāto*.

#### **Social ethos of address or reference terms**

In the tradition ridden kumauni society it is obligatory for a younger kin to address his elder kin with the kinship term prescribed for it. Use of personal or sir name in such a case, either as reference or address, is regarded as highly objectionable and, therefore, it strictly prohibited. Erring youngsters are instantly chided for this uncultural verbal behaviour and corrected accordingly. Infact, the training for appropriate use of kinship terms starts from the early childhood and continues till one becomes an active member of this organization. The conviction behind this emphasis may be that the use of socially sanctioned kinship terms helps in strenghtening the kinship bond and amity among the kinfolk, may be consanguinal or affinal. On the other hand any disregard to appropriate term of reference or address is likely to create ill will and misunderstanding among them. Therefore, social codes do not permit any deviation from the norms set for it. In a village community, kin terms are generally and freely used to address even non kin interlocutors belonging to different social categories.



Usually, like other linguistic behaviours, the use of kinship terms is learnt by a child in a natural way. Their semantic nuances, too, are picked up by him in due course of time. Moreover, the environment of a joint family also provides an opportunity to learn the appropriate use of even those kinship terms which otherwise form the part of the terminology of affinal kins. But now a days when, under economic pressure and changed social out look, the prestigious super structure of joint family system is crumbling down, and more nuclear families are coming into existence many kinship terms which otherwise formed the part of day-to-day vocabulary of a child are becoming a thing to be acquired by him. For instance, on account of increasing tendency of late marriages and nuclear family the offsprings do not have the inbuilt opportunity of learning and using terms for great grand parents or learning the semantics of great/grand children. Even proper kinship terms for kins of father's generation, viz. FeB, FyB, FeBW, FyBW, FS, FSH, etc. are not known to them. Moreover, due to all round over emphasis on an ideal family, i. e. husband + wife + one daughter + one son, the children are unaware of qualifying terms for younger and elder brothers/sisters. The legel pressure against the practice of polygyny, and other forms of non-sacramental marital relations, which were common in the past, among khasas of this region, also has eliminated many kinship terms from the common kinship terminology of Kumauni. Infact, most of youngsters, born in the las quarter of this century, and cut off from the rural society are quite ignorant of many kinship tetms, forming an important part of kinship organization among rural Kumaunese.

### Analysis of Kinship Terms:

Now, with this social background we shall take up various kinship terms current in the family circle of Kumauni society and shall try to explain their uses and fuctions in various social contexts as terms of reference and terms of address.

### Spouses

**Husband:** First of all we take up the term of reference for husband. In Kumauni there are many terms to refer to this relationship, viz *maish*, *baig*, *mālik* and *ādim*, all conveying the general sense of 'man' are regional variants, among these the terms *mainsh* and *baig* have their specific lingnistic areas, but *ādim mālik* are common to both. The socio-linguistic situation alongwith the

regional background, in which a reference to and one of these can be made, vary according to the role of dyads and the speech situation. For instance, in a normal course of speech, the wife of the person in question does not use any of these terms while referring to him, particularly in his presence. But while referring him to some one else she can, ofcourse, with regional preferences use any of these terms without any reservation (e.g. in a statement such as 'at that time my husband was not at home' etc.). In other situations a wife always prefers to refer him either with the use of a pronominal form (third person plural number) or with the help of some teknonymic terms.

In a linguistic situation in which the wife is the receiver of message or an addressee, and the addresser is a non-relation or a stranger or an official performing some official duty, such as collection of data for census etc., he may refer to him with any of these terms, but no addresser having an intimate relationship either with her or with her husband would ever refer him with these terms. In an intimate social situation the use of any of these terms would not only sound odd but also would be taken as an act of impoliteness. In a direct interlocution, however, the proper social etiquette would demand the addresser to refer to him in terms of his own kin relationship with him, such as *dādā kākā, māmā, bhinā, saurju* etc. And in case of a non-kin, but having a familiar and intimate social situation, the usual way of referring to the husband of a woman would be either to affix the honorific term *jyu* with the surname (or caste name) of the person concerned, e.g. *jweshi jyu* (Mr. Joshi) *Thakur saib* or to append this honorific *jyu* to his first name, as in *Ram Dutt jyu*, if there is not a wide gap of social hierarchy or age. In case the husband referred to is younger in age or inferior in kin relation to the addresser than the proper form of reference would be to refer him by his first name.

In a situation in which the wife is the addresser and a close kin is an addressee then for the wife, the proper way to refer to her husband would be to refer to him (husband) in terms of his (kin's) relationship with him qualified with proper pronominal form, means, 'your', as in *tumārā dādā* (your elder brother), *tymārā bhinā* ('your' non-hon.) brother-in law) etc. or just by the honorific form of the third person pronoun, viz. *un* (he (hon)).

In a linguistic situation where a wife has to defend her own action with reference to her husband or an action of a third person involving her husband, she in a temperament of anger, displeasure, anguish or indifference may refer him as 'my man'



(*myar adim/mainsh/baig*) as in 'he is my man, I may say any thing to him.....', 'If my man has said this.....', 'why did he say this to my man' etc. These terms irrespective of social differences, may be used by all wives in their temperamental assertions.

The term *gharwale* which means 'one who has/owns/ leads a house' is normally used in semi-formal or formal situation. It is qualified by an appropriate form of a pronoun in the genitive case. Its use in the plural indicates respect and politeness and in the singular inferiority and impoliteness, and the modifying pronominal form also is changed accordingly.

The term *dulhai* | *dulhau* | *dhulau* (regional variants) literally means 'bridegroom', is primarily used by an upper strata of society. This term is gradually falling into disuse in the general sense of 'husband' and is more or less being narrowed down to indicate bridegroom or to the male partner of a newly married couple.

The term *khasam* is a borrowed one. It has been borrowed from the *Perso-Arabic* stock by Kumauni speakers through their contact with Urdu speaking people. But in Kumauni it is used only in derogatory and contemptuous contexts. In a verbal dual a woman while accusing her counterpart or cursing her, usually, refer to her husband with this term. It is never used in a polite language. On the otherhand it also denotes a man having illegitimate intimacy with a woman.

In a socio-linguistic situation in which a woman has to refer to her husband, the most conventional way is the use of the pronominal form as stated above, or by making a reference to any one, usually to the eldest issues of them, Consequently, the phrasal expression would assume the form of 'father of so and so.' But the situation would warrant here that the child is known to the addressee otherwise the reference would be made by the pronominal device only. In case a child happens to be present there then the reference can be made as 'father of this' without naming the child. But in all the cases the linguistic expression would always assume an honorific form.

Another teknonymic device employed by a wife while referring to her husband is the use of the phrase '*nānakā bābu*' 'father of children'. This expression, usually, takes place when the speech situation is somewhat formal, i.e. where the interlocutor is not related to the person concerned (husband). Referring to a husband by his wife with the help of certain phrasal expressions or

*teknonymic* devices is also resorted to when the speech activity is taking place in the presence of family members or near relations. The socio-linguistic rule of avoidance of the use of proper name of the spouse is universally observed in Kumauni. Recently, however, the tendency of using personal name of the wife is growing among educated couples of new generation, but the wives still adhere to the old convention. *Wife* Terms of reference for a wife are: *saini*, *swasni*, *gharwali*, *dulhaini*/*dhulaini*, *jwe*. From among these the term *gharwali*, meaning, 'who is the mistress of the house' is the most respectable. It can be used in all sorts of speech situations, formal or informal. But in a domestic setting it is not used by any interlocutor. There she, in the presence of other members of the family, is referred to by her husband with the pronominal substitute *u* (3rd person singular number) or 'mother of so and so' if they have an issue. On the other hand other members of the family while referring to her use the term *dulhaini* or *saini*, qualified by a pronoun (2nd, 3rd) or the name of the husband in the genitive case. Here in this context the former mode of reference indicates intimacy and affection and the latter some what distance (emotional or other wise) and impoliteness. Moreover, in certain speech forms both of these terms are used in free variation and in others with an age oriented connotation, i.e. the former term is used with reference to a young wife, whereas the latter with reference to a wife who has crossed her youth. In a family setting the normal mode of reference to the term 'wife' is to refer to her in terms of kinship relationship which he/she has with her. There the term is used in its absolute form qualified by 2nd person pronoun, if the speaker is any other member of the family and the addressee is the husband of the woman and the relevant kinterm is qualified by suitable pronominal form in the genitive case if the speaker is the husband himself. (as in 'your so and so').

*Gharwali* is the term which is used in formal context. A husband while introducing his wife to an outsider or a newly acquainted relation may refer to her as '*my gharwali*' or a stranger while enquiring about the wife of the addressee may refer to her as '*your gharwali*'. This term is seldom used in family or closely intimate situations.

The term *jwe* which, too, denote the sense of wife is an impolite term. It is as derogatory and contemptuous as the term *khasam* (H.), explained earlier. The use of this term is confined to unpleasant contexts, i.e. to the context of exchange of hot



words or reference to some unsocial or unethical action of the wife e.g. *dwiye jwe khasam taran huni ain* (both wife and husband come to quarrel) or *usai khasam cha usi jwe cha* (the husband and wife belong to the same category i.e. are equally bad). In certain social contexts this term also conveys the sense of subordination or extra-marital sexual relationship.

### Affinal Kins of Spouse's Group

Male affinal kins of spouse's group in the family are HeB and HyB. The term for HeB is *jethano/jyathjyu* and for HyB is *dewar/dyawar*. Linguistically, the former term is shortened when the honorific *jyu* is appended to it and no honorific *jyu* can be appended to the latter term (i.e. HyB). In the Kumauni kinship organization, however, both these relations have an honorific position, as such both terms are invariably used in the plural by brother's wife, younger or elder. The term for HeBW is *jethani* and for HyBW is *dyorani*. The elder brother's wife, like her husband, commands respect from younger brother's wife and is, consequently, referred to with honorific term, i.e. used in the plural, both in the term of reference and address and the wife of HyB is not shown this honour in any form. These terms, in principle, can further be qualified with terms denoting the sense of eldest, medial and younger as in the case of the kins of parental group, but are never used as terms of address for which there are separate terms, viz. *didi* (elder sister), *baini* (younger sister).

Similarly, female affinal kins of spouses group in the family, are eBW and yBW. The term for eBW is *boji/bhoji* (local variants) and for yBW is *bwāri*. The former terms have honorific social and regional variants, but the latter does not have any such variant. These can further be qualified with terms denoting the sense of eldest, medial and younger, and also are used as terms of address.

Other kins belonging to this group in a family circle are HeS and HyS. The term for HeS is *gusyani/pauni* (local/social variations). She commands special respect from her younger brother's wife and is always referred to with honorific term, sometimes, referred to as *nānijyu* (younger mother-in-law.). The term for HyS is *nand*. In the kinship hierarchy she too, has a superior position as such is always referred to in honorific terms, i.e. in honorific plural.

### Parents

**Father:** In Kumauni the most prevalent kinship terms for 'father' are; *bā*, *bāb*, *bābu*, *bābjyu*, *bājyu*, *bojyu*, *boji*, all showing local variations, there being no semantic variation in them. In some localities, inhabited by different communities, the use of one variant may be current in the community and of the other in the other community. In general, the term *bājyu* is considered to be somewhat rustic and *bābu* highly cultured or sophisticated. In fact, these two sets of terms have developed a cleavage in their use and the resultant attitude is emergence of a dual behaviour among socially conscious speakers, using the former form in their local social environments, both as a term of reference or address, and the latter in a formal situation. Infact, such a speaker, out of social fear of being branded as backward or of being detected of his social status, deliberately avoids the use of this term and switches over to other terms having higher social value. But till recently in the highly stratified Kumauni society the use of terms, prevalent among high class speakers, by the speakers belonging to lower strata of society was frowned at and they were snubbed for such a linguistic behaviour. But now though the situation is no more there, yet the sense of linguistic superiority, so deeply instilled among certain classes, is still hurt by this liberty of speech behaviour, gaining currency among all classes of speakers.

It has been noticed that in urban educational institutions, sometimes, the students coming from backward areas or from the lower strata of the populace are ridiculed for using such forms of kinship terms as are considered rustic by the children coming from urbanized areas or middle class families or high caste families. But on account of all round social awakening a fast change in conventional linguistic behaviour too, is taking place along with the change in the social set up of this tradition ridden Kumauni society,

There is one more reference term, viz. *bab*, for 'father', but it carries a derogatory and entemptuous connotation and is never used by one's own children either as a term of reference or term of address. Its use as a term of reference is attested only either in a speech situation in which the speaker suffers from the complex of social superiority and nourishes an attitude of inferiority towards the person in question, e.g. a Brahman/Rajput speaking to a low caste interlocutor (as in '*tyar bab kan cha?*' where is your father?) or in a rural setting in which both the addressee and his father, who is being referred to, are younger enough in age and inferior



in kin relationship from the addresser (e.g. a grand-father speaking to his grandson, or an elder uncle speaking to his nephew) or in a mental state of anger, displeasure or disgust or in the situation of cursing, abusing etc. This term has been borrowed from Urdu and is normally used by officials while eliciting information about parentage, i.e. father's name. Till recently the use of the term *maibab* for a govt. official was very common and in certain areas it still lingers on. Some times it is also used by an addresser belonging to lower strata of society while addressing to a person belonging to a higher strata of society, particularly while seeking some favour from him. Infact, this is a legacy of Muslim rule in India and Kumauni inherited it from that culture sometime in the past. The compounded term *maibab* is also used with reference to God or the Supreme power, as in *isbvara ! tumi myar mai bab cha* (O God you are my mother and father).

Socio-linguistically, in Kumauni, the terms *bojyu* or *bābā/bābu*, normally, carry a semantic load of affection, love, familiarly and homely feeling and the *bāb*, a semantic load of displeasure, contempt and inferiority, and the term *bājyu* is associated with social backwardness and rusticity. A shortened term *bā*, as a term of address also is attested in certain linguistic communities. Although Kumauni has borrowed and is fastly borrowing kinship terms from its neighbouring language Hindi, yet so far the Hindi term for father, viz. *pitā*, has not found any favour with Kumauni speakers, urban or rural, either as a term of reference or address, except in official documents.

**Mother :** For mother the universal term in Kumauni is *ijā* or its phonetic variant *ij*. In western Kumauni, which shares many linguistic features with Garhwali, the borrowed term *mā* is also current, but the native Kumauni term *ijā* too, is commonly understood and sparingly used. The term *ijā* as a term of reference is used by all strata of Kumauni speakers, irrespective of their socio-cultural background. A peculiar feature of this term in Kumauni is this that, like Hindi term *mātā ji* it has never been generalised, i.e. it is never used for any woman other than one's own mother. Moreover, the Hindi term, *mātā* has a different semantic connotation in this language. There it denoted the sense of a 'mendicant woman'.

The term *mE*, developed from *māi* and used as a term of reference only, is an impolite term and is used in a social context in which the addresser belongs to a superior class or higher status and the addressee to a lower class and inferior status. Thus the

socio-linguistic distinction between the term *ijā* and *mE* is this that the term *ijā* is a reverential term and can be, unreservedly, used in all linguistic situations by all classes of speakers, but the use of the term *mE* is somewhat contemptuous and its use is restricted to a linguistic situation in which the addressee belongs to a lower status and inferior class than the addresser, as such it can never be used with reference to an addressee belonging to a higher status or socio-economically superior class. Further, the term *ijā* is used as a term of address or as a term of interjection, endearment and exclamation indicating the sense of compassion, pain, agony, surprise etc., but not the term *mE*. On the other hand, in an extended use of this kin term, when compounded with the term *bāb* 'father', it is the variant *mE* which is used not the term *ijā*. For instance, humble rural folk usually use the term *māi bāb* for a person holding socio-economically higher position, to seek some favour from him. In such a context, infact, it conveys the sense of 'lordship' with reference to addressee and a sense of submission with reference to the addresser.

#### Consanguinal Kins of Parental Group

Reference terms for consanguinal kins of parental group are identical with kinship terms. The term of reference for father's elder brother is *ṭhul bābu*/*ṭhulbā*/*jyaṭh bābu*/*jeṭhbā tāu*, further qualified by terms *ṭhul*/*jyaṭh* (eldest), *majil* (medial) and *nān* (younger), if their number is more than one. The term *ṭhulbā* and *jyaṭhbā* (local variations) are the original kin terms of Kumauni, denoting the sense of 'big father' and 'elder father' respectively. The term *tāu* is a recent borrowing from Hindi and is restricted to urbanized speakers only. Similarly, the terms for FeBW are *ṭhulijā* < *ṭhuli* + *ijā* (=elder mother), *jeṭjā* < *jeṭhi* + *ijā* (=elder mother) and *tāi* with the same setting. In these cases the term of address is identical with terms of reference.

The term for FyB is *kākā* which is further qualified as *ṭhul* (eldest), *mejil* (medial) and *nān* (younger), if the number is more than one, there being no local or social variation of this term. The term for FyBW is *kāki* further qualified according to the grade of her husband. The Hindi term *chāchā* and *chāchi* have yet to make an entrance in the domain of kinship terminology of Kumauni. These, terms have no variation and are used as terms of address in all settings.

Linguistically, in the above references a notable point is this that if the speaker is the nephew/neice than the term for male



relations is used always in plural and for female in singular, but if the speaker is somebody else and the addressee is the nephew/niece than these terms are to be used in accordance with the kinship relation the speaker has with the person in reference.

The kin/reference term for father's sister, younger or elder, is *bubu* or *pushyān* (local variants). Socially, though she commands a high respect from her brother's sons and daughters yet, linguistically, the case is not so, she is referred to or addressee in non-honorific terms.

### Affinal Kins of Parents Group:

Parents of the spouses are the kins who belong to this category. In a family circle, the term for HF or for persons of his category is *š aure*, further qualified by terms like *ṭhul/jyaṭh*, *majil*, *nān* according the order of brothers in that group. A variant form of it is *šaurjyu* which is considered to be more polite and reverential. There if the speaker is the wife of the son than both these terms are used in the plural, but in case the speaker is some one else than the term may be used according to the kinship or social relationship of the speaker with the person in question.

The Kinship term for HM is *šāsu* and for her the term of reference, too, is identical with it, but while introducing her to some one the daughter-in-law may refer to her as her *iyu* which is identical with the term of address. As a mother-in-law she commands a venerable position therefore, this term is always used in the plural. But on the other hand a male ego never uses the term *jyu* for his mother-in-law (WM), either as a term of reference or a term of address. She is invariably referred and addressed a *šāsu* by her son-in-law.

**General Term for Offsprings:** The general term for children, in Kumaunī, is *nān-tin*, *cyal-cyeli*, *bāl-bace*. Out of these the compounded terms *nān-tin*, and *bāl-bace* are general terms and *cyal-cyeli* have both a specific and general connotation. The components of this term can be used combinedly and independently. Combinedly these denote the sense of children in general and separately the sense of boy (*cyalo*) and girl (*cyeli*). In this form these can be used as a term of reference and address for 'son' and 'daughter' with reference to one's own offsprings and the terms *nāno* (male child) and *nāni* (female child) are areal variants of the first component of the term *nān-tin*. The written form of which is *nānā-tinā*. In this the first component *nānā* can be used singly as term of reference only in the general sense of 'children',

but not *tinā*. The second component is neither used independently nor there is any variant of it. The term *bāl – baccā* is a borrowed term from Hindi and has not fully penetrated in the interiors of Kumauni, and has yet to make a place for itself in the kinship terminology of Kumauni. In its limited use, too, it is only the second component of it that can be used singly as term of reference to denote the general sense of children, but in no form it is used as a term of address.

The reference term for Be/yZ (male ego) and HBZ is *Bhatijo* and for his daughter is *bhatiji*. These terms have no variation whatsoever and are used unrestrictedly in all social and linguistic contexts. In the context of address these are treated at par with ones awon children. But in case of a female ego the term for BZ is *bhadyo* and his daughter *bhadye* and in the context of address these are treated at par with younger brothers and younger sisters.

### Siblings

The term for 'brother and sister' is *bhE-bEni* which is general as well as specific. In its general conotation it conveys the sense of 'brothers and sisters from the same parentage' and in particular *bhE* means 'younger brother' and *bEni* means 'younger sister'. For instance, in a linguistic discourse *Katuk bhE bEni chā tum?* (How many brothers and sisters are you?), it has its general meaning and in a context *yo myar bhE cha* (this fellow is my younger brother) or *yo meri bEni cha?* (She is my younger sister) or addressing a boy as *bhayā/bhulā* or a girl as *bEni/bhuli* it specifically denotes the kinship of 'younger brother' and 'younger sister', for there being specific terms for 'elder brother' (*dādā*) and 'elder sister' (*didi*) in this language. To differentiate different categories of brothers and sisters, i.e., real, parallel and cross cousins, modifying terms *šākE/šagE* (real), *Kakbarak* (paternal), *mampuši* (mother's brother's and father's sister's), etc. are prefixed, as reference terms only. The terms *bhulā* (brother) and *bhuli* (sister), the regional variants of *bhE-bEni*, are used in the linguistic areas of western Kumauni, contiguous to Garhwali.

The terms *bEni* (younger sister) and *didi* (elder sister) in a polygamous setting, besides the above, are also used as terms of address for younger and elder co-wives or for husband's younger and elder brother's wives respectively.

### Specific Terms for Siblings

**Younger Brother/Sister:** Kin terms for a younger brother are *boE/bhulā* and for younger sister *bEni/bhuli*. These are few of



Kumauni kinship terms the use of which, as a term of reference and address, is extended to several kin types, and also to non-kins. As a term of address these are frequently used by a female ego for her brother's children or to any kin or non-kin falling in the category of age group of one's brothers and sisters, though in such a situation the addressee may not reciprocate the addresser with the elder sibling term (male/female). Infact, it is a polite generalised term that can, conveniently be used as a term of address even to a non-kin who is younger in age to the speaker. In a rural setting the use of these kin terms, viz. *bhaya/bhulā*, *dadā*, *didī*, *bhulī*, *bEnī* is quite frequent among middle class Brahmans and Rajputs but restricted with reference to lower caste interlocutors. Outside the family these terms are also used, as terms of address, with reference to HSH or his brothers if younger to the speaker. But within the family the use of these kin terms as terms of address is not favoured. It is only in some emotional contexts that these terms find a place as a term of address, otherwise in normal course of speech they are addressed by their first name.

**Elder Brother :** The kin term for elder brother *dadā* or *dājyu* (a polite term). But as address term there is a shortened term *dā* which can be used singly or in compound with the first name of the addressee, if he is a distant kin or non-kin. Incase of a real elder brother the use of his first name is avoided. Among affinal kins this term as a term of reference and address is used for all cross cousins when older in age to the speaker. Besides, it is also used as a term of address by a female ego for her HSH and his brothers if he is elder to her. Historically, this may be a legacy of exchange marriage system prevalent in Kumauni society. But when used for a non-kin then, usually, its shortened form is appended to the first name of the addressee. In spite of its liberal use for kins or non-kins, the conservative Kumauni society does not favour its use with reference to a low caste addressee. In the past a low caste speaker could not dare address his high caste brother as *dadā*, *dājyu* or *bhayā*. Similarly, the Brahmans belonging to the preislamic class also do not like to be addressed in kin terms.

**Elder Sister :** The single term for elder sister is *didī*. It is perhaps the only kin term which has no caste or areal variant. Its extension both as a term of reference and address is very wide. It is equally current in Garhwali and Nepali, the other two constituents of Central Pahari.

In a social context the use and function of this term is, more or less, similar to that of the term *dādā* (eB). Outside the consanguinal kin, it is used both as a term of reference and address for HeBW and WeBW, if elder in age than the Ego, or for older co-wife. To address the wife of one's WeBW as sister also confirms the prevalence of the exchange marriage system in Kumauni kinship organization. Within the family circle, usually, kin terms standing for brother (including brother-in-law) and sister (including sister-in-law), or sons and daughters are distinguished by qualifying terms such as *ṭhulo/ṭhuli* or *jeṭho/jeṭhi* (eldest), *majilo/majili* (medial), *nāno/nāni* or *Kānsho/kānshi* (younger). With reference to brothers and sisters, these terms are used by an Ego for his/her elder kins only not for younger kins, e.g. *ṭhulo dādā* (eldest brother), *majilo dādā* (next to eldest brother), *nāno dādā* (immediately elder to the Ego) and so on, but with reference to one's offsprings these terms denote the eldest, medial and the youngest of all issues.

It certain social settings an honorific marker, viz. *jyu* as a mark of respect, sophistication or politeness is appended to the term of reference and address with reference to senior kins, consequently terms like *baujyu* < *bābu jyu* (father), *dājyu* < *dādā jyu* (elder brother), *kākjyu* < *kākā iyū* (younger uncle), *mām jyu* < *māmā jyū* (maternal uncle), *mjēyee* < *māmāi + jyū* (maternal aunt) etc.

#### Grand Parents and Grand Children :

The Kin term or a reference term for a grand father, both paternal or maternal, is *bubu/barbājyu* (local and social variants) and for grand-mother, both paternal and maternal, is *āmā* (having no variant whatsoever). Linguistically, the term for grand father is used in honorific plural and for grand mother in non-honorific singular. All the kins belonging to this category are referred to in these very terms.

The terms for grand children are *nāti* for son's son/daughter's son and *nātini* for son's daughter and daughter's daughter. All the kins belonging to their category are referred to and addressed with these very terms, there being no variation whatsoever, in this respect.

#### Social preferences in paired terms

A linguistic analysis of kin terms used in pairs or compounded forms is an indicator of the sex based attitude of social superiority in Kumauni, otherwise belonging to the same kin category, i.e. in some cases one finds that the kinship term standing for the male member precedes the term standing for the female



member and in others just reverse is the case. For instance, in terms *bhE-bEni* (brother and sister), *daā-boji* (elder brother and elder sister-in-law), *kak-kaki* (younger uncle and his wife) etc. The preference for the term for male over the term for female shows the social importance and superiority of a male in this social set up. But on the other hand one finds that in terms like *mE-bāb / ij-bāb* (mother and father), *śaśu-śaur* (mother-in-law and father-in-law), *āmā-bubu* (grand-mother) and grand-gather) *saini-mainsh* (wife and husband), even *jwekhasam* (wife and husband in a pejorative sense), the female partner takes precedence over the male partner. This may, perhaps, be a part of legacy that Kumauni, like many other Indo-Aryan languages, inherited from ancient Indian culture.

**Colophone:** The author partly stands indebted to S. Suseendrarajah for the inspiration that he got from his paper on 'Kinship terms in Jaffna Society' published in the IJDL, Vol. XII No. 1.

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## REVIEW

**THE SYNTAX OF WORDS,** Elisabeth O. Selkirk,  
The MIT Press, Massachusetts, U. S. A 1982, pp. 8+136.

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The study of word in the language has always poised a challenge to scholars. We have enough evidence of the efforts made by different scholars at different times. But they could not reach to any acceptable (universal) principle which could serve as a tool for the study of word in the language. Ancient Indian Scholars had also carefully attempted this problem from different angles but they could not proceed beyond to a close limit. It is, therefore, philosophically said there 'anadi nidhanam brahma shabda tatwa...'

After the development of various linguistic theories for language analysis scholars have been tempted to touch upon the problem of word. There have always been good arguments among the scholars whether word should be accepted as a separate level of analysis and it has some individual function in the language or it should be accepted as a part of syntax.

The present monograph 'The Syntax of Words' by Elisabeth O. Selkirk is the seventh in the series of Linguistic Inquiry Monographs. This book in fact was originally a part of author's forthcoming book 'Phonology and Syntax: The relation between Sound and Structure'. But due to some reasons the author felt to publish it separately in the form of a book. The book includes three long chapters alongwith a small preface and a series foreword by the general editor. Notes and references are included at the end of the chapters.

Most of the linguists have classified word study under morphology and several approaches have been applied to analyse the complexities of word. Within the framework of generative



grammar several scholars from Lees (1960) to Williams (1981) have attempted to uncover the mysteries of word but the 'conclusion that words with derivational morphology and compound words are not formed by syntactic transformation is taken as a point of departure' by the author in this book. In the section 'A context - free Grammar for Words' of the first chapter the author has maintained that English words are generated only by a context-free system and rejected the doubts raised by Roeper and Siegel (1978) in their paper. She has, on the other hand, defended the views of some earlier scholars, that a context-free rewriting system by itself is capable of generating all the words of a language. Further, she has proposed an X-theory in Word-syntax which is designed on the mathematical presentation. The notion of her presentation is almost the same as done by Chomsky (1970), Bresnan (1976) etc. for S-structure. Here the author has developed the notion successfully and given a well-knit foundation for understanding her proposed view on word structure.

In spite of using syntactic idioms for word study the author is very clear about the place of word in the grammar. Morphology, the author has emphasized, differs and has separate rules from syntax. She has rightly pointed out that most of the words we speak and understand have been heard then before, unlike sentences which are for the most part novel to us. Most of the words of the sentences are those which can be listed in the dictionary but sentences are always formed anew. The basic fact of difference between word and sentence is that speakers have knowledge about the actual words of the language but the sentences originate with the situations. Therefore word structure rules cannot be viewed as generating the words anew each time they are used.

The second chapter is dealt with the compounding in the word structure. In this long chapter the main purpose of the author is to focus upon the essential features of word-compounds and to describe their relevance to the theory of word structure. Compound words are formed, e.g. in English, by different ways. Therefore a general X schema for compounding would not adequately cover up all the possibilities of compounding. The author has thus analysed this issue on the basis of headedness of compounds which display the syntactic and semantic characteristics. Other compounds which are not having heads have been treated by a quite general set of rewriting rules. The author has tried to establish the word structure as a separate level and argued contrary to the findings of Roeper and Siegel (1978). In this connection

she has critically examined the observations presented by Roeper and Siegel on verbal compounds. She has found their analysis inconsistent and weak in the theoretical framework. She has pointed out that verbal compounds 'designate a group of compounds classified according to the type of semantic relation that obtains between head and non-head.

The author has exhaustively examined, in this chapter, the findings of Roeper and Siegel (1978) and finally rejected their observations. Here she claims at several occasions that her observations on word-compound are much improved than that of earlier studies connected to it. But it is curious to note that she has not obliged to the readers to make themselves a clear cut differentiation between word and phrase. At several occasions the examples cited for words in the book raise a doubt of being used as phrases also, e. g. 'slum clearance, character assassination trash removal', etc.. In fact if such occurrences be accepted as words (or say compound words) then one may ask what should be the phrase. Ofcourse it is yet to be searched out the limitations of words which has troubled linguists very much. In this chapter the author has shown 'that a compound and its internal constituents are all of the same category level and that this type is the word.' She has argued further that the word structure rules generating compounds are of different types from those generating phrase structure.

In the last chapter 'Affixation' the author has examined the structure of derived and inflected words which are formed with the help of affixation in English. She has tried to focus upon the system of word structure rules which are required for generating the words. Derivational and inflectional affixes in English are found both inside and outside compounds. The author has concluded at a point that affixations and compounding form a part of the same subsystem of grammar.

There have been some debate upon whether inflectional morphology be included along with derivation morphology. It has been assumed in many works, e.g. Chomsky (1970), Siegel (1974) and Aronoff (1976) that inflectional morphology is introduced by syntactic transformations. But here the author of the book has rejected this notion and raised a doubt that 'it is not clear that a principled limit can be drawn between inflection and derivation (p. 69)'. In support to her this stand the author argues that 'deriving inflected form via transformations makes it impossible for a grammar to express real generalizations about their shape (p. 69)'.




In the last chapter the author has proposed that a work structure must include a theory of morphological category types. The author thus includes in such types word, root and affix. She believes that such a theory would be 'richer and powerful' than a theory which might include only one morphological category type, i.e. word.

The book is a good research work and the author has made a sincere effort to her study. The work is academically rich and gives a thoughtful material to researcher in morphology and syntax. The presentation of arguments are powerful and fully supported by logical examples. I believe scholars would welcome it.

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
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
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